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PRICE THEORY, COMPETITION, AND 
THE RULE OF REASON 
Alan J. Meese* 
Challenging traditional antitrust jurisprudence, Professor Alan 
J. Meese argues that the present structure of Rule of Reason analysis, 
applied pursuant to Standard Oil v. United States, has become out-
dated. The Rule of Reason as currently applied by the courts rests 
upon neoclassical price theory, an economic paradigm that assumes 
that legitimate competition consists of unbridled technological rivalry, 
unconstrained by nonstandard contracts. Recently, however, the Su-
preme Court has begun to apply a competing paradigm- Transaction 
Cost Economics-when determining whether a contract is unreason-
able "per se" or instead deserving of Rule of Reason scrutiny. Pro-
fessor Meese argues that Transaction Cost Economics more accu-
rately reflects market realities with the result that courts should also 
apply the teachings of this new paradigm when conducting Rule of 
Reason analysis. 
Accordingly, Professor Meese concludes that courts should 
abandon the current three-part Rule of Reason inquiry in those cases 
where nonstandard contracts avoid per se treatment because they 
plausibly produce nontechnological efficiencies by overcoming a 
market failure. In such cases, proof that a contract results in prices or 
other terms of trade different from those that preexist a restraint 
should not suffice to establish a prima facie case. Further, proof that 
contractual integration combats a market failure should, in any event, 
rebut a prima facie case, eliminating the need for courts to balance 
"anticompetitive harms" against procompetitive benefits. Finally, be-
cause the less restrictive alternative element of Rule of Reason analy-
sis rests upon an assumption that any benefits of a nonstandard con-
tract coexist with procompetitive effects, courts should abandon this 
element when analyzing restraints that purportedly combat market 
failure. 
* Ball Professor of Law, William and Mary School of Law. J.D., The University of Chicago; A.B., 
The College of William and Mary. 
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Everyone knows that antitrust law should protect and further "com-
petition." But what exactly is competition? A grocer might "compete" by 
falsely claiming that her rival is selling poisoned beef or by falsely claiming 
that her own beef is more nutritious. She might also price below her own 
costs or those of her rival, driving him out of business and taking over the 
market, at least for a time. A firm that makes film might compete against 
its rivals by inventing a better film or by redesigning a popular camera to 
use only its brand of film, expanding its own market share as a result. 
While each of these practices is competitive in one sense, any rational 
society should distinguish among them. All would applaud the invention 
of a new film, but most would agree that slander and false advertising are 
not competition in any sense that society wishes to embrace. The distinc-
tion between these practices could rest on some abstract conception of {le-
gitimate) competition. Most, however, would adopt a more instrumental 
definition, distinguishing among various practices based upon their per-
ceived social utility. Such an approach would treat as competitive any 
practice that, under the circumstances, would seem to further society's wel-
fare when compared to the status quo. 
If competition, however defined, is our desideratum, then it might 
seem that its antithesis, "cooperation," is a bad thing. Not so fast. To be 
sure, Ford and General Motors should not cooperate when setting prices. 
But what if the same two firms merge, eliminating competition between 
them while at the same time realizing significant economies of scale that 
enhance the new firm's ability to compete in the larger marketplace? 
Similarly, two or more employers should not cooperate when setting the 
wages of their respective employees. However, what if a college sports 
league adopts a rule forbidding members to pay their "student-athletes" 
more than tuition plus room and board, claiming that the policy prevents 
"college" football from deteriorating into semi-pro football? 1 Finally, gro-
cers should not divide territories among themselves. Nevertheless, what if 
dozens of small grocers pool their resources to form a joint venture that 
develops a private label brand and assigns each member a particular terri-
tory in which it will have the exclusive right-and thus powerful incen-
tives-to promote and sell the brand?2 
As each of these examples should show, socially useful competition 
often requires some cooperation, cooperation that reduces or even elimi-
nates rivalry between the cooperating parties. Indeed, when we speak of 
"a firm" engaged in "unilateral" activities, we are almost always referring 
to what economists call a "nexus of contracts" between employees, man-
agers, and suppliers of capital, contracts that snuff out competition be-
tween the parties to them. {Partners at large law firms do not bid against 
each other for the labor of associates.) If society defines as competitive all 
marketplace activity that enhances its welfare, then many forms of coop-
1. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
2. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
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eration, even those that eliminate competition between cooperating par-
ties, are competitive in the sense that is relevant for antitrust purposes. 
A society that seeks to encourage useful competition must construct 
an institutional framework that channels individual initiative in competi-
tive directions.3 Thus, society must prevent those unilateral acts, like slan-
der, that reduce welfare. It must also enforce those contracts that imple-
ment useful cooperation. Finally, it must forbid those agreements that 
entail "undue" or "harmful" cooperation and thereby undermine society's 
welfare.4 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which forbids contracts "in restraint of 
trade," polices the line between acceptable ("competitive") and unaccept-
able ("anticompetitive") cooperation.5 Like "competition," the term "re-
straint of trade" does not define itself; all contracts, like all cooperation, 
restrain trade or competition in some sense. For nearly a century, then, 
courts have expressly held that the Sherman Act forbids only unreasonable 
restraints, usually purporting to judge "reasonableness" according to eco-
nomic effect.6 In modern parlance, courts applying this "Rule of Reason" 
ask whether a contract "promotes" competition or, instead, "destroys" it, 
by creating or exercising market power.7 
Some contracts are so plainly harmful that courts condemn them with 
little analysis, deeming them "unreasonable per se."8 Most contracts sur-
vive such condemnation, however, and undergo more careful scrutiny, un-
der what courts (redundantly) call "the Rule of Reason."9 Courts, schol-
ars, and the enforcement agencies have articulated a three-step test to 
govern analysis under this Rule of Reason. First, a plaintiff must establish 
a prima facie case by showing that the restraint produces tangible anti-
competitive harm, a showing that usually consists of proof of "actual det-
rimental effects" such as increased price or reduced output.10 Second, the 
defendants must prove that their agreement produces "procompetitive" 
benefits that outweigh the harm implicit in plaintiff's prima facie caseY 
Third, even if the defendants can make such a showing, the plaintiff can 
still prevail by proving that the defendants can achieve the same benefits 
3. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, "Free" Enterprise and Competitive Order, in INDIVIDUALISM AND 
ECONOMIC ORDER 107, 110--14 (Henry Regnery 1972} (1948); see also Ronald H. Coase, The Institutional 
Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REv. 713, 717-18 (1992} (showing that the background structure 
of legal entitlements can affect the nature of economic activity and thus the allocation of resources). 
4. See Hayek, supra note 3, at 115 ("We cannot regard 'freedom of contract' as a real answer to 
our problems if we know that not all contracts ought to be made enforceable and in fact are bound to ar-
gue that contracts 'in restraint of trade' ought not be enforced."}. 
5. Section 2, by contrast, polices unilateral acts. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube 
Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-69 (1984) (explaining the respective domains of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act). 
6. See infra note 31 and accompanying text. 
7. See infra notes 32-44 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra notes 104-51 and accompanying text. 
11. See infra notes 151-66 and accompanying text. 
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by means of a "less restrictive altemative."12 This three-part test, it is said, 
helps courts distinguish those contracts that harm or destroy competition, 
by creating or exercising market power, from those that promote it. 
This article offers a critique of the modem Rule of Reason and the 
vision of competition on which it depends. As shown below, the present 
structure of Rule of Reason analysis, as articulated by courts, the enforce-
ment agencies, and most leading scholars, rests on an outmoded model of 
competition and is thus inherently biased against contractual integration 
that produces nontechnological efficiencies. More precisely, the modem 
structure of Rule of Reason analysis rests upon a vision of competition de-
rived from neoclassical price theory, the economic paradigm that domi-
nated industrial organization for much of the twentieth century. Accord-
ing to this paradigm, competition consists of constant technological rivalry 
between autonomous firms, unconstrained by so-called nonstandard con-
tracts; that is, agreements that constrain the discretion of purchasers and 
competitorsY This rivalry, it is said, results in an equilibrium of competi-
tive prices, output, and other terms of trade, an equilibrium that maximizes 
social welfare.14 Within this paradigm, any contractual arrangement that 
produces output, prices, or other terms of trade that depart from the com-
petitive baseline is prima facie anticompetitive and properly subject to 
condemnation absent concrete proof of some justification that outweighs 
the harmY 
Price theory's definition of competition drives each aspect of the 
modem Rule of Reason described above. For instance, decisions allowing 
plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case by proving "actual detrimental ef-
fects" rest upon a presumption that any departure from the prices or other 
terms of trade produced by technological rivalry reflects an anticompeti-
tive exercise of market power.16 Similarly, the requirement that procom-
petitive benefits offset or outweigh anticompetitive effects by reducing 
prices or preventing their increase rests upon price theory's partial equilib-
rium trade-off model and its assumption that any benefits resulting from a 
contract or transaction coexist with anticompetitive effects reflected in a 
prima facie case.17 Given this assumption, courts naturally conclude that 
any benefits produced by such a contract coexist with anticompetitive 
harm, harm that courts must balance against benefits.18 Indeed, the same 
assumption, i.e., that benefits necessarily coexist with anticompetitive 
harm, drives the requirement that, where possible, defendants achieve any 
procompetitive benefits through means less restrictive of competition.19 
12. See infra notes 167-80 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra note 242 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra note 225 and accompanying text. 
15. See infra note 2% and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 156--66 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra note 243 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra notes 155-{)6 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text. 
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Each of the price-theoretic assumptions animating the current struc-
ture of Rule of Reason analysis is inconsistent with recent advances in 
economic theory, in particular, transaction cost economics (TCE). Ac-
cording to TCE, technological rivalry unconstrained by nonstandard con-
tracts can produce suboptimal results, as firms and consumers struggle to 
overcome various costs of transacting in an atomistic market.20 As a result, 
the transaction cost paradigm assumes that nonstandard contracts are pre-
sumptively efforts to overcome these costs, thus better serving consumers 
and society at large.21 On the other hand, price-theoretic competition-
technological rivalry unconstrained by nonstandard contracts-will often 
result in a market failure, that is, output, price, and other terms of trade 
different from those desired by consumers and society at large.22 Properly 
understood, then, competition can take a contractual form and includes 
most such restraints, which need not involve or create market power but 
instead help firms and consumers better approximate the output, price, 
and other terms of trade that a well-functioning market would produce.23 
Of course, TCE is not new to antitrust. In recent decades, the Su-
preme Court has often embraced TCE when determining whether or not a 
contract is unlawful per se.24 Applying TCE, the Court has held that cer-
tain contracts once deemed unlawful per se may in fact attenuate or over-
come market failure with the result that courts should evaluate such 
agreements under the more forgiving Rule of Reason.25 Such decisions 
implicitly recognize that contracts producing price, output, or other terms 
of trade different from the status quo ante can be beneficial, and there is 
no reason to confine this reasoning to decisions policing the boundaries of 
the per se rule. 
TCE and its vision of "contractual competition" undermine each of 
the three main aspects of the Rule of Reason described above. To begin 
with, application of transaction cost reasoning refutes those decisions and 
enforcement policies holding that proof of actual detrimental effects suf-
fices to establish a prima facie case. To be precise, where defendants avoid 
per se condemnation by arguing plausibly that a restraint overcomes mar-
ket failure, proof that the agreement results in price, output, or other terms 
of trade that depart from those produced by price-theoretic competition 
should not give rise to a presumption that the restraint reflects any exer-
cise of market power. Instead, such proof is at least equally consistent with 
a conclusion that the agreement is a form of contractual competition that 
overcomes market failure and thus enhances social welfare. Therefore, 
such proof should not give rise to a prima facie case under the Rule of 
Reason. By adopting a contrary approach, the Supreme Court, lower 
20. See infra note 316 and accompanying text. 
21. See infra note 310 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra note 327 and accompanying text. 
23. See infra notes 329-32 and accompanying text. 
24. See infra notes 340-55 and accompanying text. 
25. See infra notes 340-55 and accompanying text. 
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courts, and the enforcement agencies have clung to an outmoded vision of 
competition inconsistent with the more modem vision they have often 
embraced in the per se context. 
TCE also undermines the standards courts currently employ to 
evaluate justifications defendants offer for nonstandard contractual inte-
gration that is prima facie anticompetitive. Market failure often produces 
price, output, or quality that departs from the optimal level. Nonstandard 
contracts can combat market failure and enhance social welfare precisely 
because they alter the terms of trade produced by an unrestrained market. 
Thus, proof that a nonstandard contract produces benefits otherwise 
deemed cognizable under the Rule of Reason suggests that any increase in 
prices, for instance, reflects the procompetitive elimination of market fail-
ure. Such an increase need not reflect an exercise of market power, with 
the result that there are no harms to balance against benefits. As a result, 
proof that a contractual restraint produces nontechnological benefits by 
eliminating a market failure should rebut a prima facie case, regardless of 
whether this proof tends to show that the agreement reduces prices. 
At the same time, courts and enforcement agencies should abandon 
their consideration of so-called less restrictive alternatives when conduct-
ing Rule of Reason analysis of nonstandard contracts that plausibly coun-
teract market failures. Consideration of such alternatives depends upon 
an assumption that procompetitive benefits necessarily coexist with anti-
competitive effects once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case. Be-
cause such effects coexist, it is said, antitrust law should encourage defen-
dants to adopt restraints that achieve the same benefits while harming 
competition less.26 Once the defendants show that a restraint attenuates a 
market failure, however, any presumption of anticompetitive effects 
should collapse, undermining any assertion that harms and benefits coexist 
and that defendants should achieve benefits through a less anticompetitive 
method. 
Part I of this article examines the normative and jurisprudential 
foundations of the Rule of Reason, showing that the rule requires courts to 
employ the best available economic theory to determine whether a chal-
lenged contract advances consumer welfare or instead harms consumers by 
creating or exercising market power. Part II reviews the standards that 
courts and the enforcement agencies apply when conducting analysis un-
der the Rule of Reason, standards that leading scholars have also em-
braced. Part III outlines the competing models of competition that price 
theory and TCE have produced as well as the influence of these respective 
models on antitrust doctrine. Part IV argues that the current structure of 
Rule of Reason analysis reflects the outmoded price-theoretic vision of 
competition. While the current structure of Rule of Reason analysis may 
make sense as applied to restraints that plausibly create technological effi-
26. See infra notes 167--SO and accompanying text. 
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ciencies, such an approach is unduly biased against nonstandard agree-
ments that may overcome market failures. 
I. THE RULE OF REASON 
A. Normative Foundations-Preventing Monopoly or Its Consequences 
The language of the Sherman Act seems straightforward, banning 
"restraint of trade or commerce among the several states.'m The statute's 
plain language would seem to call into question any contract with an inter-
state nexus.28 All contracts, it seems, "restrain trade," that is, alter com-
merce from the course it would otherwise take. Nonetheless, as Justice 
Holmes told us, economic progress requires cooperation, and the power to 
regulate commerce does not include the power to "disintegrate society ... 
into individual atoms.''29 From the very beginning, then, the Supreme 
Court engrafted upon the statute a "reasonable construction," thus avoid-
ing assertions that the Act outlaws ordinary and useful contracts, which at 
the time found shelter in liberty of contract.30 In so doing, the Court made 
it plain that agreements that actually promote commerce are outside the 
Act's scope, even if such contracts "indirectly" restrain interstate trade or 
even (indirectly) increase "the cost of conducting an interstate business.''31 
27. 15 u.s.c. § 1 (2001). 
28. 7 PHILIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 'JI 1501 (1986); see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the 
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984) (noting that every contract "restrains trade" in some sense). 
29. SeeN. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 411 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I am happy 
to know that only a minority of my brethren adopt an interpretation of the law which in my opinion 
would make eternal the bellum omnium contra omnes and disintegrate society so far as it could into indi-
vidual atoms. If this were [Congress's] intent I should regard calling such a law a regulation of commerce 
as a mere pretense. It would be an attempt to reconstruct society."); see also Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest 
City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.) ("The war of all against all is not a 
good model for any economy. Antitrust law is designed to ensure an appropriate blend of cooperation 
and competition, not to require all economic actors to compete full tilt at every moment."). 
30. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (noting that liberty of con-
tract does not protect the sort of direct restraints of interstate trade forbidden by the Sherman Act); id. at 
235-38 (finding restraint in question "direct" because it raised prices above the level "competition" would 
produce); United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898) ("[T]he act of Congress must 
have a reasonable construction, or else there would scarcely be an agreement or contract among business 
men that could not be said to have, indirectly or remotely, some bearing upon interstate commerce, and 
possibly to restrain it." (quoting Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 600 (1898))); id. at 567-68 
(Sherman Act does not outlaw "ordinary contracts and combinations" protected by liberty of contract); 
see also MARTIN 1. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCfiON OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM 105-17 
(1988) (Congress rejected proposals to ban all contracts limiting "free competition" because of constitu-
tional concerns); Alan J. Meese, Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative Era, 79 B.U. L. REv. 1 (1999) (not-
ing that state and federal formative era decisions construed the Sherman Act to avoid interference with 
liberty of contract). 
31. Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. at 568 ("[T]he statute applies only to those contracts whose direct 
and immediate effect is a restraint upon interstate commerce· ... to treat the act as condemning all agree-
ments under which, as a result, the cost of conducting an interstate commercial business may be increased, 
would enlarge the application of the act far beyond the fair meaning of the language used."); Hopkins, 
171 U.S. at 592--{i()() (same); Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604, 615-19 (1898) (finding contract that 
affects interstate trade incidentally or indirectly not a violation of the Act); see also United States v. Ad-
dyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271,282-83 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft, J.) (stating that the Sherman Act does not 
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Thus, the Court said, the Act only banned contracts that restrained 
trade-and thus increased prices-directly, that is, without connection to 
any main, lawful purpose.32 Such contracts were, of course, beyond the 
protection of liberty of contract.33 
Since 1911, the approach taken in these early cases has found expres-
sion in the Rule of Reason announced in Standard Oil Co. v. United 
States. 34 There, the Court confirmed that the Sherman Act, like the com-
mon law before it, served to promote the right to contract, not to smash 
it.35 To be sure, commercial contracts would limit the freedom of action of 
the parties to them and thus in some sense restrain competition and 
proscribe partial restraints that are ancillary to a legitimate undertaking), affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); 
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 316-42 (1897). 
32. See Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 235-38 (finding naked horizontal price fixing a "direct" restraint 
of trade because it drove prices above a reasonable level); Joint- Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. at 566-68; Hop-
kins, 171 U.S. at 592...QOO; Anderson, 171 U.S. at 615-19 (holding that agreement was not a restraint of 
trade within the meaning of the Act where it did not "meddle with prices" and thus "lacked every ingre-
dient of monopoly" but was instead designed to "regulat[e] the transaction of business in which the par-
ties to the business were engaged"); see also Nat'! Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115, 128-30 (1905) 
(stating that liberty of contract does not prevent states from banning monopolistic combinations). 
33. See BARRY CusHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT 142-49 (1998) (explaining that 
Commerce Oause jurisprudence of the period equated intrastate activities that affected interstate com-
merce "directly" with businesses "affected with a public interest" and thus subject to price regulation un-
der then-prevailing applications of "substantive due process"); Meese, supra note 30, at 65-67 (concluding 
that formative era courts defined as "direct" those restraints that exercised market power without coun-
tervailing benefits and thus fell outside the protection of liberty of contract). See generally Munn v. llli-
nois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877). 
34. 221 U.S. 1 (1911); see also United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911) (reaffirming 
and elaborating Standard Oil's Rule of Reason). 
35. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 60 (finding that the Sherman Act "evidenced the intent not tore-
strain the right to make and enforce contracts, ... which did not unduly restrain interstate or foreign 
commerce, but to protect that commerce from being restrained by methods, whether old or new, which 
would constitute an interference that is an undue restraint"); Am Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. at 180 (noting 
that the Standard Oil Court exercised "the duty to interpret, which inevitably arose from the general 
character of the term restraint of trade, [which) required that the words restraint of trade should be given 
a meaning which would not destroy the individual right to contract and render difficult, if not impossible, 
any movement of trade in the channels of interstate commerce"). Scholars who have considered the 
question uniformly agree that the Standard Oil Court construed the Sherman Act in light of liberty of 
contract. See, e.g., RUDOLPH PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA 56-58 (1996) ("The Standard 
Oil (1911) opinion's Rule of Reason can be understood as closing Lochner's circle of individual lib-
erty .... ");SKLAR, supra note 30, at 146-48; Edward Corwin, The Antitrust Acts and the Constitution, 18 
VA. L. REv. 355, 368-70 (1932). It should be noted, however, that some of these same scholars have ar-
gued that Standard Oil constituted a departure from decisions such as Joint- Traffic Ass'n and Trans-
Missouri Freight. See, e.g., PERITZ, supra, at 52-60; Corwin, supra, at 368-70; see also Standard Oil, 221 
U.S. at 83-106 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing strenuously that "Rule of Reason" an-
nounced by Standard Oil was inconsistent with previous case law); David Millon, The Sherman Act and 
the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1219, 1288 n.314 (1988) (arguing that Standard Oil's Rule of 
Reason was a departure from earlier, more "literal" case law). I have argued elsewhere that, in fact, the 
approach taken by Standard Oil is entirely consistent with prior case law, which also construed the 
Sherman Act in light of liberty of contract. See Meese, supra note 30, at 43-67 (concluding that early de-
cisions construed the Sherman Act in light of liberty of contract); see also Oine v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 
U.S. 445, 46()...{)1 (1927) (Taft, C.J.) (stating that Standard Oil simply reaffirmed principles announced in 
Joint-Traffic Ass'n and Addyston Pipe); WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: 
THE EVOU.JTION OF THE SHERMAN LAW 265 (1965) (semble); WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE ANTI-
TRUST ACT ANDTHESUPREMECOURT 89-93 (1914) (same); Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the 
Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 802-05 (1965) (Part I) (same). 
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trade.36 Nonetheless, it was the right to contract, and not regulatory inter-
vention, that would empower firms and individuals to participate in the 
marketplace, preserving meaningful competition and thwarting monopoly 
over the long run.37 As a result, the Court said, the Sherman Act did not 
disturb "normal," "usual," or "ordinary" contracts that "furthered" or "de-
veloped" trade but instead struck only at those "unusual" contracts that 
restrained competition "unduly."38 This distinction between "usual" and 
36. See Stantkrd Oil, 221 U.S. at 63 (arguing that all contracts literally "restrain trade" to some ex-
tent); see also Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (Brandeis, J.) ("But the legality 
of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test, as whether it restrains competi-
tion. Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of 
their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates 
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy compe-
tition."). 
37. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 62 ("[T]he omission of any direct prohibition against monopoly in 
the concrete ... indicates a consciousness that the freedom of the individual right to contract when not 
unduly or improperly exercised was the most efficient means for the prevention of monopoly."); Am To-
bacco Co., 221 U.S. at 180 (stating that failure to construe the Sherman Act in light of liberty of contract 
would "render difficult if not impossible any movement of trade in the channels of interstate commerce"); 
id. at 181 ("[G]iving to the statute a reasonable construction, the words 'restraint of trade' did not em-
brace all those normal and usual contracts essential to individual freedom, and the right to make which 
was necessary in order that the course of trade might be free."); Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. at 566-68 
(stating that the Sherman Act does not ban "ordinary contracts and combinations"); Whitwell v. Cont'l 
Tobacco Co., 125 F. 454, 460-61 (8th Cir. 1903) (Sanborn, J.) ("There is nothing in the [Sherman Act] 
which deprived any of these competitors of these rights [of contract]. If there had been, the law itself 
would have destroyed competition more effectually than any contracts or combinations of persons or of 
corporations could possibly have stifled it. The exercise of these undoubted rights is essential to the very 
existence of free competition, and so long as their exercise by any person or corporation in no way de-
prives competitors of the same rights, or restricts them in the use of these rights, it is difficult to perceive 
how their exercise can constitute any restriction upon competition or any restraint upon interstate 
trade."); see also Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) ("[I]t is that body 
of law [i.e., contract law] that establishes the enforceability of commercial agreements and enables com-
petitive markets-indeed a competitive economy-to function effectively."); Nat'l Cotton Oil Co. v. 
Texas, 197 U.S. 115, 128 (1905) ("[s]ome combination of capital, skill or acts is necessary to any business 
development, and ... the result must inevitably be a cessation of competition."); United States v. Ad-
dyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (1898) (noting that, at common law, "restrictions in the articles of 
partnership upon the business activities of the members ... were to be encouraged'' (emphasis added)), 
affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (Taft, J.). 
38. See Stantkrd Oil, 221 U.S. at 57 (noting that American common law forbade only those re-
straints that "unduly diminished competition"); id. at 58 (stating that American common and statutory 
law forbade only those restraints "unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions"); id. at 62 (remark-
ing that the statute's "purpose was to prevent undue restraints of every kind or nature"); id. at 75-76 
(finding that defendants' methods. of expansion were not "normal" or "usual" and thus constituted undue 
restraints of trade); Am Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. at 179 ("[T]he words 'restraint of trade' at common law 
and in the law of this country at the time of the adoption of the Anti-trust Act only embraced acts or con-
tracts or agreements or combination, which operated to the prejudice of the public interests by unduly 
restricting competition, or unduly obstructing the course of trade .... "); id. (noting that Stantkrd Oil held 
that the "statute did not forbid or restrain the power to make normal and usual contracts to further trade 
by resorting to all normal methods, whether by, agreement or otherwise, to accomplish such purpose"); 
N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 361 (1904) (Brewer, J., concurring) ("Congress did not intend 
to reach and destroy those minor contracts in partial restraint of trade which the long course of decisions 
at common law had affirmed were reasonable and ought to be upheld .... fT]he general language of the 
[A Jet is also limited by the power which each individual has to manage his own property and determine 
the place and manner of its investment. Freedom of action in these respects is among the inalienable 
rights of every citizen."); see also Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 66 (stating that the "Rule of Reason" and "di-
rect or indirect" test articulated in Joint- Traffic Ass'n "come to one and the same thing"); Joint- Traffic 
Ass'n, 171 U.S. at 566-68 (stating that the Sherman Act banned only "direct restraints" and not all con-
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and "unusual" contracts, the Court said, was equivalent to that between 
"direct" and "indirect" restraints it had announced in prior decisions.39 
Whether a particular restraint on competition was undue, the Court 
held, would depend upon an analysis of the character of the agreement or 
the surrounding circumstance of the case.40 Such an analysis did not in-
volve implementation of any abstract, technical conception of competition. 
Unlike modem economists, who view competition as a technical term of 
art, functionally linked to the efficient allocation of resources, the Standard 
Oil Court, like classical economists, equated competition with rivalry, the 
struggle between several firms to realize economic opportunities.41 De-
fined in this way, and thus drained of any economic content, competition 
was not an unalloyed good, as it is for modem economists. When tem-
pered by an appropriate amount of cooperation embodied in an ordinary 
or normal restraint, such rivalry could enhance economic welfare by assur-
ing consumers high quality products at the lowest possible price.42 
tracts "under which, as a result, the cost of conducting an interstate commercial business may be in-
creased"}. 
39. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 66 (concluding that the application of the Rule of Reason pro-
duces the same results as the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" restraints); Am Tobacco Co., 
221 U.S. at 178-79 (stating that Standard Oil announced the Rule of Reason "without departing from any 
previous decision of the court"); see also Cline, 274 U.S. at 461 (same); TAFf, supra note 35, at 89-95 
(same). 
40. [The Sherman Act struck at] all contracts or acts which were unreasonably restrictive of 
competitive conditions, either from the nature or character of the contract or act or where the 
surrounding circumstances were such as to justify the conclusion that they had not been entered 
into or performed with the legitimate purpose of forwarding personal interest and developing 
trade, but on the contrary ... with the intent to do wrong to the general public and to limit the 
right of individuals. 
Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58. 
41. See FRANK M. MACHOVEC, PERFEcr COMPETITION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF Eco. 
NOMICS 96-138 (1995) (examining classical conception of competition); Paul McNulty, Economic The-
ory and the Meaning of Competition, 82 Q.J. ECON. 639, 647 (1968) (arguing that the classical concept 
of competition "was a behavioral one, the essence of which was the effort of the individual seller to 
undersell, or the individual buyer to outbid, his rivals in the marketplace"); George Stigler, Perfect 
Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. POL EcoN. 1, 1-2 (1957) (finding that Adam Smith 
equated "competition" with "rivalry in a race-a race to get limited supplies or a race to be rid of ex-
cess supplies"); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937, at 270 
(1991}. 
Although classicists were concerned to preserve "competition," they did not understand 
that term as we understand it today. Competition was not a theory about cost-price relationships, 
as it came to be in Neoclassical economics .... Rather, competition was a belief about the role of 
individual self-determination in directing the allocation of resources, and about the limits of state 
power to give privileges to one person or class at the expense of others. 
Two years before passage of the Sherman Act, a leading political economist defined competition in the 
following manner: "[Competition is] the operation of individual self-interest, among the buyers and 
sellers of any article in any market. It implies that each man is acting for himself solely, by himself 
solely, in exchange, to get the most he can from others, and to give the least he must himself." 
See FRANCIS A. WALKER, POLmCAL ECONOMY 91-92 (3d ed. 1888}, quoted in HOVENKAMP, supra, at 
274. 
42. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58 (concluding that common law did not void those contracts that 
had a "legitimate purpose of reasonably forwarding personal interest and developing trade"); Joint-
Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. at 575 ("[l]t is plain that commerce can and does take place on a large scale and in 
numerous forms without competition."); see also McNulty, supra note 41, at 643-45 (stating that classical 
economists argued that "competition" would result in "natural" price, i.e., the lowest price necessary to 
induce production of the product in question). Some scholars would take issue with the assertion that 
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Instead of banning all restraints on competition, then, the Sherman 
Act required antitrust courts to employ the sort of "reason" that they had 
long employed when implementing the common law of trade restraints.43 
The application of such reason would enable judges to enforce the "public 
policy embodied in the statute," by determining whether a challenged re-
straint limited marketplace rivalry (competition) so much that it produced 
or threatened to produce monopoly or its consequences.44 There were, ac-
cording to the Court, three such consequences: the ability to restrict out-
put, raise prices, or reduce quality.45 Modern economists, of course, would 
Congress designed the Sherman Act to maximize consumer welfare, if such welfare is equated with total 
social wealth and thus involves application of a Kaldor-Hicksian efficiency benchmark. See generally 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 14-17 (5th ed. 1998) (explaining concept of Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency). According to these scholars, classical economists did not understand that the exercise 
of market power would distort the allocation of resources and thus reduce total social welfare. See Louis 
Kaplow, Antitrust, Law and Economics, and the Courts, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 181, 207...{)8 & n.140 
(1987). Thus, it is said, Congress must have had purely distributional goals in mind when it passed the 
Sherman Act, with the result that any arrangement that involves or facilitates an exercise of market 
power and thus increases prices, directly or indirectly, offends the Act. See Kaplow, supra, at 207...{)8; 
Robert H. Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as the Ruler of Antitrust, 33 ANTITRUST 
BuLL 429 (1988); Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: 
The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 92-96 (1982). However, at least one clas-
sical economist apparently understood that the possession and exercise of market power would distort the 
allocation of resources and reduce total social welfare, independent of any impact such power might have 
on price. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
682-83 (Modern Library ed. 1994} (arguing that mercantile monopolies "derange more or less the natural 
distribution of the stock of the society" and that "every derangement of the natural distribution of stock is 
necessarily hurtful to the society in which it takes place"); see also E.G. West, The Burdens of Monopoly: 
Classical Versus Neoclassical, 44 S. ECON. J. 829, 836-37 (1978) (arguing that Adam Smith understood 
allocative inefficiency as one burden of monopoly}. 
At any rate, the conclusions of this article do not depend upon any equation of "consumer welfare" 
with efficiency defined in a Kaldor-Hicksian sense. Even if the Sherman Act forbids all contracts that 
(1} exercise market power and (2) result in higher consumer prices, the present structure of Rule of 
Reason analysis is overinclusive in the sense that it identifies as "anticompetitive" numerous contracts 
that do not, in fact, create or exercise market power. See infra Part IV. 
43. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 60. 
44. See id. ("[T)he standard of reason which had been applied at the common law ... was intended 
to be the measure used for ... determining whether in a given case a particular act had or had not brought 
about the wrong against which the statute provided."}; id. at 62 (stating that the Court should apply Rule 
of Reason "to enforce the prohibitions of the act and thus the public policy which its restrictions were 
obviously enacted to subserve"); id. at 58 (stating that the common law refused to enforce "all contracts 
or acts which were unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions [and thus designed] to bring about 
the evils, such as enhancement of prices, which were considered against public policy"); United States v. 
Addyston Pipe Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282-83 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft, J.) (stating that a contract whose "sole 
object" is to "restrain competition" was unenforceable at common law and thus unlawful under the 
Sherman Act), affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
45. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 52; id. at 61 (defining "restraint of trade" as "undue restraint of the 
course of trade" which brings about monopoly or "which produces the same result as monopoly"); id. at 
57 (stating that the common-law referred to contracts that "were thought to unduly diminish competition 
and hence to enhance prices-in other words, to monopolize" as "being in restraint of trade"); id. (stating 
that the prohibition on restraints of trade was aimed at "the acts of individuals producing or tending to 
produce the consequences of monopoly"); id. at 52 (listing "evils" of monopoly as: (1) the power to fix 
prices; (2) the power to limit output and; (3) the danger of deterioration in the quality of the monopolized 
product); id (characterizing "power arbitrarily to enhance price" as one "evil" of monopoly}; see also 
SMITH, supra note 42, at 69 ("The monopolists, by keeping the market constantly under-stocked, by never 
fully supplying the effectual demand, sell their commodities much above the natural price, and raise their 
emoluments, whether they consist in wages or profit, greatly above their natural rate."); 1i-IOMAS 
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equate these consequences with the exercise of market power and the cor-
responding reduction in social welfare.46 This treatment of the Sherman 
Act as a form of externality regulation was consistent with the then-
dominant approach to political economy, an approach that the Court had 
read into the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.47 
This Rule of Reason did not empower courts to validate harmful 
agreements that judges might nevertheless deem reasonable.48 Nor did it 
empower judges to void legitimate or normal contracts that incidentally 
limited competition and might indirectly raise prices.49 Instead, the rule 
required courts to ban all contracts that limited competition in a manner 
that would produce the consequences of monopoly and thus harm con-
SOWELL, CLASSICAL ECONOMICS RECONSIDERED 20-21 (1974) (arguing that classical economists 
equated "monopoly" with any restriction of supply). 
46. See, e.g., KENNETH ELZINGA & WILLIAM BREIT, THE ANTirRUST PENALTIES 3 (1976) (arguing 
that antitrust regulation can be justified as regulation eliminating the externality of deadweight welfare 
losses caused by monopoly restrictions on output); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTirRUST POL-
ICY 11-13 (1999) (describing deadweight loss caused by monopolist's exercise of market power); SMITH, 
supra note 42, at 69 (arguing that "[t]he price of monopoly is upon every occasion the highest which can 
be got. The natural price, or the price of free competition, on the contrary, is the lowest which can be 
taken, not upon every occasion indeed, but for any considerable time together. The one is upon every 
occasion the highest which can be squeezed out of the buyers, or which, it is supposed, they will consent to 
give. The other is the lowest which the sellers can commonly afford to take, and at the same time con· 
tinue their business."); Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation, and Liability Rules: A 
Comment, 11 J.L. & EcoN. 67,70 (1968) (making same argument as Elzinga & Breit); William Landes & 
Richard Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REv. 937, 937 (1981) (defining market 
power as ability profitably to price above marginal cost); see also Bark, supra note 35, at 802-DS, 831-32 
(arguing that Standard Oifs Ru1e of Reason was designed to further "the creation of wealth, or, to say the 
same thing, the maximization of the satisfaction of consumer wants"). 
47. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, at 200-01 (arguing that the Supreme Court only sustained 
abridgements of contractual liberty that were designed to correct market failure); PERITZ, supra note 35, 
at 50-52 (arguing that Standard Oil reflected concern for liberty of contract recognized in Lochner); 
SKLAR, supra note 30, at 108-17 (arguing that Congress narrowed initial drafts of the Sherman Act to 
accommodate concerns that the statute might infringe liberty of contract); Meese, supra note 30, at 15-34 
(recounting classical economic paradigm and its embrace by courts practicing economic due process); id. 
at 88-91 (suggesting that formative era jurisprudence could be explained by concern for welfare losses 
caused by cartel output reductions); see also Nat'! Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115,129 (1905) ("It is 
the power to control prices which makes the inducement of combinations and their profit[s]. It is such 
power that makes it the concern of the law to prohibit or limit them."). 
48. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 65 (stating that the Rule of Reason does not empower courts to 
exempt agreements that unduly restrict competition from the statute); United States v. Joint-Traffic 
Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 575-77 (1898) (rejecting defendants' invitation to consider policy arguments in favor 
of railroad cartel). 
49. See Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 66 ("To treat as condemned by the act all agreements under 
which, as a result, the cost of conducting an interstate commercial business may be increased would 
enlarge the application of the act far beyond the fair meaning of the language used. There must be some 
direct and immediate effect upon interstate commerce in order to come within the act." (quoting Hopkins 
v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 592 (1898))); Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 54 (listing "undue enhancement of 
price" as one evil of monopoly (emphasis added)); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 
(1911) (stating that the Act does not forbid "the power to make normal and usual contracts to further 
trade by resorting to all normal methods, whether by agreement or otherwise, to accomplish such pur-
pose"); Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. at 566-68 (same); see also Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 
U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (stating that the mere fact that a contract restrains price competition does not con-
demn it under Rule of Reason). 
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sumers and society.50 Absent government imposition of monopoly, then, 
the Sherman Act, if properly enforced, would ensure the appropriate 
amount of competition and protect society from arrangements that pro-
duced or threatened to produce market power.51 
B. Applying Principles-the Role of Evolving Economic Theory 
Although initially controversial? modem courts and commentators 
agree that Standard Oil and its Rule of Reason should be the starting point 
for any antitrust analysis.53 Still, the embrace of this principle begs an im-
portant question: how should courts go about distinguishing "ordinary," 
"normal," or "usual" restrictions, which "further" and "develop" trade 
from those that "unreasonably restrict competitive conditions" and thus 
produce the consequences of monopoly?54 Standard Oil's invocation of 
the common law in support of its Rule of Reason suggests one source of 
wisdom, namely the vast body of precedents governing trade restraints 
that was in place when Congress passed the Sherman Act.55 Congress, af-
ter all, anticipated that the courts would draw upon common-law prece-
dents and methodology when formulating antitrust doctrine.56 Perhaps 
50. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 52-62; see also Bork, supra note 35, at 802-04 (noting that Stan-
dard Oil created "a rule of reason keyed to the avoidance of the consequences of monopoly and had 
placed upon the courts the duty of perfonning economic analysis to detennine in which acts and agree-
ments the evils of monopoly were present"). 
51. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 62 (concluding that the Sherman Act assumes that "the operation 
of the centrifugal and centripetal forces resulting from the right to freely contract was the means by which 
monopoly would be inevitably prevented if no extraneous or sovereign power imposed it and no right to 
make unlawful contracts having a monopolistic tendency were pennitted. In other words that freedom to 
contract was the essence of freedom from undue restraint on the right to contract."); Whitewell v. Cont'l 
Tobacco Co., 125 F. 454,460-61 {8th Cir. 1903) (stating that protection of right to contract was "essential 
to the very existence of free competition"). 
52. See LE1WIN, supra note 35, at 265-70 {describing political and legislative reaction to Standard 
Oil); ALBERT H. WALKER, THE "UNREASONABLE" OBITER DICI'A OF CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE IN 1HE 
STANDARD OIL CASE {1911). As noted earlier, some contemporary and modem commentators have 
argued that Standard Oifs invocation of the Rule of Reason was a wholesale repudiation of prior deci-
sions under the Act. See supra note 35 {collecting authorities to this effect). I have shown elsewhere that 
this position rests on a misreading of pre-1911 decisions. See Meese, supra note 31, at 43-67 {arguing that, 
like Standard Oil, early state and federal decisions construed antitrust statutes narrowly, to avoid claims 
that such statutes offended liberty of contract); id. at 59-67,75-80 (contending that early case law voided 
only those contracts that exercised or threatened to create market power); see also TAFT, supra note 35, at 
89-95 (arguing that Standard Oil did not depart from prior case law). 
53. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717,723 {1988); Arizona v. Maricopa County 
Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 {1982); Nat'! Soc'y of Prof! Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-92 
{1978); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale 
Stores, lnc., 359 U.S. 207, 211 {1959); 7 AREEDA, supra note 28, ']['11500-1501; LAWRENCE A. SULUV AN 
& WARRENS. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTrrRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 192-94 {2000) {praising 
Standard Oil as "an antitrust classic"). 
54. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58 (distinguishing between these two sorts of contracts). 
55. See id. at 60 {holding that Congress intended the courts to apply "the standard of reason which 
had been applied at the common law and in this country in dealing with the subjects of the character em-
braced by the statute"); see also supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
56. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20-21 {1997) ("Congress 'expected the courts to give 
shape to the statute's broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition."' (quoting Nat'/ Soc'y of 
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courts should ban those restraints that were void at common law, while at 
the same time validating those that common-law courts would have en-
forced.57 
From the very beginning, however, courts have rejected invitations to 
engraft the stock of common-law precedents onto the Sherman Act.58 As 
Standard Oil itself noted, the universe of trade restraints is in constant flux: 
human ingenuity produces restraints that the common law did not ad-
dress.59 More fundamentally, the effects of well-known restraints are 
themselves not static: economic conditions change, and such changes may 
themselves alter the effects of particular restraints. At the same time, hu-
man understanding evolves-or at least changes-over time; restraints that 
once appeared beneficial or benign to the most learned economists may 
now seem harmful.60 
For these reasons, even the common law was not static, but instead 
treated identical restraints quite differently in different eras.61 At one 
time, for instance, covenants ancillary to the sale of a business were unlaw-
ful per se.62 Over time, however, conditions and economic understanding 
changed, and courts came to believe that such agreements were both more 
Prof/ Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 688)); see also SKLAR, supra note 30, at 112-17 (detailing congressional assump-
tions that courts would treat the Sherman Act as a license to articulate a common law of trade restraints). 
57. Cf Klor's, Inc., 359 U.S. at 211 (suggesting that the Sherman Act banned all contracts that were 
unenforceable at common law and any others that "new times and economic conditions would make un-
reasonable"). 
58. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 327-28 (1896) (rejecting argu-
ment that the term "restraint of trade" is "to be given the same meaning that [it] received at common 
law"). Moreover, while then-Judge Taft purported to rely upon the common law to justify his opinion in 
Addyston Pipe, the approach he announced in fact departed from the common law's willingness to en-
force "reasonable" horizontal price fixing agreements. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, at 286-87; see 
also infra note 68 (describing Supreme Court's repudiation of common-law decisions enforcing noncoer-
cive price-fixing agreements). 
59. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 59-60 (stating that Congress drafted the Sherman Act to address 
"the many new forms of contracts and combinations which were being evolved from existing economic 
conditions"); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 180--81 (1911) (showing that the Rule of 
Reason empowers courts to condemn arrangements that frustrate the policy of the statute even if they 
were unknown to the common law). 
60. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 57-58 (noting that, during the late nineteenth century, American 
courts and legislatures adjusted common-law restrictions in response to changed understandings of the 
economic effects of various agreements); id. at 55-56 ("[D]evelopment of more accurate economic con-
ceptions and the change[ d) conditions of society [caused repeal of overbroad English statutes and adjust-
ment in English common law]."). 
61. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Consol. Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 409 (1889) (stating that the original rules gov-
erning restraints of trade were "made under a condition of things, and a state of society, different from 
those which now prevail, [with the result that] the rule laid down is not regarded as inflexible, and has 
been considerably modified"); Skrainka v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo. App. 522, 525 (Mo. Ct. App. 1880) ("It 
is not that contracts in restraint of trade are any more legal or enforceable now than they were at any 
former period, but that courts look differently at the question as to what is a restraint of trade."); Dia-
mond Match Co. v. Roeber, 13 N.E. 419, 421-22 (N.Y. 1887); Kellog v. Larkin, 3 Pin. 123, 139-41 (Wis. 
1851); see also Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 51-58 (describing common law's evolving treatment of trade re-
straints); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271,280--82 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft, J.) (same), 
affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
62. See Y.B. 2 Hen. 5, fol. 5, Pasch, p1.26. 
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beneficial and less harmful than once imagined.63 As a result, courts re-
fused to enforce only "general" restraints of trade that barred the seller 
from pursuing his trade in the entire jurisdiction, enforcing those partial 
restraints that were reasonable.64 
Antitrust courts have always taken a similar approach, eschewing any 
reliance upon a static common law and instead embracing economic the-
ory to assist them in distinguishing undue restraints from those that are or-
dinary or normal.65 Such an approach follows naturally from Standard 
Oil's requirement that judges employ reason to determine whether a re-
straint hinders competitive rivalry between the parties to it in a manner 
that produces the economic consequences banned by the statute.66 In so 
doing, courts have felt free to rely upon economic theories quite different 
from those extant in 1890, thus updating the Sherman Act to keep pace 
with changing perceptions about the economic consequence of particular 
agreements.67 While the principle animating the Rule of Reason remains 
63. See Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 280--81 (describing evolving appreciation of benefits of various an-
cillary restraints); Diamond Match Co., 13 N.E. at 420-23. 
64. See Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711); see also, e.g., Union Straw-
board Co. v. Bonfield, 61 N.E. 1038, 1040 (Ill. 1901) (invalidating general restraint Without regard to 
reasonableness); Alger v. Thacher, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 51,53-54 (1837) (same). · 
65. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15-22 (1997) (relying upon changed economic perceptions 
to overrule per se ban on maximum resale price maintenance); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 
485 U.S. 717,732 (1988) ("The Sherman Act adopted the term 'restraint of trade' along with its dynamic 
potential. It invokes the common law itself, and not merely the static content that the commori law as-
signed that term in 1890."); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207,211 (1959) (Sherman 
Act empowered courts to ban contracts which "new times and economic conditions would make unrea-
sonable"); Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 406 (1911) ("With respect to 
contracts in restraint of trade, the earlier doctrine of the Common law has been substantially modified in 
adaptation to modern conditions."); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 327-29 
(1897); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, at 268 ("One of the great inyths about American antitrust 
policy is that courts began to adopt an 'economic approach' to antitrust problems only in the 1970s. At 
most, this "revolution" in antitrust policy represented a change in economic models. Antitrust policy has 
been forged by economic ideology since its inception."); Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative 
Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REv. 219, 226 (1995) ("ln almost every era of antitrust 
history, policymakers have employed economic models to explain or modify the state of the law and the 
rationale for its enforcement."). 
66. It should be stressed that White's test was phrast<d wholly in economic terms, giving no 
evidence of concern for possibly competing values. A corollary of this value choice is that the law 
should develop according to the progress of economic thought. The law is, therefore, neither 
made inflexible by controlling precedent nor required to change only through abrupt shifts of ba-
sic doctrine. Thus a court could alter the law without repudiating the theory underlying prior de-
cisions by explaining that. those decisions had misconceived the economic effect of particular 
agreements or practices. This characteristic is, of course, inherent in Peckham's and Taft's state-
ments of the rule of reason, as it is in any law governed by economic analysis. 
Bork, supra note 35, at 805. 
67. See Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 731 ("The term 'restraint of trade' in the statute, like the term 
of common law, refers not to a particular list of agreements, but to a particular economic consequence, 
which may be produced by quite different sorts of agreements in varying times and circumstances."); see 
also Khan, 522 U.S. at 15-22 (relying upon revised economic understanding to repudiate prior doctrine); 
Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52-57 (1977) (same); Klor's, Inc., 359 U.S. at 211 
(stating that the Sherman Act empowered courts to ban contracts made unreasonable by "new times and 
economic conditions"). 
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constant, applications change, as courts translate the principle in light of 
new inforrnation.68 
II. IMPLEMENTING STANDARD OIL'S RULE OF REASON 
A. A Two-Step Inquiry 
One could read Standard Oil and its Rule of Reason to require a 
case-by-case assessment of the reasonableness of each challenged re-
straint.69 Indeed, some early case law seemed to indicate as much.70 Yet, 
the decision itself suggested a contrary approach, stating that courts should 
determine the reasonableness vel non of a restraint by examining the "na-
ture or character" of an agreement or the "surrounding circumstances. "71 
Subsequent courts ultimately came around to this position, declaring cer-
68. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1165, 1247-51 (1993) (describing 
such an approach to interpretation and application of the Sherman Act); see also Alan J. Meese, Tying 
Meets the New Institutional Economics: Farewell to the Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 91-93 
(1997) (arguing that the Supreme Court should "translate" tying doctrine in light of recent changes in 
economic theory). 
The evolving judicial treatment of horizontal price-fixing provides a quintessential example of this 
approach. When Congress passed the Sherman Act, common-law courts generally enforced such 
agreements, at least those that set a "reasonable" price. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, at 288-93. 
Such an approach reflected the "political economy" of the day, which assumed that markets were in-
variably populated by numerous sellers and characterized by low barriers to entry. In such a world, 
horizontal price-fixing could only produce prices above the "natural" level if cartelists took steps to 
thwart entry by others. See Meese, supra, at 17-18. Indeed, some early decisions under the Sherman 
Act refused to void cartels that did not seek to limit the output of strangers to the agreement. See 
United States v. Nelson, 52 F. 646 (C.C.D. Minn. 1892). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court rejected this 
approach to price-fixing, voiding umeasonable agreements regardless of whether defendants inter-
fered with the actions of others. See Dr. Miles Med. Co., 220 U.S. at 404-D9; Addyston Pipe & Steel 
Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211,238-45 (1899). 
69. Standard Oil Co. of NJ. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (stating that statute "intended 
that the standard of reason which had been applied at the common law and in this country in dealing with 
the subjects of the character embraced by the statute was intended to be the measure used for the pur-
pose of determining whether in a given case a particular act had or had not brought about the wrong 
against which the statute provided" (emphasis added)). Indeed, the author of Standard Oil, Chief Justice 
White, argued as much (in dissent) fifteen years earlier. See Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. at 
343-74 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that courts should ban only those price-fixing agreements that set 
umeasonable prices). 
70. See, e.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360-61 (1933); Chi. Bd. of 
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,238 (1918). Moreover, while scholars often cite Judge Taft's and 
Justice Peckham's Addyston Pipe decisions as examples of "per se rules" against unadorned horizontal 
price-fixing, both decisions in fact ultimately rested upon a determination that the cartel under attack had 
charged "umeasonable" prices. See Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 235-38 (rejecting assertion that cartel 
merely set reasonable prices); id. at 238 ("The facts thus set forth show conclusively that the effect of the 
combination was to enhance prices beyond a sum which was reasonable."); United States v. Addyston 
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 291-93 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft, J.) (finding that defendants' cartel had produced 
umeasonable prices), affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); see also Meese, supra note 30, at 59-fJ7 (arguing that Ad-
dyston Pipe rested on finding that cartel prices were above the reasonable level). 
71. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58; United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911); see 
also Bork, supra note 35, at 804 (stating that the Standard Oil opinion recognized that some arrangements 
could be unlawful per se). 
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tain categories of restraints unreasonable per se, and thus subject to sum-
mary condemnation.72 
Per se rules are no exception to the approach articulated in Standard 
Oil. To the contrary, such rules simply implement the overarching Rule of 
Reason, just as a requirement that motorists "stop and look" before cross-
ing any railroad tracks once implemented the more general requirement 
that tort victims act reasonably.73 A conclusion that a particular class of 
restraint is unlawful p~r se rests upon a determination that a thoroughgo-
ing examination of the reasonableness of such restraints will always or al-
most always result in a conclusion that they exercise or create market 
power and thus restrain competition (rivalry) unduly.74 In this way, per se 
rules replicate the result that full blown analysis would produce while at 
the same time avoiding the administrative costs of such an inquiry.75 
As applied in the courts, then, Standard Oil's Rule of Reason mani-
fests itself in a two-step analysis. The first step-per se analysis-requires 
characterization and then classification of a restraint.16 Here courts inquire 
into the nature of the agreement and decide whether it is unlawful per se 
or instead subject to further scrutiny.77 If the restraint survives this step, 
that is, if it is not unreasonable per se, courts proceed to the second step, 
namely, a fact-intensive analysis of the actual effects of the restraint.78 
While courts refer to this second step as a Rule of Reason analysis, both 
steps of the process attempt to answer the question put by Standard Oil, 
viz., is a restraint "unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions."79 
72. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 433-36 (1990); Arizona v. Mari-
copa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, J<IS-54 (1982); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 
(1958); see also Klor's, Inc., 359 U.S. at 211 (relying on Standard Oil's reference to "nature and character" 
of certain agreements for proposition that some agreements are umeasonable per se ). 
73. See Bait. & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66,70 (1927). 
74. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) ("Per se treatment is appropriate '[o]nce experience 
with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the 'rule of reason will 
condemn it."' (quoting Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 344)); accord Superior Court Trial Law-
yers Ass'n, 493 U.S. at 432 n.15; see also N. Pac. Ry Co., 356 U.S. at 5; Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58 (stat-
ing that public policy condemned "all contracts or acts which were umeasonably restrictive of competitive 
conditions, either from the nature or character of the contract or act, or where the surrounding circum-
stances were such as to justify the conclusion that they had not been entered into or performed with the 
legitimate purpose of reasonably forwarding personal interest, and developing, trade" (emphasis added)). 
75. See Khan, 522 U.S. at 10; Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. at 434-35; Maricopa 
County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 344. 
76. See supra notes 70-76. 
77. /d. 
78. Jd. 
79. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984) ("(W]hether the ulti-
mate finding is the product of a presumption [implemented via the per se rule J or actual market analysis, 
the essential inquiry remains the same-whether or not the challenged restraint enhances competition."); 
Nat'! Soc'y of Prof! Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978) (quoting Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 
58); Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 236, 238 (1918) ("The true test of legality is whether the 
restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is 
such as may suppress or even destroy competition."); Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 56, 57 (stating that Ameri-
can common and statutory law banned arrangements that "were thought to unduly diminish competi-
tion"); see also FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 434-35 (1990). 
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Because both steps involve the same ultimate inquiry, the methodol-
ogy employed in the first step should help shape the approach taken in the 
second. After all, the creation of per se rules is as much a process of exclu-
sion as of inclusion. Thus, the standards employed at the first step do 
more than define the class of restraints subject to immediate condemna-
tion; they also implicitly determine the nature of those restraints that are 
"left over" and thus subject to more thorough scrutiny under the second 
step's Rule of Reason. Moreover, for three decades per se rules domi-
nated antitrust doctrine, as courts continually expanded the list of agree-
ments subject to automatic condernnation.80 Only recently have courts be-
gun to contract the scope of per se rules, and they have done so in a 
manner that has important implications for the Rule of Reason in gen-
eral.81 Any attempt to comprehend and critique modem Rule of Reason 
analysis must therefore begin with an understanding of the process that 
leads to Rule of Reason treatment in the first place. 
B. The First Step-Per Se Analysis 
The current case law, which this article does not question, holds that a 
particular class of restraints is unreasonable per se if the restraints are "al-
ways or almost always anticompetitive" and always or almost always "lack 
redeeming virtues" that would, if present, "outweigh" or "justify" any 
anticompetitive effect.82 Plaintiffs can readily satisfy the first prong of this 
test, given the manner in which the Court defines anticompetitive when 
conducting per se analysis.83 Like Standard Oil, the Court has abjured any 
technical definition of competition and instead equated the term with "ri-
valry" for the purpose of per se analysis, with the result that any coordina-
tion of previously independent activity is anticompetitive.84 This definition 
80. See infra notes 240-303 and accompanying text. 
81. See infra notes 345--{)3 and accompanying text. 
82. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) ("Some types of restraints, however, have such 
predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effect, and such limited potential for procompetitive benefit, 
that they are deemed unlawful per se." (emphasis added)); Catalano, Inc. v. Target Stores, Inc., 446 U.S. 
643, 646, 649-50 (1980) (same); Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 7-8, 19-20 (1979) (same); 
Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977); United States v. Topco Assocs. Inc., 405 
U.S. 596, 6(J7 (1972) (same); N. Pac. Ry. Co v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (same); see also North· 
west Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 290 (1985) (stating that 
certain group boycotts are per se unlawful because they "are so likely to restrict competition without any 
offsetting efficiency gains that they should be condemned asperse violations"). 
It should be noted that the Court has used the term "anticompetitive" in a different sense on occa-
sion to refer to an arrangement's overall effect on economic welfare. See, e.g., NCAA, 468 U.S. at 
103-{)4 ("Per se rules are invoked when surrounding circumstances make the likelihood of anticom-
petitive conduct so great as to render unjustified further examination of the challenged conduct." (em-
phasis added)). Such usage is comparatively rare, however. 
83. See Chi. Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238 (noting that all contracts limit individuals' freedom of 
action and thus restrain competition in some sense). 
84. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 98-100 (suggesting that agreement on price and output required justifi-
cation to avoid per se condemnation); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-54 
(1982) (finding maximum price-fixing arrangement "anticompetitive" and unlawful absent valid competi-
tive justification); Catalano, 446 U.S. at 649-50 (holding an agreement fixing credit terms between com-
No.1] RULES OF REASON 95 
of anticompetitive sweeps quite broadly, applying as it does to any number 
of garden variety arrangements. The formation of a partnership or a cor-
poration, for instance, necessarily eliminates actual or potential rivalry be-
tween the parties to the new venture.85 The same is true of a merger, joint 
venture, or covenant ancillary to the sale of a business.86 If competition is 
equated with rivalry, all of these restraints reduce competition when com-
pared to the status quo ante and thus satisfy the first part of the two-part 
test for per se illegality. 
Of course, the economy would grind to a halt if the Sherman Act 
banned all agreements that are anticompetitive in this broad sense. Rec-
ognizing this, Standard Oil held that the Act forbids only undue restric-
tions of competition.87 Thus, an initial conclusion that a restraint is anti-
competitive is only the beginning of per se analysis. Courts recognize that 
many restraints that eliminate or temper competition produce procompeti-
tive efficiencies or redeeming virtues that can outweigh or justify any anti-
competitive limitation on rivalry.88 In other words, courts recognize that 
petitors unlawful per se given absence of any recognized redeeming virtue); Nat'/ Soc'y of Prof/ Eng'rs, 
435 U.S. at 692-96 (concluding that a ban on competitive bidding requires competitive justification); GTE 
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 51-59 (treating reduction of intrabrand rivalry as sufficient to require inquiry 
into restraint's redeeming virtues); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261-64 (1963) (hold-
ing that the possibility that territorial restraint had redeeming virtues obviated application of per se rule). 
85. See Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 356-57 (holding that partnership involves price-
fixing, but is subject to Rule of Reason because of economic integration that produces efficiencies); 
Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 9 (stating that the existence of a partnership is not per se unlawful because 
of its redeeming virtues); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271,280 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft, 
J.) (noting that creation of partnership and associated restraints should be analyzed under the Rule of 
Reason even though the arrangement "might reduce competition"), affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
86. See Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 23-24; Nat'/ Soc'y of Prof/ Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 688-89 (show-
ing that covenants not to compete are analyzed under the Rule of Reason even though they eliminate 
"potential competition"). 
87. Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.) 
("Antitrust law is designed to ensure an appropriate blend of cooperation and competition .... "); see 
also supra note 65 and accompanying text; 
88. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 102 (finding that various horizontal restrictions on rivalry between 
member schools could help create a distinctive product and thus be "procompetitive"); Maricopa County 
Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 357 (noting that doctors that formed a clinic "would have the type of partnership 
in which a price-fixing agreement among the doctors would be perfectly proper"); Broad. Music Inc., 441 
U.S. at 9 ("When two partners set the price of their goods or services they are literally 'price fixing,' but 
they are not in per se violation of the Sherman Act."); id. at 23 ("Not all arrangements that have an im-
pact on price are per se violations of the Sherman Act or even unreasonable restraints. Mergers among 
competitors eliminate competition, including price competition, but they are not illegal per se, and many 
of them withstand attack under any existing antitrust standard."); Nat'/ Soc'y of Prof/ Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 
688-89 (stating that courts have historically sustained covenants ancillary to the sale of a business as rea-
sonable because "[ t ]he long-run benefit of enhancing the marketability of the business itself- and thereby 
providing incentives to develop such an enterprise-outweighed the temporary and limited loss of compe-
tition"); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-57 (1977) (refusing to apply per se rule to 
restraints that limited intra brand rivalry because such restrictions could enhance interbrand rivalry); Ap-
palachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360-Q1 (1933) ("The mere fact that the parties to an 
agreement eliminate competition between themselves is not enough to condemn it. ... The familiar illus-
trations of partnerships, and enterprises fairly integrated in the interest of the promotion of commerce, at 
once occur."); Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 280 ("(W]hen two men became partners in a business, although 
their union might reduce competition, this effect was only an incident to the main purpose of a union of 
their capital, enterprise, and energy to carry on a successful business, and one useful to the community. 
Restrictions in the articles of partnership upon the business activity of the members, with a view of secur-
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such restraints might be normal or ordinary with the result that a fact-
intensive Rule of Reason analysis will not always or almost always con-
demn them.89 Indeed, given the breadth with which the Court defines 
anticompetitive, it is the second portion of this test that saves most restric-
tions on rivalry from automatic condemnation and thus determines 
whether a particular type of restraint is unreasonable per se.90 
One may wonder at this point why any type of contract is ever unrea-
sonable per se. After all, a determination whether a restriction is undue or 
not would seem to require a case-by-case exercise of judgment. Moreover, 
one can always attribute some benefit or redeeming virtue to a particular 
contract, no matter how harmful it might seem. Indeed, much regulation 
consists of coercive restrictions that mandate prices or output different 
from what a free market would produce.91 Nonetheless, the Sherman Act 
does not recognize the same breadth of justifications for contractual re-
strictions on trade that the Constitution tolerates where legislative inter-
ference is concerned.92 More precisely, proponents of a private restraint 
that restricts competition cannot avoid per se treatment by arguing that the 
reduction in competition produces noneconomic benefits that somehow 
outweigh the agreement's economic effects.93 While states can decide that 
enforcing a raisin cartel is wise public policy, grape growers cannot justify a 
cartel by arguing that society is better off if the cartelists receive a supra-
competitive return on their investment.94 Thus, a purported virtue is only 
redeeming if it serves a legitimate purpose, that is, does not depend on the 
ing their entire effort in the common enterprise, were, of course, only ancillary to the main end of the un-
ion, and were to be encouraged."). 
89. See Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 23-24; cf State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (stating 
that per se condemnation only is appropriate when Rule of Reason analysis will always or almost always 
condemn a contract). 
90. See 7 AREEDA, supra note 28, 'I[ 1509, at 414 ("[C)lassifying conduct as falling within a per se 
category depends on the presence or absence of redeeming virtues."). 
91. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 39&-99 (1937) (sustaining statute setting mini-
mum wage against due process challenge); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502,539 (1934) (sustaining state 
statute setting minimum resale price of milk); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280-311 
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (recounting various purported benefits of entry restrictions); cf Dr. Miles 
Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 40&-09 (1911) (holding minimum resale price main-
tenance an unreasonable restraint of trade). 
92 Cf Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (sustaining Oklahoma statute 
prohibiting opticians from fitting or duplicating lenses without a prescription from an ophthalmologist). 
93. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 424 (1990); Nat'! Soc'y of Prof! 
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (stating that the purpose of analysis under Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act is "not to decide whether a policy favoring competition is in the public interest, or in the 
interest of the members of an industry"); id at 689-91 nn.16--17. Indeed, even where Congress has itself 
exempted a particular industry or activity from the antitrust laws, courts read such "exceptions ... nar-
rowly, with beady eyes and green eyeshades." Chi. Prof! Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 672 
(7th Cir. 1992); see also Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 231 (1979). 
94. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282-83 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft, J.), ajf'd, 
175 U.S. 211 (1898). Compare Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943) (holding that state-created raisin 
cartel that restrained interstate commerce is beyond the scope of the Sherman Act), with Nat'/ Soc'y of 
Prof/ Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 689-90 (holding that private parties cannot justify restraints on the ground that 
competition is itself unreasonable in a particular industry). 
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exercise of market power.95 Put another way, a restraint is procornpetitive 
if it affects productive activity in a manner that enhances the welfare of 
consumers.96 Defendants cannot avoid per se condemnation of an anti-
competitive restraint by arguing that rivalry is itself unreasonable.97 
Ultimately, then, any determination of whether a restraint falls into 
the per se category or merits further analysis under the Rule of Reason re-
quires an assessment of any justifications proffered by the proponents of a 
restraint. That is to say, once a plaintiff has shown that a restraint limits 
competition, i.e., rivalry between the parties, the tribunal must determine 
whether any justification proffered by the defendants is cognizable, that is, 
constitutes the sort of virtue that the Sherman Act recognizes as redeem-
ing or legitimate. Such an analysis does not entail any assessment of the 
factual basis of the purported justification. Instead, the step consists of a 
sort of relevance inquiry, that is, a determination whether, if proved, the 
justification offered by the defendants would tend to enhance the welfare 
of consumers, thus rebutting any presumption that the restriction on com-
petition is undue.98 The body of law distinguishing restraints that are un-
reasonable per se from those that are not consists in large part of a series 
of conclusions about whether various proffered justification are cognizable 
in this sense, determinations that depend in part on economic theory's best 
95. See Nat'/ Soc'y of Prof/ Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 690--91 nn.l&-17 (1978) (concluding that Standard 
Oil limits courts to consideration of competitive impact of restraints); see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of 
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984) ("Under the Sherman Act the criterion to be used in judging the 
validity of a restraint on trade is its impact on competition."); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 
106, 179 (1911) (stating that the Sherman Act does not "restrain the power to make normal and usual 
contracts to further trade"); United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898) (stating that 
Sherman Act does not reach an agreement "for the purpose of promoting the legitimate business of an 
individual or corporation"); POSNER, supra note 42, at 12-17 (explaining distinction between total social 
wealth and total social utility); Bork, supra note 35, at 805 ("It should be emphasized that [Standard Oil's 
Rule of Reason] was phrased wholly in economic terms, giving no evidence of concern for possibly com-
peting values."). 
96. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (Standard Oil rests on desire to thwart "conse-
quences of monopoly" that harm consumers); see a/so, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3,14-16 (1997) 
(treating as "procompetitive" propensity of contract to result in lower consumer prices); FfC v. Ind 
Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (treating "the creation of efficiencies in the operation of a 
market or the provision of goods and services" as a "procompetitive virtue"); NCAA, 468 U.S. at 113-14 
(equating "procompetitive efficiencies" with reduction in consumer prices). 
97. See Nat'/ Soc'y of Prof/ Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 689-90; see also United States v. Socony-Vacuum 
Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150, 220-22 (1940); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911) 
(under the Rule of Reason, restraints of trade cannot "be taken out of that category [of undue restraints J 
by indulging in general reasoning as to the expediency or non-expediency of having made the contracts, 
or the wisdom or want of wisdom of the statute which prohibited their being made"); Joint- Traffic Ass'n, 
171 U.S. at 575-77; Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 282--83 (dictum); cf Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 171-
73 (describing state and federal regulation designed to combat evils of destructive competition). 
98. See Nat' I Soc'y of Prof/ Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 686 (describing district court's refusal to make find-
ings regarding whether competition unregulated by the restraint would have resulted in inferior engineer-
ing services); id. at 693-96 (affirming district court's decision in this regard); United States v. Topco As-
socs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 705 (1972) (noting that district court found defendants' market position as well as 
the benefits of the restraint "relevant" to its analysis); id. at 606--11 (reversing the district court's decision 
to consider evidence that challenged restraint enhanced interbrand competition); Thomas G. Kratten-
maker, Per Se Violations in Antitrust Law: Confusing Offenses with Defenses, 77 GEO. L.J. 165, 172-73 
(1988). 
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evaluation of the causes and consequences of such restraints.99 Absent 
such a justification, it seems safe to assume that the defendants-who have 
spent resources negotiating and enforcing an agreement that eliminates ri-
valry without producing any cognizable benefits-believe they have or will 
soon have the market power necessary to injure consumers, i.e., to pro-
duce monopoly or its consequences_HJO Thus, such restraints are always or 
almost always undue, with the result that per se condemnation is appropri-
ate.101 If, however, the defendants can proffer such a justification, the per 
se rule does not apply, and courts examine the restraint under the Rule of 
Reason. 
C. The Second Step-the Rule of Reason 
Under current law at least, defendants are able to proffer cognizable 
benefits for most restraints.102 Such proffers obviate application of the per 
se rule and mandate a full Rule of Reason analysis. While the Supreme 
Court has declined to specify the precise method of such an analysis, it has 
provided some general guidance, guidance supplemented by the Court's 
pronouncements in the per se context. According to the Court, tribunals 
conducting a Rule of Reason analysis must weigh all of the relevant facts 
and circumstances and thereby determine whether, in the Court's words, 
the restraint in question destroys competition, and thus works consumer 
harm or instead merely regulates, promotes, or furthers competition to the 
benefit of consumers.103 Such weighing, in turn, requires courts to deter-
99. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 46 at 254 ("[T]he label 'illegal per se' entails that certain justifica-
tions or defenses will not be permitted."); Krattenmaker, supra note 98, at 172-73; see also supra notes 
65-67 and accompanying text {showing that changes in economic theory have resulted in changed judicial 
conclusions about whether certain justifications cognizable). 
100. See Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 339 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reasoning 
that existence of a naked horizontal price-fixing agreement itself defines contours of the relevant market 
and suggests that the defendants possess market power); FfC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 
U.S. 411,435 n.18 (1990) ("'Very few firms that lack power to affect market prices will be sufficiently fool-
ish to enter into conspiracies to fix prices. Thus, the fact of agreement defines the market."' (quoting 
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 269 {1978))); Joint-
Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. at 569 (contending that price-fixing agreement must "maintain [ J rates above what 
competition might produce. If it did not do that, its existence would ... be rescinded or abandoned"); 
Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 282~3 ("(W)here the sole object of both parties in making the contract as ex-
pressed therein is merely to restrain competition, and enhance and maintain prices, it would seem that 
there was nothing to justify or excuse the restraint, that it would necessarily have a tendency to monopoly, 
and therefore would be void."); 7 AREEDA, supra note 28, 'l[1506, at 391-92 {"The defendants are in the 
best position to suggest the benefits that might flow from their activities. If they fail to suggest any, the 
court is entitled to assume there are none."); HOVENKAMP, supra note 46, § 5.6C, at 256 ("[A) naked 
agreement is rational only on the premise that the participants have market power."). 
101. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (explaining that the Sherman Act forbids as "undue 
restraints" those contracts that produce monopoly or its consequences). 
102. See infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text. 
103. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 {1988) (Under the Rule of Reason 
'"the fact finder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should 
be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition."' (quoting Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE 
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977))); Nat'! Soc'y of Prof) Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 
(1978) ("[T)he inquiry mandated by the Rule of Reason is whether the challenged agreement is one that 
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mine whether the harmful effects of a restraint, if any, outweigh any re-
deeming virtues. 104 
The Court's injunction to weigh "all the circumstances of a case" begs 
several questions about what form such weighing should take. Someone 
must produce evidence of what those circumstances are, and courts must 
evaluate such evidence by assigning burdens of proof. After all, the plain-
tiff's assertion that a contract produces actual harm is just that, an asser-
tion. At the same time, defendants' proffer of cognizable procompetitive 
benefits, while sufficient to avoid per se condemnation, is not proof. The 
nature of the adversary system therefore begs three related questions. 
First, what, if anything, must a plaintiff show to make out a prima facie 
case? Second, if a plaintiff does establish such a case, what must defen-
dants proffer or even show to rebut it and avoid judgment? Third, if the 
defendants rebut a prima facie case and thus avoid judgment, how should 
courts go about weighing the facts and circumstances of a case? As shown 
below, the Supreme Court has provided a definitive answer to the second 
question, while strongly suggesting answers to the first and third. Taking 
their cues from the High Court, lower courts, leading scholars, and the en-
forcement agencies have answered each of these questions for themselves, 
and the result has been a common Rule of Reason test with three main 
elements. 
1. Prima Facie Case 
As noted above, proof that a contract limits rivalry between the par-
ties to it gives rise to a presumption that the arrangement restricts compe-
tition unduly and thus reflects an exercise of market power. Absent a 
plausible assertion that the restraint produces cognizable benefits, this pre-
sumption survives, and courts declare the arrangement unlawful per se.105 
One could imagine a similar approach under the Rule of Reason, under 
which proof of the restraint would itself cast upon defendants a burden of 
promotes competition or one that suppresses competition."); Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 
231, 238 (1918) ("The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and 
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competi-
tion," quoted in GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49 n.15). 
104. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 113-15 (1984) (examining whether 
proffered procompetitive efficiencies offset restraint's anticompetitive consequences); GTE Sylvania, 433 
U.S. at 57 n.27 (rejecting assertion that courts are incapable of "balancing intrabrand and interbrand 
competitive effects of vertical restrictions"); see also, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (lOth Cir. 
1998) (Ultimately under the Rule of Reason "the harms and benefits must be weighed against each other 
in order to judge whether the challenged behavior is, on balance, reasonable." (citing 7 AREEDA, supra 
note 28, '{1502, at 372)); Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Ass'n, Inc., 996 F.2d 537, 
543 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that under the Rule of Reason, "it remains for the factfinder to weigh the 
harms and benefits of the challenged behavior"); 7 AREEDA, supra note 28, 'li 1500, at 362-63, 'li 1502, at 
372, 'li 1507 (explaining that Rule of Reason analysis calls for balancing); HOVENKAMP, supra note 46, at 
257-58 (discussing the application of balancing under Rule of Reason analysis). 
105. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text. 
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producing evidence that their arrangement produces cognizable benefits, 
the absence of which would establish the existence of harm.106 
While the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed this question, 
lower courts have uniformly held that plaintiffs must make some threshold 
showing of what courts call "anticompetitive harm" over and above the 
mere existence of a contract that is anticompetitive as courts employ that 
term in per se analysis.107 Such a showing establishes a prima facie case 
which, if not rebutted, entitles the plaintiff to judgment.108 A requirement 
that plaintiffs make such a threshold showing reflects Standard Oil's nor-
mative assumption that, without more, a mere restriction on parties' free-
dom of action does not constitute a cognizable antitrust harm.109 A con-
trary approach, i.e., a requirement that defendants adduce evidence of 
benefits in each and every Rule of Reason case, would reflect undue hos-
tility toward private contracts, the very activity the Sherman Act is sup-
posed to promote.U0 Economic logic also compels such a requirement. 
Once the defendants have identified a valid procompetitive objective for 
the restraint-thus avoiding per se condemnation-mere proof that the ar-
rangement restricts rivalry cannot give rise to a presumption of tangible 
anticompetitive effect, since such a restriction is at least equally consistent 
with a conclusion that the arrangement is a normal or usual method of fur-
thering trade.111 Absent some threshold showing of actual harm, then, 
106. See supra notes 98-100 (discussing judicial assumption that absence of cognizable benefits sug-
gests that restraint on rivalry harms consumers). 
107. See Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason, 1999 BYU L. REv. 1265, 1268 (arguing that 
lower courts uniformly require proof of anticompetitive harm before requiring defendants to adduce evi-
dence of benefits). Some have read NCAA to provide that the mere existence of an explicit restraint on 
price or output casts upon the defendants some burden of justification. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FfC, 526 
U.S. 756,770 (1999) (dicta) (reading NCAA apparently in this manner); NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109 ("(W]hen 
there is an agreement not to compete in terms of price or output, 'no elaborate industry analysis is re-
quired to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agreement."'); Chi. Profl Sports Ltd. 
P'ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.) (reading NCAA to hold that any 
agreement on price or output required some justification). However, this passage followed the Court's 
endorsement of the district court's findings that the restraint actually reduced output and raised prices. 
See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104-D8. Thus, some scholars have argued that the Court did not in fact mean to 
dispense with the requirement that plaintiffs prove some anticompetitive harm, beyond the mere exis-
tence of the restraint, to establish a prima facie case. See 7 AREEDA, supra note 28, 'll1511, at 433-34; 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 46, at 262; see also Law, 134 F.3d at 1020. See generally Alan J. Meese, Farewell 
to the Quick Look, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 461, 463 (2000) (describing alternate readings of NCAA). 
108. See Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., Inc., 996 F.2d 537,543 (2d 
Cir. 1993); 7 AREEDA, supra note 28, '1[1502, at 371. 
109. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text; see also Bark, supra note 35, at 805 (concluding 
that Standard Oirs "test [was] phrased in wholly economic terms"); Meese, supra note 30, at ~0 (argu-
ing that formative era state and federal courts repeatedly rejected claims that a contractual restriction on 
freedom of action constituted a cognizable antitrust harm). 
110. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S.1, 61-62 (1911). 
111. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,587-88 (1986) (noting that 
evidence that is as consistent with procompetitive as with anticompetitive objectives cannot, without 
more, support an inference of anticompetitive conduct); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Co., 465 U.S. 
752, 761-64 (1984) (same); First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 279-80 (1968) 
(same); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,466-67 (1992) ("Legal 
presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market realities are generally disfa-
vored in antitrust law."). 
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courts properly leave assessment of such arrangements to the market-
place.112 
a. The Market Power Filter 
While all lower courts agree that a plaintiff must make some thresh-
old showing that a contract produces tangible economic harm, there is dis-
agreement about just what form such a showing must take. Led by the 
Seventh Circuit, a diminishing number of courts now hold that a plaintiff 
must first prove that the proponent of a restraint possesses market power 
of the sort necessary to harm competition, and thus consumers, in the 
manner that the plaintiff alleges.113 Such a showing involves proof of mar-
ket structure similar to that which plaintiffs must make when challenging 
mergers and must include proof of the boundaries of a relevant market, 
the defendants' position therein, and the presence of barriers to entryY4 
In these circuits, failure to establish market power undermines the plain-
tiff's prima facie case and requires dismissal of the claim. 115 
112. Capita/Imaging, 996 F.2d at 547 ("[J)ustifications are unnecessary where [plaintiff] has not car-
ried its own initial burden of showing a restraint on competition."); Consultants & Designers, Inc. v. But-
ler Serv. Group, Inc., 720 F.2d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1983); see also Carrier, supra note 107, at 1308-14 
(concluding that the legislative history of the Sherman Act supports requirement of threshold proof of 
anticompetitive harm); id. at 1558 (stating that this requirement is "beyond debate"). It should be noted 
that some scholars believe that the mere existence of some restraints should give rise to a burden of justi-
fication. See, e.g., John J. Flynn, The "Is" and "Ought" of Vertical Restraints After Monsanto Co. v. Spray-
Rite Service Corp., 71 CORNELL L. REv. 1095, 1143-46 (1986). These scholars believe that contractual 
restraint of individual "freedom" is itself a cognizable antitrust harm, separate and apart from any effect 
such contracts might have on consumers. Thus, mere proof that a contract restrains a dealer's discretion, 
for instance, gives rise to a presumption of harm according to these scholars. See Alan J. Meese, Price 
Theory and Vertical Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, 45 UCLA L. REv. 143, 176-83 (1997) (discuss-
ing so-called Populist approach to vertical restraints). Such an approach is of course inconsistent with 
Standard Oil. 
113. See, e.g., L.A.P.D., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Corp., 132 F.3d 402,404-05 (7th Cir. 1997) (Easterbrook, 
J.); Chi. Profl Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J.); Rothery 
Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210,217-21 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.); Ball Mem'l 
Hosp., Inc. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1334-35 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J.); Polk Bros., 
Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.); Valley Liquors, Inc. v. 
Renfield Imps., Ltd., 678 F.2d 742,745 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.). 
114. See, e.g., Rothery Storage, 792 F.2d at 217-21 (explaining that plaintiffs failure to establish the 
existence of any market in which the defendants played a significant role doomed Rule of Reason chal-
lenge); id. at 230 (noting that "[m]erger policy has always proceeded by drawing lines about allowable 
market shares .... We can think of no good reason not to apply the same inferences to [defendants') an-
cillary restraint[s)"); Ball Mem'l Hasp., Inc., 784 F.2d at 1335-36 (explaining that absence of barriers to 
entry defeats Rule of Reason claim regardless of defendants' market share); Valley Liquors, 678 F.2d at 
745 (noting that plaintiff must establish relevant product and geographic market to prove market power); 
see also FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045,1051-54 (8th Cir. 1999) (explaining that failure to 
establish concentration in properly defined market undermines prima facie case in merger litigation); 
New York v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 321, 361-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (same); 1992 DEP'T OF 
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §§ 1-3 (1992), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2002) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES). 
115. See, e.g., Rothery Storage, 792 F.2d at 217-21; Ball Mem'l Hasp., 784 F.2d at 1335 ("Firms with-
out [market] power bear no burden of justification."); Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 191. 
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b. The Supreme Court Demurs 
Nonetheless, courts that make a showing of market power a neces-
sary condition in proof of a Rule of Reason claim are swimming against 
the tide. Most notably, the Supreme Court has declined to apply the mar-
ket power filter in each Rule of Reason case it has entertained while at the 
same time suggesting an alternate method of establishing anticompetitive 
harm of the sort necessary to give rise to a prima facie case.116 In reasoning 
that seems to apply beyond the individual cases in question, the Court has 
suggested that proof of "actual detrimental effects" should suffice to estab-
lish a prima facie case, regardless of whether structural indicia suggest that 
the defendants possess market power.117 
Consider first NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Okla-
homaY8 There, the Court evaluated an agreement among the NCAA's 
member schools limiting the price and output of televised college football 
games and rejected the claim that the arrangement was unlawful per se 
merely because it purported to limit rivalry on price and output.119 As the 
Court saw things, some limit on competition was necessary to create the 
relevant product-college football-in the first placeY° For instance, reli-
ance upon an unbridled market would lead member schools to compete 
for players by paying them salaries or waiving any requirement that they 
attend class, thus undermining an essential feature of the product in ques-
tion-amateurism.121 
Having declined to apply the per se rule, the Court turned to an ap-
plication of the Rule of Reason.122 Relying upon the district court's find-
ings of fact, the Court concluded that the NCAA's arrangement had re-
sulted in output and prices for the Association's product-televised college 
football games-different from what a free market would have pro-
duced.123 This, the Court said, was exactly the sort of effect that consti-
116. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
117. FfC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447,460-61 (1986). 
118. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
119. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (arguing that courts deem such a limitation to be 
"anticompetitive" for purpose of the per se rule). 
120. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101-D3. 
121. The Court noted, for instance, that some agreement not to pay players a salary was necessary to 
create amateur football. See id. at 102 ("In order to preserve the character and quality of the 'product,' 
athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the like. And the integrity of the 'prod-
uct' cannot be preserved except by mutual agreement."). 
122. See id. at 103-04. 
123. See id. at 105 ("The District Court found that if member institutions were free to sell television 
rights, many more games would be shown on television, and that the NCAA's output restriction has the 
effect of raising the price the networks pay for television rights."); id. at 106-07 ("The anticompetitive 
consequences of this arrangement are apparent. ... Price is higher and output lower than they would oth-
erwise be, and both are unresponsive to consumer preference."); id. at 106 n.30 (quoting district court 
finding that "'[c]learly, the NCAA controls grossly distort the prices actually paid for an individual game 
from that to be expected in a free market"'). 
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tuted a harm under Standard Oil's articulation of the Rule of Reason and 
thus cast upon the defendants a burden of justification.124 
Having found the existence of what it deemed anticompetitive harm, 
the Court then turned to defendants' argument that proof of market power 
was nonetheless necessary to establish a prima facie case under the Rule of 
Reason.125 The Court rejected this argument for two reasons: one "legal" 
and one "factual."126 As an initial legal matter, the Court claimed that the 
restraint in question, while not unlawful per se, was nonetheless a "naked 
restraint on price or output," and thus presumptively harmful. 127 Invoking 
Professor Areeda, the most prominent antitrust scholar of his day, the 
Court asserted that no detailed market analysis was needed under these 
circumstances to cast on the defendants a burden of justificationY8 Quot-
ing language from the Solicitor General's brief, the Court suggested that 
an assessment of market power was only one method of ascertaining com-
petitive effects in Rule of Reason litigation, a method that courts could 
discard whenever the plaintiff had demonstrated anticompetitive effects 
through other means.129 This reasoning, of course, applied well beyond the 
context of the restraint in question, to any analysis under the Rule of Rea-
son. At any rate, the Court said that the district court had found as a fac-
tual matter that the defendants did have market power, because broad-
casts of college football were a distinct product for which there were no 
reasonable substitutes.130 
Just two years later, in FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, the 
Court again addressed the requirement for establishing a prima facie case 
under the Rule of Reason. There the Justices faced an.agreement between 
124. See id. at 107-{)8 ("A restraint that has the effect of reducing the importance of consumer pref-
erence in setting price and output is not consistent with [consumer welfare). Restrictions on price and 
output are the paradigmatic examples of restraints of trade that the Sherman Act was intended to pro-
hibit." (citing Standard Oil Co. of NJ. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 52-{i() (1911))); id. at 113 ("[T)he 
NCAA television plan on its face constitutes a restraint upon the operation of a free market, and the find-
ings of the District Court establish that it has operated to raise prices and reduce output. Under the Rule 
of Reason, these hallmarks of anticompetitive behavior place upon petitioner a heavy burden of establish-
ing an affirmative defense which competitively justifies this apparent deviation from the operations of a 
free market."). 
125. /d. at 109. 
126. /d. ("We must reject this argument for two reasons: one legal, and one factual."). 
127. See id. at 109 & n.39. 
128. See id. at 109 ("[W)hen there is an agreement not to compete in terms of price or output, 'no 
elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agree-
ment." (quoting Nat'! Soc'y of Prof! Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,692 (1978) (citing PHILLIP E. 
AREEDA, THE RULE OF REASON IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: GENERAL ISSUES 37-38 (1981))) ). 
129. /d. at 110 n.42. In particular, the Court quoted the Solicitor General's assertion that: 
While the "reasonableness" of a particular alleged restraint often depends on the market power 
of the parties involved, because a judgment about market power is the means by which the effects 
of the conduct on the market place can be assessed, market power is only one test of "reason-
ableness." And where the anticompetitive effects of conduct can be ascertained through means 
short of extensive market analysis, and where no countervailing competitive virtues are evident, a 
lengthy analysis of market power is not necessary. 
See id. (quoting Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 19-20) (footnote and citation omitted in 
original). 
130. See id. at 111-12. 
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dentists in certain Indiana localities not to provide X-rays to their patients' 
insurers.131 While the Court declined to hold the agreement unlawful per 
se, the Justices rejected the Federation's assertion that proof of market 
power was necessary to establish a case under the Rule of Reason. In so 
doing, the Court emphasized that the Commission had found the presence 
of "actual, sustained adverse effects on competition."132 In particular, the 
Commission had found that insurers were unable to secure compliance 
with their requests for X-rays from dentists that were parties to the re-
straint.133 In areas not subject to such an agreement, by contrast, insurers 
had little difficulty obtaining compliance with their requestsY4 Given this 
finding that the agreement among the Federation's members had actually 
affected the terms of trade, the Court said, there was no reason to go fur-
ther.135 Quoting the leading treatise on antitrust law, authored by Profes-
sor Areeda, the Court claimed that proof of market power was simply "a 
'surrogate for detrimental effects, and that proof of the latter was sufficient 
to establish a prima facie case."m6 
Of course, both NCAA and Indiana Federation of Dentists involved 
horizontal restraints,137 leaving open the possibility that the Court might 
apply the market power filter to vertical arrangements. Neither decision, 
however, purported to limit its endorsement of the "detrimental effects" 
test to the horizontal context; both quoted and relied on sources that con-
tained no such limitation.138 Moreover, each defined as "free" the market 
that had existed before the restraints, and each stated that market power 
was simply one vehicle for determining whether, in fact, the restraint pro-
duced results different from what a free market would otherwise have 
generated.139 
At any rate, even in the vertical context, the Court has declined the 
opportunity to employ a market power filter, thus implying that proof of 
direct effects may suffice to establish a prima facie case. In Continental 
T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., for instance, the Court held that such restraints 
131. 476 u.s. 447 (1986). 
132. /d. at 461. 
133. See id. at 460-61. 
134. /d. at 456 (noting evidence that "outside of Indiana, in states where dentists had not collectively 
refused to submit x rays, insurance companies found little difficulty in obtaining compliance by dentists 
with their requests"). 
135. /d. 
136. See id. at 460-61 (quoting 7 AREEDA, supra note 28, '111511, at 429). 
137. !d. at 459; NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99-105 (1984). 
138. See Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460-61 (quoting 7 AREEDA, supra note 28, 'II 1511, at 
429); NCAA, 468 U.S. at 110-11 (quoting Brief Amicus Curiae For The United States, at 19-20). It 
should be noted that Professor Areeda subsequently embraced a different test, albeit not a market power 
filter, for certain nonprice vertical restraints. See 8 PmLuP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 'II 'II 1648-1649c 
(1989); infra notes 144-45 (discussing Professor Areeda's approach to establishing a prima facie case for 
vertical territorial and customer limitations); see also Mark Patterson, The Market Power Requirement 
Antitrust in Rule of Reason Cases: A Rhetorical History, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1, 8-9 (2000) (suggesting 
that rationale of these decisions may apply with equal or greater force in the vertical context). 
139. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 113 (stating that "the NCAA television plan on its face constitutes a 
restraint upon the operation of a free market"); see also supra notes 122-36 and accompanying text 
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were unreasonable and that courts should analyze nonprice vertical re-
straints under the Rule of Reason. 140 In so doing, however, it indicated 
that reduction in "intrabrand competition" -i.e., competition in the sale of 
the manufacturer's own product-was an anticompetitive effect and re-
manded the case to the lower court for further analysis, even though the de-
fendants' share of the relevant market was only five percent.141 Moreover, 
in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, the Court declined to 
declare a tying contract unlawful per se because the market share was insuf-
ficient to establish market power, but nonetheless went on to analyze the 
arrangement under the Rule of Reason.142 The Court concluded that the 
plaintiff had not carried its burden because it had not shown that the ar-
rangement affected the price or quality of the tied product.143 
c. An Alternative Approach: The Actual Detrimental Effects Test 
Not surprisingly, most lower courts, the enforcement agencies, and 
several leading scholars have rejected the market power screen proposed 
by the Seventh Circuit.144 Echoing Indiana Federation of Dentists and Pro-
fessor Areeda, these judges, officials, and scholars all conclude that plain-
tiffs should be able to establish a prima facie case simply by showing that 
140. 433 u.s. 36,38-39, 59 (1977). 
141. See id. at 38, 51-52; see also Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 694 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(analyzing arrangement on remand without applying market power filter). 
142. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 29-31 (1984). 
143. See id. at 30-31 & n.52 ("The record simply tells us little if anything about the effect of this ar-
rangement on price or quality of anesthesiological services. As to price, the arrangement did not lead to 
an increase in the price charged to the patient. As to quality, the record indicates little more than that 
there have never been any complaints about the quality of [the defendant's] services, and no contention 
that his services are in any respect inferior to those of [the plaintiff]."). 
144. See, e.g., Re/Max Int'l, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995, 1013-15 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding 
that proof of market power is not necessary to establish a prima facie case) (citing FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of 
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986)); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019-20 (lOth Cir. 1998) (same); Levine v. 
Cent. Fla. Med. Affiliates, Inc., 72 F.3d 1538, 1551-52 (11th Cir. 1996) (same); K.M.B. Warehouse v. 
Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 1995) (same) (citing Ind. Fed'n of Dentists); United States v. 
Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993) (same) (citing Ind. Fed'n of Dentists); Flegel v. Christian 
Hosp., Northeast-Northwest, 4 F.3d 682, 688 (8th Cir. 1993) (same); (citing Ind. Fed'n of Dentists); 7 
AREEDA, supra note 28, '1!1511; DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC, GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG 
COMPETITORS 'II 3.3 (2000) (hereinafter COMPETITOR COLLABORATION GUIDELINES]; HOVENKAMP, 
supra note 46, at 256; SULUVAN & GRIMES, supra note 53, at 210-12 (approving NCAA's rejection of 
market power inquiry given proof of increased prices). To be sure, Professor Areeda opined that "plain-
tiffs must ordinarily allege and prove the market that is allegedly restrained and that defendants occupy a 
sufficient role in that market to impair competition there." 7 AREEDA,supra note 28, '1!1507b, at 397. He 
did not, however, suggest that proof of market power was a legal requirement but instead claimed that 
plaintiffs would have difficulty proving actual detrimental effects and thus would often be forced to turn 
to proof of market power as a surrogate for such effects. See id. '1!1503, at 376. 
It should be noted that Professor Areeda did not confine his support for the "actual detrimental ef-
fects" test to those instances in which the defendants obviously possessed market power. For instance, 
he endorsed application of this test in NCAA, where the definition of the relevant market was hotly 
contested. See 7 AREEDA, supra note 28, '1!1511, at 432-34; cf HOVENKAMP, supra note 486 at 262 
(conceding that resolution of the market power question in NCAA is "indeterminate"); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Ignorance and Antitrust, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVENESS 119, 124-
26 (Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece eds., 1992) (suggesting that televised college football does not 
constitute a relevant market). 
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the restraint in question produces actual detrimental effects, such as a re-
duction in output or quality or an increase in price.145 Such proof, it is said, 
establishes a presumption of anticompetitive harm, thus giving rise to a 
prima facie case.146 These scholars, jurists, and officials do not question the 
normative or theoretical basis for the market power screen. None ques-
tions the premise that consumer welfare should be the sole objective of the 
antitrust laws, as Standard Oil held.147 All also agree that, as a matter of 
economic theory, the possession of market power is a sine qua non of con-
sumer harm.148 Still, proponents of a detrimental effects route to a prima 
facie case argue that market definition is an uncertain and expensive proc-
145. See, e.g., Re/Max Int'l Inc., 173 F.3d at 1014-15 (proof that practice raised commissions paid by 
the plaintiff established prima facie case and shifted burden of production to the defendants); Law, 134 
F.3d at 1020 (finding anticompetitive effect sufficient to establish prima facie case where challenged 
agreement produced salaries different from !hose !hat preceded restraint); Levine, 72 F.3d at 1551-52; 
K.M.B. Warehouse, 61 F.3d at 129 ("If a plaintiff can show an actual adverse effect on competition, such 
as reduced output, we do not require a further showing of market power."); Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 668 
("The plaintiff may satisfy [its initial burden of production under the Rule of Reason] by proving the exis-
tence of actual anticompetitive effects, such as reduction of output, increase in price, or deterioration in 
the quality of goods and services."); Flegel, 4 F.3d at 688-89 (stating that proof that restraint reduced 
quality would establish "actual detrimental effect" and thus give rise to a prima facie case); COMPETITOR 
COLLABORATION GUIDEUNES, supra note 144, § 3.3; HOVENKAMP, supra note 46, at 256 n.25 ("Detri-
mental effects include observed decreases in output, an observed increase in price coordination, or exclu-
sion from the market of firms !hat seem to be competitive entrants."). 
146. See, e.g., Re/Max Int'l, 173 F.3d at 1014-15 (noting that plaintiffs showing !hat defendants' prac-
tices increased its real estate commissions established prima facie case); Law, 134 F.3d at 1020 (finding 
anticompetitive effect sufficient to establish prima facie case where challenged agreement produced sala-
ries different from !hose that preceded restraint); Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th 
Cir. 1996) (noting that proof !hat athletic conference excluded plaintiff from bowl competition sufficed to 
establish a prima facie case); J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serve-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524, 1542-43 (3d Cir. 
1990) (noting that the plaintiff established a prima facie case by showing that a supply contract raised the 
price of defendant's competitors); cf Levine, 72 F.3d at 1551-52 (finding that plaintiff did not make out a 
prima facie case where olher factors likely explained defendants' rising fees); Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 72B (3d Cir. 1991) (finding that the plaintiffs did not make out a prima facie case 
where, inter alia, competing dealers' prices, though higher, did not rise after !he purported restraint). 
147 .. See, e.g., Re/Max Int'l, Inc., 173 F.3d at 1000 (concluding that the purpose of antitrust is to en-
sure that efficient enterprises displace inefficient ones so that "consumers' economic interests are better 
served"); Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 673-78 (holding that social and political concerns cannot justify restraint 
that increases consumer prices); 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
'II 111 (2d ed. 2000) (arguing that courts should not give dispositive effect to noneconomic values when 
interpreting and applying the Sherman Act); COMPETITOR COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 
144, § 1.2 ("Overview of Analytical Framework") ("The central question [in Rule of Reason analysis] is 
whether the relevant agreement likely harms competition by increasing the ability or incentive profitably 
to raise price above or reduce output, quality, service, or innovation below what likely would prevail in 
the absence of the relevant agreement."); id. § 3.3 (same). 
It should be noted that two scholars who support the actual detrimental effects test also assert that 
courts should read noneconomic values into the Sherman Act. See SULLN AN & GRIMES, supra note 
53, at 2-4 (arguing that the purpose of antitrust is the prevention of economic oppression). However, 
Professors Sullivan and Grimes do not rely on noneconomic values to justify their support for the ac-
tual detrimental effects test. 
148. See, e.g., Re/Max Int'l Inc., 173 F.3d at 1015 (stating that antitrust violation entails "use of mar-
ket power" to exclude more efficient competitor); COMPETITOR COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra 
note 144, § 3.31 (equating "anticompetitive harm" with exercise of market power); 7 AREEDA, supra note 
2B, 'II 1507, at 400 ("[T]he plaintiff cannot show a significant trade restraint without giving us some reason 
to believe that the defendants have some market power."). 
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ess, subject to a high rate of error.149 Thus, once a tribunal is convinced that 
anticompetitive effects are present, any further analysis of market structure 
would seem redundant. Why require the plaintiff to rely on an inference of 
anticompetitive effects (from market structure), when it can prove those ef-
fects directly?150 
Lower courts that embrace the actual detrimental effects test do so 
without qualification. Nonetheless, some of these same courts have de-
clined to apply this approach to certain vertical restraints. These courts as-
sert that plaintiffs challenging some restraints must establish harm to inter-
brand competition: mere proof that a restraint reduces competition in the 
sales of a manufacturer's own product will not suffice.151 It should be noted 
that these decisions do not apply the market power filter but instead state 
that plaintiffs can prevail by showing actual detrimental effects in the mar-
ket as a whole, albeit without explaining just what such a showing would 
entail.152 In other vertical contexts, however, several courts have embraced 
some version of the actual detrimental effects testY3 
149. See Stephen Calkins, California Dental Association: Not a Quick Look but Not the Full Monty, 
67 ANTITRUST L.J. 495, 521 (2000); Patterson, supra note 138, at 2-3 ("The market power inquiry is gen-
erally acknowledged to be one of the most difficult and inconclusive in antitrust law, and market defini-
tion, which is often a prerequisite to the evaluation of market power, is similarly problematic."); Willard 
Tom & Chul Pak, Toward a Flexible Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST LJ. 391,399 (2000); see also CoM-
PETITOR COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 144, § 3.3 ("The Agencies focus on only those fac-
tors, and undertake only that factual inquiry, necessary to make a sound determination of the overall 
competitive effect of the relevant agreement."). 
150. See Re/Max Inc'~ Inc., 173 F.3d at 1014-15 (stating that proof of actual detrimental effects sug-
gests defendants' "use of market power to prevent a more-efficient competitor from establishing itself'); 
Law, 134 F.3d at 1019 (characterizing proof of market power as "indirect" proof of anticompetitive ef-
fects); Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 668 (noting that courts rely upon market power because proof of actual det-
rimental effects "is often impossible to make"). 
151. See, e.g., Ezzo's Invs., Inc. v. Royal Beauty Supply, Inc., 243 F.3d 980, 987 (6th Cir. 2001); 
K.M.B. Warehouse v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d at 123, 127-28 (2d Cir. 1995) (proof of harm to intrabrand 
competition not sufficient to establish prima facie case against vertical distribution restraint); cf. NCAA v. 
Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99 (1984) (proof that restraint raised prices of defendants' 
product sufficed to establish prima facie case). One could argue that the singular focus of these decisions 
on the interbrand market is compelled by the Supreme Court's determination that interbrand competi-
tion is the "primary concern of antitrust law." See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 
724 (1988) (quoting Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 435, 52 n.19 (1977)). However, nei-
ther Bus. Elecs. Corp. nor GTE Sylvania held that interbrand competition is the only concern of antitrust 
law. If it were, then a cartel of the manufacturer's own dealers would be of no antitrust concern. Thus, to 
the extent that intrabrand competition matters for antitrust purposes, proof that such competition is re-
strained and that such a restraint leads to "actual detrimental effects" would seem sufficient to establish a 
prima facie case under the best reading of decisions such as NCAA, Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, and GTE Syl-
vania. 
152 See, e.g., K.M.B. Warehouse, 61 F.3d at 127-28. 
153. See, e.g., Minn. Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Unity Hosp., 208 F.3d 655, 661...{)2 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(suggesting that proof that exclusive dealing contract raised defendants' own prices would suffice to estab-
lish a prima facie case); Town Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors, Corp., 959 F.2d 468,483-
84 (3d Cir. 1992) (rejecting market power filter when analyzing tying contract under the Rule of Reason); 
J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524, 1542-43 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that proof that 
supply contract raised the prices paid by defendants' competitors sufficed to establish a prima facie case); 
Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1988) (Breyer, J.) (conducting Rule 
of Reason analysis without regard to market power). 
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2. Rebutting the Prima Facie Case 
Proof that a restraint is prima facie anticompetitive, however made 
out, does not itself give rise to liability. Instead, such proof merely casts 
upon defendants a burden of justification, that is, of adducing evidence that 
the restraint in fact produces cognizable procompetitive benefits that may 
justify or offset any anticompetitive effects.154 Courts and individual judges 
occasionally assert that defendants bear the burden of proving that a re-
straint creates such benefits.155 However, the vast majority of courts and 
scholars conclude that the defendants' burden at this point is merely a bur-
den of production, that is, of adducing evidence from which a tribunal could 
conclude that the restraint produces cognizable benefits.156 
Proof that a restraint produces significant cognizable benefits does not 
entitle the defendants to judgment, however. Instead, courts, enforcers, 
and leading scholars all conclude that the fact-finder must weigh any such 
benefits against the arrangement's anticompetitive harms, determining 
which effects predominate.157 In so doing, judges, officials; and scholars as-
154. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 1 B-20 (holding that because defendant failed to prove existence of pro-
competitive benefits, plaintiff prevailed); Law, 134 F.3d at 1022-24 (same); 7 AREEDA, supra note 28, 
'li 1503, at 376 (stating that courts allow plaintiffs to rely upon proof of market power because proof of 
actual effects is difficult). 
155. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 788 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) ("In the usual Sherman Act§ 1 case, the defendant bears the burden of establishing a pro-
competitive justification." (emphasis added)); NCAA, 468 U.S. at 113 (stating that defendants bear "a 
heavy burden of establishing an affirmative defense which competitively justifies [the restraint]"). 
156. See, e.g., Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., Inc., 996 F.2d 537,543 
(2d Cir. 1993) ("After the plaintiff satisfies its threshold burden of proof under the Rule of Reason, the 
burden shifts to the defendant to offer evidence of the pro-competitive 'redeeming virtues' of their com-
bination. Assuming defendant comes forward with such proof, the burden shifts back to plaintiff .... " 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted)); 7 AREEDA, supra note 28, 'li 1507b, at 397 ("Once the plaintiff sat-
isfies his burden of persuasion ... he will prevail unless the defendants introduce evidence sufficient to 
allow the tribunal to find that their conduct promotes a legitimate objective."). It should be noted that 
Justice Breyer has cited each of these authorities in support of his assertion that defendants bear a burden 
of proof once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case. See Cal. Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 788 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Both of the authorities, however, plainly refer to a burden of production. 
157. See Law, 134 F.3d at 1019 ("[T]he harms and benefits must be weighed against each other in 
order to judge whether the challenged behavior is, on balance, reasonable." (citing 7 AREEDA, supra note 
28, 'l! 1502, at 372)); Doctor's Hosp. of Jefferson, Inc. v. Southeast Med. Alliance, Inc., 123 F.3d 301,307 
(5th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he anticompetitive evils of a restrictive practice must be balanced against any pro-
competitive benefits or justifications within the confines of the relevant market." (quoting Hornsby Oil 
Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 714 F.2d 1384, 1392 (5th Cir. 1983))); Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 
101 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[Court must determine] whether the restraint's harm to competition 
outweighs the restraint's procompetitive effects."); Aegel v. Christian Hosp., Northeast-Northwest, 4 F.3d 
682, 688 (8th Cir. 1993) ("[Court] weighs 'the harms and benefits to determine if the behavior is reason-
able on balance."' (quoting Bhan v. NME Hosp., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404,1413 (9th Cir. 1991))); Capital Imag-
ing, 996 F.2d at 543 ("[O]nce defendant produces evidence of benefits, the factfinder must weigh the costs 
and benefits of a restraint."); 7 AREEDA, supra note 28, '11507b, at 397 ("[A]bsent showing that defen-
dants could achieve benefits via less restrictive means, the tribunal must somehow weigh and balance the 
harm against the benefit."); CoMPETITOR CoLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 144, § 3.37 (Agen-
cies' analysis involves "comparison of cognizable efficiencies and anticompetitive harms ... in assessing 
the overall competitive effect of the agreement."); HOVENKAMP, supra note 46, at 257-58 (same); SuLU-
v AN & GRIMES, supra note 53, at 211 (Rule of Reason applied to horizontal restraints requires court to 
determine "whether benefits are attained and, if so, whether they exceed the harms"); id. at 333-35 
(same) (endorsing such an approach to vertical restraints). 
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sume that any redeeming virtues necessarily coexist with the anticompeti-
tive harm established by the plaintiff.158 In NCAA, for instance, defendants 
claimed that the venture and the accompanying restraint produced market-
ing efficiencies and was thus procompetitive.159 The Court rejected this ar-
gument, claiming that procompetitive efficiencies would necessarily mani-
fest themselves as increased output and lower prices.160 The district court, 
however, had found that the plan reduced output and increased prices, and 
the Court held that these findings established that anticompetitive harm 
swamped any benefits and thus refuted the defendants' attempt at justifica-
tion.161 The Court rejected on similar grounds the defendants' claim that 
the restraint furthered competitive balance among the various members of 
the league.162 Courts, enforcers, and leading scholars have taken the same 
approach where defendants claim that efficiencies justify an otherwise anti-
competitive merger, assuming, as they do, that any efficiencies coexist with 
anticompetitive effects.163 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has gone even further, suggesting that a 
purported justification is not even cognizable in the first place unless it 
tends to reduce prices to or below the level that obtained before the defen-
dants adopted the challenged restraint. In National Society of Professional 
Engineers, the Court evaluated a professional association's ban on competi-
tive bidding by its members.164 Defendants sought to justify the ban by as-
serting that competitive pressure to offer services at the lowest price would 
158. See infra notes 461-'/0 and accompanying text. 
159. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 113-14 (describing the NCAA's argument). 
160. See id. at 114 ("If the NCAA's television plan produced procompetitive efficiencies, the plan 
would increase output and reduce the price of televised games."); see also id. at 103 (characterizing 
Broadcast Music, Inc. as holding that "a joint selling arrangement may be so efficient that it will increase 
sellers' aggregate output and thus be procompetitive."). 
161. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 114; see also Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 
693 (1978) (noting that defendants' claim that restraint enhanced quality of product by preventing com-
petitive bidding rested on assumption that restraint led to higher prices and thus was not cognizable); 
COMPETITOR COLlABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 144, § 3.37 ("Overall Competitive Effect") 
("[T)he Agencies assess the likelihood and magnitude of cognizable efficiencies and anticompetitive 
harms to determine the agreement's overall actual or likely effect on competition in the relevant market. 
To make the requisite determination, the Agencies consider whether cognizable efficiencies likely would 
be sufficient to offset the potential of the agreement to harm consumers in the relevant market, for exam-
ple, by preventing price increases."); HOVENKAMP, supra note 46, at 264 ("[T)he only justifications that 
are acceptable are those tending to show that the challenged restraint really does tend to increase output, 
and thus decrease price."). 
162. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 119-20 ("The hypothesis that legitimates the maintenance of competi-
tive balance as a procompetitive justification under the Rule of Reason is that equal competition will 
maximize consumer demand for the product. The finding that consumption will materially increase if the 
controls are removed is a compelling demonstration that they do not in fact serve any such legitimate 
purpose."). 
163. See, e.g., FfC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1222-24 (11th Cir. 1991); FTC v. Cardinal 
Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 61-{i3 (D.D.C. 1998); FfC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1088-90 
(D.D.C. 1997); HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 114, § 4; HOVENKAMP, supra note 46, at 
503 (endorsing such an approach). See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust De-
fense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REv. 18 (1968) (articulating the "trade-off model" for com-
paring harms and benefits of a merger). 
164. 435 u.s. 679 (1978). 
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undermine the quality of services that members would ultimately pro-
vide.165 
The Court rejected this argument, holding that the District Court 
properly refused to consider evidence supporting it. According to the 
Court, the very description of the argument confirmed that the defendants' 
agreement had an "anticompetitive purpose and effect."166 The Court con-
cluded that defendants' argument was premised on the assumption that the 
agreement would maintain or increase the price level.167 Recognition of 
such a justification, then, would be inconsistent with the Sherman Act's 
"legislative judgment that ultimately competition will produce not only 
lower prices, but also better goods and services."168 
3. The Less Restrictive Alternative 
Indeed, the fact that a restraint results in lower prices or increased 
output does not necessarily doom the plaintiff's case. Instead, lower courts, 
agencies, and leading scholars all agree that the fact-finder should subject 
such proof to a less restrictive alternative test.169 Thus, even before they 
165. See id. at 685--86 (discussing defendants' proffered justification and associated offer of proof). 
166. See Nat' I Soc'y of Prof/ Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 693. 
167. See id. at 693--94. 
168. /d. at 695; see also FfC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1990) (re-
jecting argument that coercive imposition of higher legal fees was justified because increased fees would 
increase the quality of representation); 7 AREEDA, supra note 28, '111504, at 380-81 (endorsing this aspect 
of Professional Engineers); HOVENKAMP, supra note 46, at 194 (stating that defendants' justification in 
Professional Engineers necessarily rested on a desire to exercise market power). 
169. See, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (lOth Cir. 1998) (noting that once defendants prove 
that benefits are present, the plaintiff can prevail by showing that "those objectives can be achieved in a 
substantially less restrictive manner"); Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996) 
("Under the rule of reason, the fact-finder examines the restraint at issue and determines whether the 
restraint's harm to competition outweighs the restraint's pro-competitive effects."); United States v. 
Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 679 (3d Cir. 1999) (same); Hegel v. Christian Hosp., Northeast-Northwest, 4 
F.3d 682, 688 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that once the defendant adduces evidence of procompetitive effects, 
"[t)he plaintiff, driven to this point, must then try to show that any legitimate objectives can be achieved 
in a substantially less restrictive manner" (quoting Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1413 (9th 
Cir. 1991))); Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., Inc., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d 
Cir. 1993) ("Assuming defendant comes forward with such proof, the burden shifts back to plaintiff for it 
to demonstrate that any legitimate collaborative objectives proffered by defendant could have been 
achieved by less restrictive alternatives."); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 595 
(1st Cir. 1993) (Rule of Reason analysis requires "the most careful weighing of alleged dangers and po-
tential benefits"); 7 AREEDA, supra note 28, ~ 1507b, at 397-99; id. 'II 1505b, at 385-89; COMPETITOR 
COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 144, § 3.36(b) ("Reasonable Necessity and Less Restrictive 
Alternatives") ("[I)f the participants could have achieved or could achieve similar efficiencies by practi-
cal, significantly less restrictive means, then the Agencies conclude that the relevant agreement is not rea-
sonably necessary to their achievement."); HOVENKAMP, supra note 46, at 256-57 (endorsing such a test 
for evaluation of horizontal restraints ancillary to joint ventures); id. at 489 (endorsing such a test when 
evaluating vertical distribution restraints); STEPHEN F. ROSS, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 157-58 
(1993) (contending that an ancillary restraint should be unlawful if "broader than necessary to achieve its 
purpose"); SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 53, at 218--23 (endorsing such a test for analysis of horizontal 
restraints); id. at 335 (endorsing such an approach for analysis of distribution restraints); Thomas A. Pi-
raino, Jr., Reconciling Competition and Cooperation: A New Antitrust Standard for Joint Ventures, 35 WM. 
& MARY L. REv. 871, 930 (1994) (endorsing application of less restrictive alternative test to restraints 
ancillary to legitimate joint ventures). 
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balance procompetitive benefits against anticompetitive harm, courts and 
agencies first allow a plaintiff to prove that a restraint or practice less re-
strictive of rivalry between the parties would create the same benefits pro-
duced by the restraint.170 Such proof entitles the plaintiff to judgment, re-
gardless whether the benefits of the restraint outweigh its costs.171 Indeed, 
some scholars have argued that plaintiffs should prevail even if the less re-
strictive alternative is slightly less effective than the restraint under chal-
lenge.172 While the Supreme Court has not squarely endorsed such a test, it 
has premised one per se rule on the assertion that less restrictive alterna-
tives are always available to advance any legitimate objective.173 This ap-
170. See, e.g., Re/Max Int'l, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995, 1015 (6th Cir. 1999) (rejecting 
proffered benefits as a matter of law where defendants could have achieved such benefits by less restric-
tive means); Chi. Prof! Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667,675-76 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.) 
(rejecting claim that reduction in free riding justified apparent output restriction where defendants could 
have charged purported free riders a fee for use of common resource); Gen. Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat'! 
Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 1984) (voiding territorial allocation where defendants 
could have and did achieve legitimate objective by means of a less restrictive alternative); Mackey v. NFL, 
543 F.2d 606, 621-22 (8th Cir. 1979) (voiding regulation of free agency where league could achieve legiti-
mate objectives via less restrictive means); see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 
85,114 (1984) (finding that defendants' attempt at justification failed where, among other things, "NCAA 
football could be marketed just as effectively without the television plan") (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Re-
gents of Univ. of Okla. 546 F. Supp. 1276, 13()6...{)8 (W.D. Okla. 1982)); Law, 134 F.3d at 1024 n.16 (de-
clining to consider less restrictive alternatives where defendant had not proved existence of cognizable 
benefits); cf County of Tuolumne v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting 
asserted less restrictive alternative as less effective and "significantly more costly" than restraint under 
challenge). 
171. See supra note 169 
172. See 7 AREEDA, supra note 28, 'I 1505, at 383--84 (after a plaintiff has established a prima facie 
case, a restraint "must not only promote the legitimate objective but must also do so significantly better 
than the available less restrictive alternatives"); id. 'II 1507b, at 397 (courts should ask whether "the objec-
tive can be achieved (nearly?) as well by a significantly less restrictive alternative"); 11 HERBERT Ho. 
VENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 'II 1912i, at 302 (1998) ("[P]laintiff is permitted to show that the same (or 
nearly the same) procompetitive benefits could be achieved by a realistic, less restrictive alternative."); 
SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 53, § 5.4b, at 223 (courts should ask whether less restrictive alternative 
proffered by the plaintiff is "nearly as effective"); Lawrence A. Sullivan, Viability of the Current Law on 
Horizontal Restraints, 75 CAL. L. REV. 835, 851 (1987) (courts should ask whether legitimate objectives 
"can be substantially obtained" by less restrictive alternatives offered by the plaintiff). It should be noted 
that Professor Hovenkamp suggests a different approach in a subsequent discussion of the question. See 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 46, at 257 (court should inquire whether alternative will achieve "the same effi-
ciencies"). 
173. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 25-26 n.42 (1984); Standard Oil 
Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293,305-06 (1949) (stating that tying agreements are per se unlawful 
because less restrictive alternatives are "protection enough" for any legitimate objectives); lnt'l Salt Co. v. 
United States, 332 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1947) (stating that presence of less restrictive alternative undermines 
attempt to justify tying contract); Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 138-40 (1936) 
(same). To be sure, the Court mentioned the presence of less restrictive alternatives in NCAA as one 
factor militating against the defendants' attempt to justify the restraint at issue. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 
119. Ultimately, however, the Court determined that any cognizable benefits produced by the restraint 
did not outweigh the restraint's anticompetitive effects, given the district court's findings that the restraint 
resulted in prices higher than they otherwise would have been. Thus, the Court did not have to determine 
whether the presence of a less restrictive alternative could render an otherwise beneficial restraint unlaw-
ful. See supra notes 169--72 and accompanying text (discussing less restrictive alternative test). 
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proach is also identical to that taken by courts and enforcement agencies in 
the merger context.174 
The less restrictive alternative test may seem counterintuitive, given 
the Rule of Reason's singular focus on consumer welfare.175 After all, ap-
plication of such a test allows courts to void restraints that are beneficial on 
balance because they do not enhance consumer welfare enoughP6 How is 
it that courts can void a contract that produces none of the evil conse-
quences of monopoly that Standard Oil deemed the sole target of the 
Sherman Act?177 
There is, however, some internal logic to the less restrictive alternative 
test, not to mention some support in the common law.178 After all, there-
quirement only comes into play after the plaintiff has demonstrated that the 
restraint in question produces harmful effects, such as a reduction in output 
or increase in prices.179 If the Rule of Reason is designed to enhance con-
sumer welfare, then it seems that antitrust doctrine should be concerned 
with such a departure from the allocation of resources previously produced 
by a competitive market, even if such a departure happens to coincide with 
the creation of cognizable benefits. Such a departure, it seems, produces an 
externality, an externality that reduces consumer welfare below what it 
could be.180 Presumably, the less restrictive alternative requirement, if 
properly enforced, will induce firms to achieve cognizable benefits without 
simultaneously creating or exercising market power, thus defeating a mar-
ket failure and maximizing the welfare of consumers.181 It therefore seems 
appropriate that courts ask whether "there [are] other and better ways ... 
174. See FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 
1066, 1090 (D.D.C. 1997) (rejecting efficiency defense where defendants purportedly could have achieved 
such benefits via less restrictive means); HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 114, § 4; see also 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 46, § 12.263-b4, at 503-04 (endorsing application of less restrictive alternative 
test in the merger context). 
175. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (showing that Standard Oifs Rule of Reason rests on 
solicitude for consumer welfare). 
176. See Meese, supra note 68, at 73 (showing that, as applied in the tying context, the less restrictive 
alternative test penalizes defendants "not for imposing net social harm, but instead for failing to benefit 
society sufficiently"). 
177. See supra notes 35-52 and accompanying text (showing that Standard Oil's Rule of Reason 
voids only those contracts that lead to monopoly or the evils associated with it). 
178. See Gibbs v. Consol. Bait. Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 409 (1889) ("(If] the restraint upon one party 
is not greater than protection to the other party requires, the contract may be sustained."); see also Ross, 
supra note 169, at 158. 
179. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
180. See ElZINGA & BREIT, supra note 46, at 3-4 {characterizing output reduction below competi-
tive level as an externality); Calabresi, supra note 46, at 70. 
181. See 7 AREEDA,supra note 28, 'l[ 1507b, at 397-98 (assuming that procompetitive benefits coexist 
with anticompetitive effects once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case); HOVENKAMP, supra note 
46, at 259 (noting that a court that condemns an arrangement because of presence of a less restrictive al-
ternative can limit its relief to a requirement that the parties achieve their objectives by less restrictive 
means); SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 53, at 223; see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 46, at 255-59; Sul-
livan, supra note 172, at 851. 
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by which the collaborators can achieve their legitimate objectives with 
fewer harms to competition."182 
III. ANTITRUST'S Two MODELS OF COMPETITION 
As noted earlier, Standard Oil's Rule of Reason analysis should dis-
tinguish those restraints that unduly limit competition-which the Court 
equated with rivalry-from normal or usual contracts that limit rivalry but 
further or develop trade.183 Application of the Rule of Reason, then, re-
quires courts to employ economic theory to determine whether a contract 
produces the consequences of monopoly and thus offends the policy laid 
down by the Sherman Act.184 For instance, such theory can inform courts 
as to whether a contract is "always or almost always anticompetitive," 
"lacking in redeeming virtue," and thus subject to per se condemnation.185 
Such theory can also assist courts in determining how to structure Rule of 
Reason analysis of those contracts that may produce redeeming virtues and 
thus survive the per se inquiry.186 
Courts do not generate economic theory themselves, nor can they lo-
cate this theory in legislative history or common-law precedents. Instead, 
courts exercising reason must select from among those theories that 
economists and others generate, theories on which advocates rely when liti-
gating Rule of Reason cases. Any attempt to understand antitrust doctrine 
as well as the results produced by Rule of Reason litigation must begin with 
an understanding of the economic theories of the time, as such theories in-
182. See 7 AREEDA, supra note 28, '11502, at 371; id. at 384 (noting that a less restrictive alternative 
analysis asks whether defendants' "objective [can] be achieved as well without restraining competition so 
much"); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 46, at 258 (justifying less restrictive alternative test as search for 
"obviously less anticompetitive alternative"); SULUV AN & GRIMES, supra note 53, at 335 ("[If] strong 
evidence is offered for the promotional benefits of the distribution restraint, a court should examine 
whether less anticompetitive means ... may be available to achieve the same marketing benefits. That 
the producer or dealer may prefer a particular distribution restraint is not enough to justify its use because 
the preference may be based on an anticompetitive gain from the restraint."); id. at 223 (applying similar 
reasoning in the horizontal context); Sullivan, supra note 172, at 851 ("[I]f [efficiencies] can be substan-
tially obtained by means significantly less threatening to competition, the inquiry should also end."). 
183. See supra notes 34-50 and accompanying text. 
184. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1910) (explaining that the 
Sherman Act empowers courts to implement the public policy evinced by the Act in light of reason); see 
also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 21 (1993) (noting that court should revise precedents "when the 
theoretical underpinnings of those decisions are called into question"); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 
Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47-48 (1977) (relying in part on great weight of scholarly commentary as rationale for 
overruling prior decision). But see Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211 (1959) 
(stating that the Sherman Act bans those restraints that were invalid at common law and others that ad-
vances in economics show to be unreasonable). See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in 
Antitrust Law?, 60 TEx. L. REv. 705 (1982) (arguing that changes in economic theory can justify expan-
sion or contraction of antitrust prohibitions). 
185. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (showing that a per se analysis requires courts to de-
termine whether an agreement is "always or almost always" anticompetitive and, if so, whether the 
agreements lacks procompetitive redeeming virtues). 
186. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (showing that oourts decline to apply per se rule 
where defendants adduce plausible assertion that contract produces redeeming virtues). 
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evitably inform judges' understanding of the restraints the Sherman Act re-
quires them to evaluate.187 
As shown below, economists have over the past few decades provided 
antitrust courts with two different economic paradigms capable of imple-
menting Standard Oil's normative focus on consumer welfare: price theory 
and TCE.188 Each such paradigm embraces a normative conception of 
competition functionally related to the efficient allocation of resources.189 
However, while these two paradigms begin with the same normative focus, 
each offers a radically different descriptive account of the causes and con-
sequences of contractual integration, the main object of Rule of Reason 
analysis.190 As a result, each approach implies alternative and contradictory 
models of competition that courts can and do apply when conducting the 
descriptive sort of Rule of Reason analysis mandated by Standard Oil. 
A predecessor to TCE, price theory held a monopoly on antitrust 
economics for some time, driving both steps of Standard Oil's Rule of Rea-
son as well as merger law.191 More recently, TCE has emerged as a stout 
competitor to price theory, and each paradigm currently has significant and 
contradictory influence over the scope and content of per se rules.192 In 
particular, the Supreme Court continues to embrace the price-theoretic 
model of competition in some contexts, relying on price theory to conclude 
that certain practices are necessarily anticompetitive and without redeem-
ing virtue.193 At the same time, the Court has rejected price theory in other 
contexts, relying upon TCE to conclude that contracts once deemed plainly 
(and only) anticompetitive can in fact possess redeeming virtues and thus 
should receive further analysis under the Rule of Reason.194 
This part will elucidate the price-theoretic model of competition and 
its historical influence on antitrust policy and doctrine. This part will also 
introduce and explain price theory's competitor-TCE-as well as its con-
comitant model of competition. Unlike price theory, which recognizes only 
technological competition, TCE suggests that much competition is essen-
tially contractual, that is, takes the form of competing governance struc-
187. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, at 268; Jacobs, supra note 65, at 226 ("In almost every era of 
antitrust history, policymakers have employed economic models to explain or modify the state of the law 
and the rationale for its enforcement."). 
188. The term paradigm has at least two possible definitions that might be relevant in this context. 
First, one might define a paradigm as "all the shared commitments of a scientific group." See THoMAS 
KUHN, Second Thoughts on Paradigms, in THE EsSENTIAL TENSION: SELECfED STUDIES IN SCIEN-
TIFIC TRAomoN AND CHANGE 292, 294 (1977). Second, one might define "paradigm" as an "exem-
plar" or "concrete problem solution" that members of a particular scientific community embrace. See 
id. at 298. This article uses the term "paradigm" in the first sense: to connote the "shared commit-
ments of a scientific group," namely, economists who pursue the study of "industrial organization." 
189. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, at 270. 
190. /d. at 273-95. 
191. /d. at 3Q4..-D5. 
192. /d. at 305-D?. 
193. See, e.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986). 
194. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
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tures, each of which is ultimately a creature of contract.195 Finally, this part 
will examine the continuing influence of each of these contending models 
on the current scope of per se rules and thus, by implication, the influence 
of these paradigms on the category of restraints that survive per se analysis 
and thus warrant further analysis under the Rule of Reason. In so doing, 
this section will set the stage for part IV's analysis and critique of price the-
ory's continuing influence on the three main elements of Rule of Reason 
analysis identified earlier. 
A. Contractual Integration and Applied Price Theory 
For decades courts did not really choose between competing eco-
nomic theories. Instead, economists created and embraced a uniform eco-
nomic paradigm which lawyers, enforcement officials, and legal scholars 
transmitted to the courts. This paradigm, called price theory, dominated 
economists' treatment of industrial organization, the study of how firms are 
organized and conduct their activities.196 Price theory rested upon several 
interrelated assumptions which, when taken together, made up a model 
that economists and others employed to interpret business behavior, includ-
ing contracts, the focus of antitrust's Rule of Reason.197 The assumptions 
animating this paradigm were straightforward. Firms were autonomous en-
tities that interacted with others through an impersonal and chaotic spot 
market.198 The boundary between a firm and the market, that is, the dis-
tmction between what a firm produced itself and what it purchased from 
others, was solely a function of the firm's own costs and those of potential 
suppliers of goods or services, including distribution.199 Firms had little or 
no control over these costs, which were instead determined by technol-
ogy_2oo 
195. See infra notes 304-{)8 and accompanying text. 
196. See R.H. Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in PouCY ISSUES AND RE-
SEARCH 0PPORTUNmES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 59,61-64 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1972) (arguing 
that, as of 1972, industrial organization consisted simply of applied price theory). Indeed, after reviewing 
two of the period's leading industrial organization texts, Professor Coase concludes that "Essentially 
[both authors] consider the subject of industrial organization as applied price theory." See id. at 62; see 
also JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 25--27 (1968) [hereinafter BAIN, INDUSTRIAL 0RGANI· 
ZATION]; RICHARD CAVES, AMERICAN INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, CONDUCf, PERFORMANCE 14 (1967) 
("The subject of 'industrial organization' applies the economist's models of price theory to the industries 
in the world around us."); GEORGE STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 1 (1968) (portraying 
industrial organization as "price or resource allocation theory"); Joe S. Bain, Market Classifications in 
Modem Price Theory, 56 Q.J. ECON. 560 (1942). 
197. See 0UVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 7, 23-26 (1985) (de-
scribing "orthodox framework" of economics from 1940 to 1970s). 
198. See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386, 388 (1937) (asserting that 
then-current economic theory described firms as "islands of conscious power in [an] ocean of unconscious 
co-operation like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk" (quoting D.H. RoBERTSON & 
STANLEY DENNISON, CoNTROL OF INDUSTRY 85 (1923)). 
199. /d. 
200. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 197, at 7-8 ("The prevailing orientation toward economic organi-
zation [under price theory] was that technological features of firm and market organization were deter-
minative."); id. at 23-26, 86-89; Richard N. Langlois, Transaction Costs, Production Costs, and the Pas-
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Price theory's exclusive focus on technological efficiencies was not ar-
bitrary or accidental, but instead reflected a number of overlapping as-
sumptions about the nature of markets and their supporting institutions as 
well as the capacity of firms and individuals that participate in them. For 
instance, price theory assumed that purchasers had perfect information 
about the items they purchased, or that sellers could convey such informa-
tion, and buyers could absorb it, without cost.201 Moreover, price theory as-
sumed that bargaining and enforcement costs were nonexistent, with the 
result that trading partners could negotiate complete contracts governing 
every aspect of their relationship that courts would easily enforce.Z02 The 
sage of Time, in COASEAN ECONOMICS: LAW AND ECONOMICS AND TiiE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOM-
ICS 1, 2-4 (Steven G. Medema ed., 1998) (describing technological focus of so-called Pigouvian price the-
ory); George Stigler, The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the Market, 59 J_ POL ECON. 185, 
185 (1951) (stating that economic theory has "generally treated as a (technological?) datum the problem 
of what the firm does-what governs its range of activities or functions"); Oliver Williamson, Technology 
and Transaction Cost Economics, 10 J. EcoN. BEHAV. & ORG. 355, 356 (1988) (asserting that under, 
price-theoretic paradigm, "the 'natural' boundaries of the firm were thought to be defined by engineering 
considerations")-
Thus, contemporary descriptions of the benefits of vertical integration emphasized cost reductions 
of technological origin. See, e.g., BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 196, at 381 
("[E]conomies of integration generally involve a physical or technical integration of the processes in a 
single plant. A classic case is that of integrating iron-making and steel-making to effect a saving in fuel 
costs by eliminating a reheating of the iron before it is fed to a steel furnace."); JOEL B. DIRLAM & 
ALFRED E. KAHN, FAIR COMPETITION: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST POLICY 23 (1954) 
("[I]ntegration may also have strong economic justification and may make competition more effective. 
To take the most obvious kind of example, a petroleum refinery that operates both a simple distilla-
tion and a thermal cracking unit or a steel mill that operates side by side a blast furnace and a Besse-
mer converter can make use of certain by-products, like gases or heat, which would be wasted if the 
steps were performed disconnectedly_ The possible improvements in efficiency are not confined to 
such engineering savings from integrated productive operations. A farm machinery manufacturer who 
can give his salesman a full product line to carry may make fuller use of the gasoline and time they use 
in distributing his products than if he had only one product to sell. And the economic advantages are 
not limited to efficiency: by integration a firm may uncover new supplies of raw materials, offer cus-
tomers new products or alternative sources of old ones, and reduce costs and prices through by-passing 
or supplanting a monopolist."); F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 78 (2d ed. 1980) ("One motive for vertical integration is to reduce costs. A classic 
example is found in the steel industry: Integration of blast furnaces, converters, and primary reduction 
mills reduces handling and the need for reheating."); WILLIAM G. SHEPHERD, MARKET POWER & 
EcONOMIC WELFARE 37 (1970) ("The cost advantages in a firm may be of two types: technical and 
pecuniary. Only technical economies represent a genuine improvement in social efficiencies."); 
Robert H. Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an Economic Miscon-
ception, 22 U. CHL L REv. 157, 200 (1954) (describing the benefits of vertical integration as "by-
pass[ing] a monopoly at one level, or __ . enabling the achievement of internal efficiencies")-
201. See Langlois, supra note 200, at 2 ("In this kingdom [the price-theoretic paradigm], knowledge 
remains explicitly and freely transmittable, and cognitive limits seldom if ever constrain.")- This assump-
tion was implicit in the assertion by many economists that purchasers should be "free" to choose whether 
to purchase a product that the seller wished to tie to the main product. See infra notes 204--D6 and ac-
companying text. 
202. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 197, at 7 (explaining that price-theoretic paradigm assumed that 
judicial enforcement of well-specified contracts would prevent opportunism); Kenneth Arrow, The Or-
ganization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market Versus Nonmarket Allocation, in 
PuBLIC EXPENDITURES AND POLICY ANALYSIS 59, 60 (Robert H. Haveman & Julius Margolis eds., 1970) 
("[T]he existence of vertical integration may suggest that the costs of operating competitive markets are 
not zero, as is usually assumed in our theoretical analysis." (emphasis added)); Richard N. Langlois, Con-
tract, Competition, and Efficiency, 55 BROOK. L REv. 831, 834-35 (1989) ("The traditional economic the-
ory of the firm feeds off of ___ the 'classical' theory of contract Briefly put, classical contracting involves 
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availability of such perfect contracting would, in tum, prevent opportun-
ism.203 Indeed, some price theorists assumed that firms and individuals 
would refrain from opportunism even in the absence of contractual re-
straints.204 Others assumed that firms could combat opportunism by adopt-
ing less restrictive provisions that did not limit rivalry.2°5 In short, price the-
ory assumed that market contracting-transacting-was costless.206 
These assumptions and concomitant emphasis on technological origins 
of efficiency rendered economists hostile to vertical integration generally 
and also had important implications for economists' interpretation of the 
causes and consequences of contractual integration.207 According to price 
theory, firms realized all relevant efficiencies within their boundaries, in the 
homogenous goods traded among anonymous transactors with all the (possibly contingent) terms explic-
itly spelled out in advance."). 
203. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 197, at 7; see also id. at 30 (defining opportunism as "self-interest 
seeking with guile"). 
204. For instance, economists argued that, if exclusive dealing between parties produced mutual 
benefits, dealers would observe such exclusivity voluntarily, without contractual requirement to do so. 
See DIRLAM & KAHN, supra note 200, at 181--87 ("It is difficult to see why many of the mutual benefits 
and socially beneficial consequences of exclusive dealing require coercion [i.e., contractual requirement] 
for their achievement."); Derek C. Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive Arrange-
ments Under the Clayton Act, 1961 SUP. Cr. REv. 267, 307-{)8 ("If a strong and legitimate business need 
for exclusive selling actually does exist, it is strange that dealers will not follow this policy without being 
compelled to do so by contract, for the advantages that result should benefit them as well as the firms 
from which they buy. Perhaps an occasional dealer will be too inept or short sighted to perceive his best 
interests, but such men could presumably be replaced for demonstrable inefficiency without resorting to 
the widespread use of restrictive contracts."). Others argued that purchasers were capable of deciding for 
themselves whether to purchase a product that a seller wished to "tie" to a main product. See, e.g., James 
M. Ferguson, Tying Arrangements and Reciprocity: An Economic Analysis, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
552, 558-64 (1965); Alfred E. Kahn, A Legal and Economic Appraisal of the "New" Sherman and Clayton 
Acts, 63 YALE L.J. 293, 324 n.160 (1954); William B. Lockhart & Howard R. Sacks, The Relevance of 
Economic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 
65 HARV. L. REv. 913, 946 (1952); Louis B. Schwartz, Potential Impairment of Competition-the Impact 
of Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. United States on the Standard of Legality Under the Clayton Act, 98 U. PA. 
L. REv. 10, 27 (1949) ("The efficiency of uniting two products in use [should] be judged by the user."); 
Donald F. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. REv. 50, 
66-67 (1958). Others assumed that dealers would provide optimal level of advertising and promotional 
services absent any vertical restraints. See, e.g., William S. Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer 
Restrictions: White Motor and Its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1419, 1430 (1968) (recognizing free rider 
problem but asserting that "unrestricted market" would provide sufficient presale promotional services 
by dealers). 
205. See CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TuRNER, ANTITRUST POUCY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 158 (1959) (automobile manufacturer could rely upon warranties and dealer good faith to en-
sure that dealers employed appropriate replacement parts); Donald Turner, The Definition of Agreement 
Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655, 699 (1962) 
(requirement that dealer use its best efforts within an area of "primary responsibility" will assure effective 
promotion by dealers). 
206. See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, TilE MARKET, AND mE LAW 6 (1988) (noting that "the concept of 
transaction costs" "is largely absent from current economic theory"). 
207. See BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 196, at 381 ("[T]he trained observer tends 
to form a considerable suspicion from casual observation that there is a good deal of vertical integration 
which, although not actually uneconomical, is also not justified on the basis of any cost savings. This is 
apparently true in particular of the integration of distributive facilities by manufacturing firms. In most 
cases the rationale of the integration is evidently the increase of market power of the firms rather than a re-
duction in cost." (emphasis added)); JOHN M. BLAIR, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION: STRUCTURE, BE-
HAVIOR AND PuBUC POLICY 25-40 (1972). 
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process of manufacturing the product in question.Z08 Thus, once a product 
was sold, and title to it passed beyond the firm's boundaries, a firm could do 
nothing to influence its quality or the satisfaction that the consumer re-
ceived from it. As a result, price theory recognized only "standard con-
tracts," that is, agreements of purchase and sale that simply mediated pas-
sage of title from firm to consumer (or dealer), perhaps with an 
accompanying warranty.209 Price theorists did recognize that complete ver-
tical integration could, in rare cases, produce technological efficiencies that 
were realized within a firm, before passage of title.Z10 However, they saw 
no benevolent purposes for incomplete integration achieved by so-called 
nonstandard contracts, agreements that reached beyond the firm and con-
trolled the discretion of purchasers after the passage of title or other trans-
action.211 Professor Williamson has summarized this intellectual milieu as 
follows: 
The allocation of economic activity as between firms and markets 
was taken as a datum; firms were characterized as production func-
tions; markets served as signaling devices; contracting was accom-
plished through an auctioneer; and disputes were disregarded be-
cause of the presumed efficacy of court adjudication. The 
possibility that subtle economizing purposes are served by organiza-
tional variety does not arise within-indeed is effectively beyond 
the reach of-this orthodox framework. Correspondingly, the pre-
vailing public policy attitude toward unfamiliar or nonstandard 
business practices during that interval was deep suspicion and even 
hostility.212 
208. See CoASE, supra note 206, at 3 ("The firm to an economist ... 'is effectively defined as a cost 
curve and a demand curve, and the theory [of the finn] is simply the logic of optimal pricing and input 
combination."' (quoting Marten Slater, Foreword to EDITH T. PENROSE, THE THEORY OF THE GROWTII 
OF THE FIRM, ix (2d ed. 1980))); WILLIAMSON supra note 197, at 371 (describing price-theoretic view that 
"true economies take a technological form, [and] hence are fully realized within firms" and consequently 
showing that according to the price-theoretic paradigm, there is nothing to be gained by introducing non-
standard terms into market-mediated exchange); Langlois, supra note 202, at 834 ("[T]he economists' 
firm-at least until recently-was a black box, a production function that took in inputs and transformed 
them into outputs."); id. at 835 (describing traditional theory's failure to recognize benefits of nonstan-
dard contracting); Oliver Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEO. L.J. 271, 272 (1987) (recounting the 
"prevailing practice [under price theory] of describing the firm as a production function whose natural 
boundaries were defined by technology. Economic inputs were thus transformed by the production tech-
nology into economic outputs. Organizational considerations [that might explain the boundaries of firms] 
were effectively suppressed."). 
209. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 197, at 23 (defining "classical market exchange-whereby a prod-
uct is sold at a uniform price to all consumers without restriction"). 
210. See supra note 208-09 and accompanying text (describing price-theorists' belief that complete 
vertical integration could create technological efficiencies). 
211. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 199, at 22-24 (distinguishing between "classical market exchange" 
and "nonstandard contracting"). 
212. ld. at 7. Professor Coase offered a similar evaluation of the economic milieu associated with 
price theory: 
[I]f an economist finds something-a business practice of one sort or another-that he does not 
understand, he looks for a monopoly explanation. And as in this field we are very ignorant, the 
number of ununderstandable practices tends to be rather large, and the reliance on a monopoly 
explanation, frequent. 
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Because nonstandard agreements had no apparent efficiency purposes, 
price theorists condemned such arrangements as monopolistic attempts to 
acquire or protect market power.213 
B. Price Theory and the Meaning of Competition 
Price theory's exclusive focus on technological efficiencies and con-
comitant hostility toward nonstandard contractual restraints implied a par-
ticular, narrow definition of competition. As explained earlier, Standard 
Oil equated competition with rivalry, without assigning any technical eco-
nomic meaning to either term.214 Within the lexicon of Standard Oil, then, 
all contracts are anticompetitive in the sense that they restrain the freedom 
of action of parties to them.215 The mere fact that a contract was anticom-
petitive in this sense, however, did not condemn the arrangement under the 
Rule of Reason.Z16 In a similar way, the current approach to implementing 
the per se rule treats any restraint on rivalry as anticompetitive, subject to a 
plausible assertion that the arrangement produces redeeming virtues.217 
Price theory, by contrast, imbued the word competition with norma-
tive significance and elevated the term to a technical economic concept 
functionally related to the efficient allocation of resources.218 Within this 
Coase, supra note 196, at 67. 
213. For instance, the leading textbook on industrial organization concluded that tying contracts and 
exclusive dealing arrangements had a "general tendency ... to create and preserve more concentrated 
market structures than would otherwise exist, and to elevate barriers to the entry of new sellers to various 
markets." See BAIN, INDUSlRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 196, at 364; id. at 567 (asserting that the 
"exclusionary potential" of tying contracts is "obvious"). Other scholars took similar positions. One 
economist concluded that tying contracts produced no benefits that could not be achieved by other means 
and necessarily reflected exercises of market power. See JOHN PERRY MILLER, UNFAIR COMPETITION: A 
STUDY IN CRITERIA FOR TilE CONlROL OF 'TRADE PRACITCES 199-202 (1941); Turner, supra note 205, at 
59-64 (same). Another opined that "it is almost self-evident that exclusive-dealing contracts, when im-
posed by large suppliers, will injure competition by preventing the smaller manufacturers from getting 
their goods to the market and by depriving distributors and dealers of their freedom to handle lines of 
competitive producers. There are few, if any, circumstances under which exclusive dealing imposed by 
large concerns can be envisaged as promoting competition." See BLAIR, supra note 207, at 368. Others 
concluded that contractual restraints on rivalry between dealers could produce no benefits, but would 
instead lead to excessive promotion that served only to enhance the manufacturer's market power. See 
Comanor, supra note 203, at 1436 (arguing that contractual integration cannot produce efficiencies). 
· 214. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 48 (1910). 
215. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text (describing Standard Oil's definition of competi-
tion as "rivalry," without any economic content). 
216. See supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text. As Justice Brandeis put it in Chicago Board of 
Trade, a mere reduction in competition did not indicate that a restraint produced the consequences of 
monopoly: 
The [government's] case was rested upon the bald proposition, that a rule or agreement by which 
men occupying positions of strength in any branch of trade, fixed prices at which they would buy 
or sell during an important part of the business day, is an illegal restraint of trade under the Anti-
Trust Law. But the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test, 
as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, 
restrains. To bind, to restrain is of their very essence. 
See Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,238 (1918) (emphasis added). 
217. See supra notes 102-D4 and accompanying text. 
218. See McNulty, supra note 41, at 640-50 (describing classical conception of competition and dis-
tinguishing it from modem definition). 
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paradigm, a restraint is competitive if it affects the allocation of resources in 
a manner likely to enhance social welfare, or, in the lexicon of Standard Oil, 
advances trade.219 The assumptions of price theory described earlier20 pro-
duced a particular, narrow version of legitimate competition, behavior that, 
when pursued by all market participants, maximized social welfare. In its 
most doctrinaire form, price-theoretic competition was entirely passive, 
consisting simply of responding to market demand by setting output where 
price equaled marginal cost.221 Moreover, price-theoretic competition was 
more than a behavioral concept; it was also a state of affairs.222 If replicated 
in all industries, such competition produced a "general competitive equilib-
rium," and with it optimal prices, output, and quality in all sectors.223 De-
rived from the antiseptic model of perfect competition, this definition of 
competition excluded from its ambit all varieties of nonstandard contracts, 
as well as practices-like advertising, product differentiation, and price cut-
ting-that businesspeople would deem methods of doing battle with com-
petitors.224 According to the models employed by many economists, such 
practices were not competitive at all, but instead thwarted competition and 
created or preserved market power.225 Commenting on the economist's vi-
sion of "competition" in 1948, Professor Hayek wrote: 
The peculiar nature of the assumptions from which the theory of 
competitive equilibrium starts stands out very clearly if we ask 
219. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text (showing that Standard Oil approved contracts 
that advanced trade). 
220. See supra notes 196--206 and accompanying text. 
221. See CA YES, supra note 196, at 38; COASE, supra note 206, at 3 ("The firm to an economist ... 'is 
effectively defined as a cost curve and a demand curve, and the theory (of the firm] is simply the logic of 
optimal pricing and input combination."' (quoting SLATER, supra note 208, at ix)); MACHOVEC, supra 
note 41, at 16 (stating that under perfect competition model, "the only acceptable behavior of firms is to 
mechanically reallocate capital in response to a new set of perfect-information emissions-provided like 
manna from heaven, indiscriminately and simultaneously-to the roboticized helmsmen of each firm"); 
McNulty, supra note 41, at 648-50; see also SHEPHERD, supra note 200, at 25-27; GEORGE W. STOCKING 
& MYRONW. WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 6--9 (1951). 
222. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, at 273-74 (distinguishing between the classical and modern 
notions of competition, the latter of which views competition as a "state of affairs"); McNulty, supra note 
41, at 643-45. 
223. See SCHERER, supra note 200, at 12-20 (describing model of "general competitive equilib-
rium"); SHEPHERD, supra note 200, at 25-29 (same); see also KA YSEN & TuRNER, supra note 205, at 12-
13. 
224. See Langlois, supra note 202, at 835 (linking classical theory of contract and related traditional 
theory of the firm to perfect competition model); see also McNulty, supra note 41, at 649 ("Perfect compe-
tition, on the other hand, is an equilibrium situation in which price becomes a parameter from the stand-
point of the individual firm and no market activity is possible .... (T]hus, the single activity which best 
characterized the meaning of competition in classical economics-price cutting by an individual firm in 
order to get rid of excess supplies-becomes the one activity impossible under perfect competition."). 
225. See Joan Robinson, The Impossibility of Competition, in MONOPOLY AND CoMPETITION AND 
THEIR REGULATION 245, 245-46 (Edward H. Chamberlin ed., 1954) (noting that "competition in practice 
is very imperfect and that "competition" in the broad sense in which business men understand it, largely 
consists in destroying competition in the narrow economist's sense by product differentiation, advertise-
ment, and the creation of goodwill"); see also FRIEDRICH HAYEK, Competition as Discovery Procedure, in 
NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 179, 179 (1978) 
("(Economists] who seem to derive their conception of competition solely from modern textbooks, have 
not unnaturally concluded that competition does not exist."). 
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which of the activities that are commonly designated by the verb 'to 
compete' would still be possible if those conditions were all satis-
fied. Perhaps it is worth recalling that, according to Dr. Johnson, 
competition is 'the action of endeavoring to gain what another en-
deavors to gain at the same time.' Now, how many of the devices 
adopted in ordinary life to that end would still be open to a seller in 
a market in which so-called 'perfect competition' prevails. I believe 
that the answer is exactly none. Advertising, undercutting, and im-
proving ("differentiating") the goods or services produced are all 
excluded by definition-'perfect' competition means indeed the ab-
sence of all competitive activities.226 
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While Professor Hayek accurately described the views of many 
economists, there were others who possessed a more sophisticated view of 
the subject. Many industrial organization theorists who otherwise em-
braced the price-theoretic paradigm often recognized that the real world 
usually departed from that depicted by perfect competition models.227 For 
instance, economists recognized the existence of negative and positive ex-
ternalities that might cause markets to fail to achieve the optimum alloca-
tion of resources.228 Moreover, economists recognized that firms often 
strove to improve their products or discover new (technological) methods 
of production, thus lowering costs.229 These efforts often led firms to ex-
226. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, The Meaning of Competition, in lNDIVIDUAUSM AND ECONOMIC 
ORDER, supra note 3, at 92. 
This theory (of competitive equilibrium] throughout assumes that state of affairs already to exist 
which, according to the truer view of the older theory, the process of competition tends to bring 
about (or to approximate). [Moreover] if the state of affairs assumed by the theory of perfect 
competition ever existed, it would not only deprive of their scope all the activities which the verb 
"to compete" describes but would make them virtually impossible. 
ld. at 92; see also COASE, supra note 206, at 9-10 ("Monopoly and impediments to trade such as tariffs are 
easily handled by normal price theory, whereas the absence of transaction costs in the theory makes the 
effect of a reduction in them difficult to incorporate in the analysis."); HAYEK, supra note 225, at 179 ("It 
is difficult to defend economists against the charge that for some 40 to 50 years they have been discussing 
competition on assumptions that, if they were true of the real world, would make it wholly uninteresting 
and useless." (emphasis in original)); McNulty, supra note 41, at 641 ("As it is, it is one of the great para-
doxes of economic science that every act of competition on the part of a businessman is evidence, in eco-
nomic theory, of some degree of monopoly power, while the concepts of monopoly and perfect competi-
tion have this important common feature: both are situations in which the possibility of any competitive 
behavior has been ruled out by definition."). 
227. See KA YSEN & TuRNER, supra note 205, at 8 ("The existence of significant economies of scale 
at both the plant and the firm level over some size range means that firms are not generally insignificant 
in relation to the market."). 
228. See id. at 13 n.12; SHEPHERD, supra note 200, at 27-28. 
229. See MILLER, supra note 213, at 8 ("Competition is a very complex phenomenon. It may take 
any one of several forms. It may become a rivalry in buying factors of production of better quality or in 
buying factors on more favorable terms. It may consist in an endeavor to organize and utilize factors 
more effectively in producing goods and services, this involving a rivalry in technological processes as well 
as in economy in the use and organization of men and materials. It may take the form of rivalry in attract-
ing customers. This in turn may be done in various ways: by price competition, by informative or com-
petitive advertising, by differentiation of product or of many ancillary terms and conditions of sale, or 
finally by effective choice and control of the channels of distribution."). It should be noted that Professor 
Miller's fulsome definition of competition did not include nonstandard contracts. See id. at 199-200 (ex-
plaining that tying contracts only arise where seller has a "strong monopoly position"); id. at 210 (explain-
ing that exclusive dealing arrangements only arise where there is "some element of monopoly control"); 
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pand significantly, sometimes by merger, taking advantage of (technologi-
cal) economies of scale.230 As a result, many industries were populated by 
only a few sellers, and economists recognized that such a departure from 
perfect competition was necessary to maximize social welfare.231 Nonethe-
less, while economists recognized that markets might not always be popu-
lated by numerous sellers, they generally embraced the other assumptions 
of the perfect competition model, assumptions which suggested that effi-
ciencies could only be realized within the firm.232 
Price theory's model of competition was more than theoretical: it also 
influenced the policy prescriptions of scholars, particularly those interested 
in antitrust regulation.233 In particular, this account of competition pro-
vided a benchmark against which economists and others evaluated the 
causes and consequences of nonstandard contracts.234 The classic articula-
tion of this approach can be found in an antitrust text authored by two 
Harvard economists, who premised their work on the assumption that any 
business practice that would not be adopted by a similar firm operating in a 
perfectly competitive market necessarily reflected the possession and exer-
cise of market power.235 If unchecked, such anticompetitive practices could 
SCHERER, supra note 200, at 24 (describing existence of product differentiation as a potentially beneficial 
departure from perfect competition). 
230. KA YSEN & TuRNER, supra note 205, at 128--29 ("From the standpoint of both buyers and sell-
ers, mergers may promote efficiency. Where the appropriate scale of operations or degree of integration 
of the firm changes, mergers may provide the most economical method of reshaping the structures of ex-
isting firms to the new cost conditions."). 
231. See, e.g., DIRLAM & KAHN, supra note 200, at 32 ("Product differentiation, for example, is often 
a means of competition that serves the public by providing minimum assurances of quality and by catering 
to a real consumer desire for product improvement or variation."); id. at 33 ("Rarely does the cause of 
effective competition demand an attack on an industry because of the fewness of the firms that make it 
up."); KA YSEN & TuRNER, supra note 205, at S--8; STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 221, at 53-61, 108; 
id. at 13 ("Pure competition can scarcely be realized in a machine age."). 
232. See HAYEK, supra note 226, at 94 (asserting that most assumptions of the perfect competition 
model "are equally assumed in the discussion of the various 'imperfect' or 'monopolistic' markets, which 
throughout assume certain unrealistic 'perfections"'); Langlois, supra note 200, at 2 (noting that Joan 
Robinson and Edward Chamberlin, who pioneered the theory of oligopoly, relied upon various assump-
tions of the perfect competition model); see also KA YSEN & TuRNER, supra note 205, at 7 ("The rigorous 
model of the perfectly competitive market is the appropriate starting point of any definition [of competi-
tion relevant to antitrust policy]."); id. at 8 ("Though the model of [perfectly) competitive market struc-
ture is not usable as such in our definition of competition, other concepts of the model are."). While Pro-
fessors Turner and Kaysen recognized that the perfect competition model could not provide the final 
definition of competition relevant to antitrust policy, they nonetheless assumed that any practice that a 
firm would not adopt in a perfectly competitive market reflected an exercise of market power. /d. at 8; 
see also infra note 235. 
233. See Coase, supra note 196, at 66-67 (describing particular influence that price theoretic ap-
proach to industrial organization had on antitrust policy). 
234. /d. 
235. See KA YSEN & TuRNER, supra note 205, at 8 ("Where firms can persistently behave over sub-
stantial periods of time in a manner which differs from the behavior that the competitive market would 
impose on competitive firms facing similar cost and demand conditions, they can be identified as possess-
ing market power."); id. at 75 (same); STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 221, at 108 ("The effectiveness 
of competition is apt to vary directly with the number of sellers up to the maximum consistent with the 
economies of scale."); see also BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 196, at 364 (concluding 
that concentrated "market structure ... is to some extent created by conduct, although the conduct in 
question generally is feasible because of certain basic environmental and structural characteristics of in-
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entrench and enhance a firm's market power, protecting the oligopolistic 
structure of noncompetitive industries.236 Such reasoning applied with par-
ticular force to nonstandard contracts, which limited rivalry, produced no 
cognizable benefits, and thus exercised or created market power to the det-
riment of consumers.237 According to these scholars, public policy should 
intervene in the market to eradicate such anticompetitive practices when 
feasible, and such intervention would eliminate market imperfections, ren-
der each industry as competitive as possible, and assure optimal prices, out-
put, and quality.238 Many economists held similar views, and other antitrust 
scholars followed suit, evaluating and condemning various nonstandard 
contracts as anticompetitive attempts to create, protect, or exercise market 
power.239 
dustries that various sellers can exploit to their advantage"). Despite the qualification ("generally"), Pro-
fessor Bain offered no account of how or why such contracts would arise absent an already concentrated 
market structure. Another Harvard scholar assumed that any practice other than the "efficient organiza-
tion of production" reflected the exercise of market power. See MILLER, supra note 213, at 8 ("In a 
purely competitive market competition becomes simply a matter of efficiency in organization of produc-
tion and the correct determination of the quantity to be produced. But such conditions are rare. It is 
doubtful whether there is any market in which neither the demand nor the supply is significantly affected 
by monopolistic or monopsonistic forces."). 
236. KA YSEN & TuRNER, supra note 205, at 79---ro, 89-91; see also BAIN, INDUSfRIAL 0RGANIZA· 
TION, supra note 196, at 363-65 (concluding that various nonstandard practices fortify preexisting market 
power). 
237. See KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 205, at 157-59 (arguing that tying contracts necessarily re-
flect an exercise of market power); id. at 156-57 (arguing that concerted refusals to deal are nearly always 
anticompetitive and thus should be unlawful per se). Other economists agreed. See BAIN, INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION, supra note 196, at 363-65 (defining tying and exclusive dealing contracts as ;•predatory" 
practices that thwart effective competition); MILLER, supra note 213, at 199 ("A tying arrangement is a 
successful business practice only in the circumstance that the seller has a strong monopoly position in one 
or more products."); id. at 210 ("Exclusive dealing arrangements ... are useful only in markets where 
there are some elements of monopoly control in the manufacture of the product."). It should be noted 
that Professors Kaysen and Turner made no attempt to explain those tying contracts imposed in appar-
ently competitive markets. Such arrangements, they said, were "random small transactions of no conse-
quence." See KA YSEN & TuRNER, supra note 205, at 159. 
238. See KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 205, at 12-13 (citing A.C. PlGOU, ECONOMICS OF WEL-
FARE (4th ed. 1932)); see also BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 196, at 503 (arguing that 
public policy should encourage "workably competitive markets" and "reasonably good economic per-
formance" by, inter alia, banning predatory and exclusionary conduct); id. at 506-08; id. at 14 
("[W]orkable (reasonably satisfactory) competition is revealed by, and is the result of whatever gives rise 
to, reasonably satisfactory or workable market performance-performance that enhances the aggregate 
economic welfare to a reasonable degree. Ideal performance is found in adaptations of enterprises to 
their markets which enhance to the maximum possible degree the attainment of the overall economic 
objectives relating to employment, efficiency, income distribution, and so on. "Workable" performance 
generally refers to adaptations of enterprises to their markets which reasonably approximate the ideal, or 
do not embody gross and important discrepancies from it."); id. at 14-15 (describing as "ideal" economic 
performance that produces prices equal to cost, i.e., perfect competition). 
239. See supra notes 235-37 (collecting authorities agreeing with Kaysen and Turner). Other classic 
exemplars of this approach include: DIRLAM & KAHN, supra note 200; EARL W. KINTNER, AN ANTI· 
TRUST PRIMER (1964); MILLER, supra note 213; LoUIS SCHWARTZ, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC 
ORGANIZATION (1959); STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 221; LAWRENCE SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 
(1977); Comanor, supra note 204; see also Jacobs, supra note 65, at 226-27 (contending that "Harvard 
School" of industrial organization dominated antitrust thought in the 1960s). 
Indeed, even Professor Oark, praised by Professor Hayek for embracing an expansive definition of 
"competition," defined competition in a manner that seemed to exclude contractual limits on the 
discretion of firms, i.e., nonstandard contracts. "Competition between business units in the production 
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C. Judicial Reliance on Price Theory 
For over three decades, courts implementing Standard Oil's Rule of 
Reason embraced price theory with a vengeance, often at the behest of ex-
pert enforcement agencies.240 As explained earlier, Standard Oil equated 
competition with rivalry, which normal contracts could duly restrict.241 Ul-
timately, however, courts came to adopt price theory's more stylized defini-
tion of the term, which treated competition as that collection of business 
practices leading to the efficient allocation of resources and thus the maxi-
mization of social welfare.242 While this redefinition of "competition" re-
tained Standard Oil's normative focus on consumer welfare, courts simulta-
neously embraced the various descriptive assumptions generated by price 
theory's brand of industrial organization and the particular model of com-
petition that these assumptions implied.Z43 More precisely, courts during 
this era held that antitrust regulation was designed to interdict any and all 
limitations on competition, which they defined as moment-to-moment 
technological rivalry between completely autonomous firms unconstrained 
by nonstandard contracts.244 What followed was the so-called inhospitality 
tradition of antitrust, which manifested itself in the form of extreme hostil-
ity toward any contractual restraint on the freedom of individuals or firms 
to engage in head-to-head rivalry.245 According to this approach, practices 
and sale of goods is the effort of such units, acting independently of one another (without concerted 
action), each trying to make a profitable volume of sales in the face of the offers of other sellers of 
identical or closely similar products." JOHN MAURICE CLARK, CoMPETITION AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS 
13 (1961) [hereinafter CLARK, COMPETITION]; see also HAYEK, supra note 226, at 92; J.M. Oark, Toward 
a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. ECON. REv. 241 (1940) (arguing that the perfect competition 
model did not provide a useful benchmark for judging the efficacy of competition in actual markets). 
240. The period in question began about 1940 and ended in 1977, with the Supreme Court's decision 
in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). See infra notes 345-48 and accompa-
nying text (discussing GTE Sylvania). 
241. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
242. See infra Part III.E. 
243. See supra notes 196-232 and accompanying text (describing various assumptions associated with 
price-theoretic industrial organization). 
244. Professor Oark, who embraced a broad view of the meaning of competition (approvingly) 
characterized antitrust's definition of "competition" as follows: 
[T]he concept of competition that has grown out of the antitrust laws is not confined to price 
competition, but accords a place to competition as affecting productive techniques and quality 
and design of products. As to productive techniques, it is especially concerned that access of pro-
ducers to good and efficient techniques should be as wide as is consistent with the essential pur-
pose of the patent system. This system is built around the principle of stimulating innovation in 
products and technical methods by offering inventors a temporary monopoly in the particular in-
ventions each has made, on condition that their specifications are publicly disclosed .... [A] bal-
anced conception of competition-one in which the aspects of productive techniques, improved 
and differentiated products, and price all play a part. 
See CLARK, CoMPETITION, supra note 239, at 47. This, of course, is a purely technological conception of 
competition. 
245. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 197, at 19 (describing inhospitality tradition of antitrust): id. at 
370-73 (describing influence of inhospitality tradition on antitrust treatment of nonstandard contracts); 
Easterbrook, supra note 184, at 715 ("(The] 'inhospitality tradition of antitrust' ... called for courts to 
strike down business practices that were not clearly procompetitive. In this tradition an inference of mo-
nopolization followed from the courts' inability to grasp how a practice might be consistent with substan-
tial competition. The tradition took hold when many practices were genuine mysteries to economists, and 
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inexplicable under the price-theoretic model of competition were necessar-
ily anticompetitive attempts to acquire or exercise market power and thus 
resulted in a noncompetitive allocation of resources.246 
This inhospitality tradition pervaded antitrust law in general and the 
Sherman Act in particular, especially the standard courts employed when 
conducting per se analysis. The result was a vast expansion of the scope of 
per se rules and concomitant contraction of the scope and importance of 
more thorough Rule of Reason analysis. Agreements limiting rivalry be-
tween joint venturers were unlawful per se, even if such arrangements were 
ancillary to an otherwise legitimate venture that enhanced rivalry with non-
venturers and thus appeared to produce benefits for consumers.247 Accord-
ing to the Supreme Court, such agreements amounted to a "destruction of 
competition in one sector of the economy," infringed the "freedom of indi-
vidual members [of a venture] to compete," were "always or almost always 
anticompetitive," and produced no redeeming virtues.248 Collective refusals 
to deal were similarly unlawful per se, regardless whether they produced or 
threatened to produce tangible harm to consumers.249 Such arrangements 
deprived their victims of the "freedom to buy ... in an open competitive 
market,"250 "interfere[ d) with the natural flow of ... commerce,"251 and had 
monopolistic explanations were congenial. The same tradition emphasized competition in the spot mar-
ket. Long-term contracts, even those arrived at by competitive processes, were deemed anticompetitive 
because they shut off day-to-day rivalry."). The phrase "inhospitality tradition of antitrust" apparently 
was coined by Professor Donald Turner, an economist who headed the Antitrust Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice in the 1%0s. According to Professor Turner ,"I approach territorial and customer restric-
tions not hospitably in the common law tradition, but inhospitably in the tradition of antitrust law." Don-
ald F. Turner, Some Reflections on Antitrust, 1966 N.Y. ST. B.A. ANTITRUST L. SYMP. 1, 1-2; see also 
Jacobs, supra note 65, at 227-28 (describing so-called Harvard School of industrial organization and anti-
trust policy during this period); infra notes 299-301 and accompanying text (collecting decisions contend-
ing that (price-theoretic) competition would maximize social welfare). 
246. Easterbrook, supra note 184, at 715. 
247. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (declaring ancillary-restraints allo-
cating territories among joint venture partners unlawful per se, despite district court finding that partici-
pants possessed no market power and that venture enhanced competition); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 
388 U.S. 350 (1%7) (same). See generally, Meese, supra note 107, at 469-70 n.30-31 (quoting extensively 
from district court findings in Topco that the restraints facilitated the success of the venture vis-a-vis lar-
ger, integrated chains, thus serving the interests of consumers). 
248. See Topco, 405 U.S. at 610-11 ("Implicit in such freedom is the notion that it cannot be fore-
closed with respect to one sector of the economy because certain private citizens or groups believe that 
such foreclosure might promote greater competition in a more important sector of the economy."); Sealy, 
388 U.S. at 355 (finding horizontal ancillary restraints unlawful because "their anticompetitive nature and 
effect are so apparent and so serious that the courts will not pause to assess them in light of the rule of 
reason"). 
249. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Ught & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (declaring gas 
companies' collective refusal to deal with customers of burner manufacturer unlawful per se ); Klor's, Inc. 
v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (collective refusal by appliance manufacturers to deal 
with single retailer in San Francisco unlawful per se despite absence of any showing of public harm); Fash-
ion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1940); see also MACHOVEC, supra note 41, 
at 205--{)6 (finding link between perfect competition model and this and certain other per se rules). 
250. Klor's, Inc., 359 U.S. at 213; id. at 211 (Standard Oirs Rule of Reason voids contracts that "in-
terfered with the 'natural flow' of an appreciable amount of interstate commerce." (quoting Standard Oil 
Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 57, 61 (1911))). 
251. Radiant Burners, 364 U.S. at 660 (quoting Klor's, Inc., 359 U.S. at 213). 
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"by [their] 'nature' and 'character,' a 'monopolistic tendency."'252 Horizon-
tal price-fixing that reduced prices was automatically unlawful, because it 
"cripple[ d) the freedom of traders ... to sell in accordance with their own 
judgment. "253 
Courts did not reserve this hostility for agreements among rivals, but 
exhibited equal disdain for vertical arrangements. Here again, nonstandard 
agreements that reduced some form of rivalry were deemed without re-
deeming virtue and thus anticompetitive attempts to obtain or exercise 
market power. While not unreasonable per se, vertical mergers between a 
manufacturer and distributor were unlawful under the Clayton Act if the 
distributor possessed a nontrivial share of the market, with the result that 
the transaction resulted in a "foreclosure of a share of the market otherwise 
open to competitors."254 Exclusive dealing contracts that bound a nontrivial 
number of dealers were unlawful, regardless of their benefits, because they 
placed a "potential clog on competition,''255 took "away freedom of pur-
chasers to buy in an open market," and were thus "anticompetitive."256 Ar-
rangements whereby a manufacturer encouraged dealers to purchase and 
promote the products of a particular supplier were equally problematic, 
even though they were not de jure or de facto exclusionary. Such arrange-
ments precluded dealers from making purchasing decisions "solely on the 
basis of competitive merit" because they ensured that "non-sponsored 
brands do not compete on even terms of price and quality competition."257 
Such arrangements "impaired competition"258 and "adversely affected" the 
"operation of the competitive market."259 They were not normal competi-
252. Klor's, Inc., 359 U.S. at 213 (quoting Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 68). 
253. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951). 
254. See Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,327-34 (1%2) (finding vertical merger 
unlawful where transaction would "foreclose" other manufacturers from two to three percent of the 
nation's shoe stores); United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95, 104-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1%4) 
(finding that merger between copper producer and one of ten manufacturers of "paper insulated copper 
wire" lessened competition by foreclosing other manufacturers from selling copper to the purchased 
firm); In re A.G. Spaulding & Bros., Inc., 56 F.T.C. 1125, 1168-69 (1%0) (declaring vertical merger 
unlawful without regard to share of market actually foreclosed). 
255. Standard Oil of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (finding that exclusive dealing con-
tracts necessarily "substantially lessen[ed] competition" where manufacturer bound 6.7% of region's 
dealers); United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (finding unlawful exclusive 
dealing contract that bound three percent of region's dealers), affd, 343 U.S. 922 (1952). 
256. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 320-21 (1966) (finding that such an agreement in-
volving one percent of the nation's shoe retailers offends the "central policy of the Sherman Act" and 
thus constitutes an "unfair trade practice" in violation of section 5 of the FTC Act); see also Dictograph 
Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 821, 828 (2d Cir. 1954) ("It is the policy of the Congress that [the defen-
dant's] merchandise must stand on its own feet in the open market ... without the competitive advantage 
to be obtained by the use of prohibited exclusionary agreements."). 
257. See FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223,230 (1968). 
258. See Atl. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357,370 (1965). 
259. See Texaco, 393 U.S. at 230; see also In re Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 58 F.T.C. 371, 413 
(1961) (banning supplier's agreement to pay distributor large commissions because, under such an ar-
rangement, "[t]he success of the one group is not due to the fact that its members are more able competi-
tors, nor because they offer superior products and services, and the failure of the other group is not trace-
able solely to the possible inferiority of their products and services. The one outstanding fact is that group 
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tive practices, but instead involved the "utilization of economic power in 
one market to curtail competition in another,"260 and the "use of economic 
power as a partial substitute for competitive merit."261 Even if such ar-
rangements produced benefits, they constituted "unfair methods of compe-
tition" whenever they involved a substantial amount of commerce.262 
Other vertical arrangements suffered a similar fate, and for similar 
reasons. Thus, tying contracts "den[ied] competitors free access to the 
market ... because of [the seller's] power or leverage" and thus curbed 
"competition on the merits with respect to the tied product."263 Sellers 
could invariably achieve any benefits produced by such contracts through 
less restrictive means.264 So, for instance, a seller that wished to protect the 
goodwill of the tying product by ensuring that purchasers used tied prod-
ucts of sufficient quality could provide information to consumers about the 
merits of the tied product or even adopt contractual specifications govern-
ing the quality of compliments the consumer could purchase.265 Such less 
restrictive alternatives were consistent with (price-theoretic) competition.Z66 
of [defendant J dealers has been successful ... because of the sales commission system and not because of 
either their own competitive abilities or because of the competitive advantages of their products."). 
260. See At/. Ref Co,, 381 U.S. at 369; id. at 376 (finding "little point" for the arrangement "were it 
not for (defendants'] ability to exert power over their wholesalers and dealers"); see also Texaco, 393 U.S. 
at 228-29 (finding that, despite lack of facts showing actual coercion "Texaco's dominant economic power 
was used in a manner which tended to foreclose competition in the marketing of [tires, batteries and ac-
cessories]"). 
261. Texaco, 393 U.S. at 230. 
262. See id. at 230 ("The Commission is not required to show that a practice it condemns has totally 
eliminated competition in the relevant market. It is enough that the Commission found that the practice 
in question unfairly burdened competition for a not insubstantial volume of commerce."); At/. Ref Co., 
381 U.S. at 371 (conceding that such contracts "may well provide Atlantic with an economical method of 
assuring efficient product distribution among its dealers"); id. (finding "it unnecessary to embark upon a 
full-scale economic analysis of competitive effect . . . (because] the Commission found that a not 
insubstantial portion of commerce is affected."). 
263. See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498 (1969) (quoting N. Pac. 
Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958)); United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-46 (1963); 
id. at 48 (describing adverse effects of contracts in question on "free competition"); see also Meese, supra 
note 68, at 13-16 (describing traditional view that tying contracts are the result of "coercive forcing"). 
264. See Fortner Enters., 394 U.S. at 503 ("[T]ying arrangements generally serve no legitimate busi-
ness purpose that cannot be achieved in some less restrictive way."); Standard Oil, 337 U.S. at 306 (same). 
265. See Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953) (claiming that "any 
intrinsic superiority of the 'tied' product would convince freely choosing buyers to select it over others, 
anyway"); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949); Int'l Salt Co. v. United 
States, 332 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1948) (finding that seller may not protect goodwill of tying product by re-
sorting to "disguised restraints of free competition"); Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 
131, 138-39 (1936) (stating that seller could protect goodwill by "proclaiming the virtues of its own cards 
or warning against the danger of using in its machines, cards which do not conform to the necessary speci-
fications, or ... make[ J its leases conditional upon the use of cards which conform to them"); Siegel v. 
Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43,51-52 (9th Cir. 1971) (same); Meese, supra note 68, at 71-84 (describ-
ing traditional view that various less restrictive alternatives could achieve legitimate objectives of tying 
contracts). 
266. The economic merit in tying rivets to machines and an economic justification for such ty-
ing will not suffice to prevent the operation of the statute. The Oayton Act is intended to pre-
serve competitive conditions. The open market not the court should be the forum for the presen-
tation of claims as to the merits of tied articles. The lessees are quite capable of judging for 
themselves in an atmosphere of competition whether or not the rivets of one manufacturer will 
work in the machines of another. 
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Firms that sought tying contracts, on the other hand, were exercising mar-
ket power to force purchasers to take a tied product of lower quality, higher 
price, or both.Z67 Thus, such agreements "serve[ d] hardly any purpose be-
yond the suppression of competition. "268 
Courts even went so far as to ban agreements limiting rivalry between 
a manufacturer's own dealers in the sale of its product. Resale price main-
tenance and exclusive territories were unlawful per se, as were restrictions 
on the identity of customers to whom dealers could resell.269 Like franchis-
ing, such arrangements were unusual, "inconsistent with the free-market 
principles embodied in the Sherman Act,"270 and "so obviously destructive 
of competition that their mere existence [was] enough" to justify condem-
nation.271 Exceptions were made only for agreements of consignment, un-
der which the manufacturer retained title to its product and thus realized 
efficiencies within its own boundaries.Z72 Indeed, courts even banned con-
tractual arrangements that assured consumers lower prices, i.e., maximum 
resale price maintenance. Such vertical price ceilings, the Court said, inter-
fered with "the forces of a competitive market," crippled the ability of deal-
ers "to compete," and produced no corresponding benefits.273 Here again, 
the Court equated competition with technological rivalry, unconstrained by 
nonstandard contracts, even if such competition produced prices higher 
than those set by the challenged contract. 
Judson L. Thompson Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 952,958 (1st Cir. 1945) (emphases added); cf supra note 
201 and accompanying text (describing assumptions by price theorists that firms could costlessly convey 
information and that purchasers would readily absorb such information). 
267. See Fortner Enters., 394 U.S. at 498; N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5-6; see also KAYSEN & 
TuRNER, supra note 205, at 157 ("[T]ying implies some market power on the part of the seller practicing 
it."). 
268. See Fortner Enters., 394 U.S. at 498 (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5-6). To be sure, 
courts purported to qualify the per se rule with a requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate the seller's 
economic power in the market for the tying product. SeeN. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 6-7. Still, courts 
found such power so readily as to render this requirement barely relevant. So, for instance, courts 
held that sellers had sufficient economic power whenever they possessed a product with "unique at-
tributes" that was "attractive to consumers," i.e., whenever the market in question was characterized 
by product differentiation. See Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. at 45; id. at 46-48 (finding that possession of a 
copyright creates presumption of economic power); Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d at 49-50. Indeed, as 
suggested in the text, courts even went so far as to find that the existence of such contracts itself im-
plied the "power" to impose them. See Fortner Enters., 394 U.S. at 504; Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. at 49 
(fact of market foreclosure confirmed presumption that copyright conferred economic power); N. Pac. 
Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 7-8 ("[T]he very existence of this host of tying arrangements is itself compelling 
evidence of the defendant's great power."); cf id. at 6-7 (no "economic power" would be present if 
"one of a dozen food stores in a community were to refuse to sell flour unless the buyer also took 
sugar"). In short, any departure from perfect competition (including the very existence of tying con-
tracts) was deemed evidence of economic power. 
269. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
270. United States v. Gen. Motors Co., 384 U.S. 127, 145-48 (1966). 
271. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. at 379; see also Gen. Motors, 384 U.S. at 146. 
272. See Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. at 379-82 (recognizing that restrictions governing con-
signment sales may be reasonable methods of competition with other manufacturers); Comanor, supra 
note 204, at 1436 (contending that contractual integration cannot produce efficiencies); see also infra 
notes 278-80 and accompanying text (describing endorsement of similar economic reasoning by the 
United States); cf Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13 (1964). 
273. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968). 
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The Court did not pursue this vision of competition unilaterally, but 
instead received help and encouragement from expert enforcement agen-
cies, viz., the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. In 
administrative decisions and briefs filed with the Court, these agencies re-
peatedly embraced the assumptions of price theory and the concomitant 
account of competition that these assumptions implied.274 If exclusive deal-
ing produced cognizable benefits, the government said, dealers would 
choose such a course voluntarily, that is, without any contractual require-
ment.275 Thus, contracts requiring such exclusivity suppressed competi-
tion.276 According to the Department of Justice, exclusive territories, loca-
tion clauses, and customer restrictions produced no benefits, because: (1) 
distribution efficiencies could only be realized within the boundaries of the 
firm277 or, at any rate, (2) through less restrictive altematives.278 Accord-
274. At least some enforcement officials were aware of their influence on generalist courts and re-
solved only to bring those cases that rested upon what they believed to be sound legal and economic 
propositions: 
It is the duty of the Department of Justice, not to bring a case simply on the basis that it thinks it 
can win, but to bring only those cases that it thinks it should win. It is our duty to do the best we 
can in determining appropriate interpretations of the law, and in assisting the courts in creating a 
rational body of antitrust law by seeking to win cases only on the basis of legal propositions which 
the Government believes to be sound, on the basis of the best thought it can bring to bear. I be-
lieve that it is important that the Government accept this obligation with particular seriousness 
when it brings antitrust cases. Because antitrust problems are typically technical and complex, 
many courts, whether rightly or wrongly, tend to rely to a greater extent than usual upon the 
Government's presentation of its case. This tendency is reinforced by the fact that many issues of 
antitrust law are presented to the courts in cases involving the FTC-cases in which the courts 
tend to defer to the judgment of an administrative agency. Thus the Department of Justice must 
refrain from arguing cases upon dubious legal grounds, even though, by exercising this restraint, it 
loses cases that might otherwise be won. 
Donald Turner, Address to the American Bar Association, 10 ANTrrnuST BuLL. 685, 686 (1965). Thus, 
the enforcement agencies shared a significant portion of the responsibility for the dominance of price the-
ory's model of competition during this period. 
275. In FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., the Solicitor General, head of the Antitrust Division, and FTC 
urged the Court to void exclusive dealing contracts because: 
[E]ven if it were supposed that complete line concentration was the most efficient approach, one 
would expect that retailers would be eager to achieve the attendant economies and would not 
have to be held to the line by contractual agreement. As the Commission concluded, "[w]hile 
line concentration itself may or may not be economically justifiable, there is no economic justifi-
cation for making the adherence to this doctrine the subject of agreement between buyer and 
seller and enforcing the agreement to the latter's advantage". Independent shoe dealers do not 
need restrictions on their freedom of choice in order to achieve efficiency. 
Brief for the Federal Trade Commission et al. at 29-30, FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966) (No. 
118) (citation omitted); see also supra note 204 and accompanying text (describing identical assumption 
by price theorists). 
276. See Brief for the Federal Trade Commission et al. at 30, Brown Shoe Co. (No. 118). 
277. In a brief coauthored by Donald Turner and Richard Posner, the United States argued: 
[A] rule that treats manufacturers who assume the distribution function themselves more leni-
ently than those who impose restraints on independent distributors merely reflects the fact that, 
although integration in distribution may sometimes benefit the economy by leading to cost sav-
ings, agreements to maintain resale prices or to impose territorial restrictions of unlimited dura-
tion or outlet limitations of the type involved here have never been shown to produce comparable 
economies. 
Brief for the United States at 50, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (No. 25). 
278. See Brief for the United States at 25-26, White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) 
(No. 54); see also Turner, supra note 205, at 699 (arguing that legitimate objectives of exclusive territories 
could be achieved through "less restrictive alternatives such as a clause assigning each dealer a territory of 
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ingly, such arrangements had no purpose except to "restrict competition 
among parties who would otherwise compete" and overrode "the inde-
pendent allocations [of sales effort] which would be made by individual 
firms in responses to the forces in a free market."279 The Federal Trade 
Commission agreed, stating that such arrangements prevented "competitive 
considerations ... from playing their normal part in distributor and dealer 
relationships," and marked a "distortion of natural patterns of distribu-
tion."280 Numerous antitrust scholars agreed with these assessments.281 
Exclusive territories ancillary to the formation of a joint venture met 
similar disdain. Although such arrangements could perhaps encourage lo-
cal advertising, such advertising was "from the standpoint of the policy of 
the antitrust laws ... at best, a mixed blessing."282 At any rate, there were 
less restrictive methods of achieving such promotion, and exclusive territo-
ries would result in a "severe diminution in the amount and vigor of compe-
primary responsibility which he agrees to use his best efforts to develop"). The endorsement of so-called 
best efforts clauses is of course an example of the price-theoretic assumption that judicial interpretation 
and enforcement of contracts is costless. See supra notes 202-D6 and accompanying text (explaining that 
price theory adopted this assumption). 
279. See Brief for the United States at 21, 25, White Motor Co. (No. 54); see also id. at 24 ("The pol-
icy of the Sherman Act is that the proportion of time, money, and effort to be devoted to interbrand 
rather than intrabrand competition and to each of the inducements offered by sellers to buyers, is to be 
detennined by the free decisions of individual sellers, not by agreements between a manufacturer and its 
purchasers."); id. at 22 ("The function of the agreement, thus described, is to restrain competition-the 
very thing the Sherman Act forbids-and thus the argument stands as its own condemnation. The policy 
of the Sherman Act does not prefer one form of competition to another. The Act is based on the phi-
losophy that the most efficient distribution of trucks, as of any other product, will result from intrabrand 
competition between sellers of one brand."). 
280. See In re Sandura Co., 61 F.T.C. 756, 815-16 (1958); id. at 814 (referring to the "competitive 
distortions engendered by respondent's artificial distribution structure"). 
281. For instance, responding to the argument that exclusive territories or location clauses were le-
gitimate methods of assuring adequate dealer promotion, Professor Lawrence Sullivan opined: 
The most comprehensive response to arguments like this is that [intrabrand) competition should 
be the device which determines what the public really needs or wants. Take the claim that display 
facilities are needed. If the public prefers expensive shopping amenities to lower prices, it will 
pay the higher prices to have greater amenities .... This is what should happen .... The contrary 
view assumes that the manufacturer knows better than the market how dealers ought to be de-
ployed and what services and facilities they should offer in order to maximize output. But this ar-
gument, like the comparable one in favor of resale price maintenance, assumes that the manufac-
turer will always know what is best and that his administered judgment about the ideal 
deployment of outlets across the nation will be more efficient than the deployment achieved 
through [the) myriad individual decisions by dealers investing in the distribution process. This as-
sumption undercuts the primary policy commitment which underlies the whole of antitrust, the 
conviction that market decisions are likely to be more sensitive, flexible and accurate gauges of 
the way resources should be deployed than any monolithic, administered decision. 
SULLIVAN, supra note 239, at 414-16 (emphasis added). Like price theorists, then, Professor Sullivan 
drew a distinction between "competition" and "the market," on the one hand, and nonstandard contracts 
(the manufacturer's "monolithic, administered decision") on the other. The later simply did not consti-
tute "competition." See id. at 15-17 (lauding various price-theoretic industrial organization textbooks as 
proper basis for antitrust economics). 
282. See Brief for the United States at 19, United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (No. 9); 
see also Brief for the United States at 28, United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (No. 
70-82) (arguing that brand names necessarily "insulate [a product) to some degree, from competition") 
(citing JOE S. BAlN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THElR CHARACI"ER AND CONSEQUENCES 1N 
MANUFACfURlNG INDUSTRIES 114-15 (1956)). 
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titian in the industry."283 Indeed, the United States went so far as to com-
pare such restrictions (unfavorably) to governmental regulation of market 
entry, the latter of which was superior because administered by disinter-
ested regulators.284 
The Court's hostility toward any and all contracts that limited compe-
tition as it defined it, may seem inconsistent with Standard Oil's normative 
conclusion that the Sherman Act only bans undue restraints on competi-
tion.285 Any apparent inconsistency is illusory, however, and close analysis 
reveals that the Court's embrace of price theory was not inconsistent with 
Standard Oil's consumer-driven approach. Standard Oil did not equate 
competition with any formal state of affairs or technological practices lead-
ing to that state and thus did not approve any restraints that are anticom-
petitive in a price-theoretic sense.286 Instead, as noted earlier, that decision 
equated competition with rivalry, and recognized that some (but not all) re-
straints on such "competition" could enhance consumer welfare.287 
For its part, the price-theoretic Court did not "disintegrate [soci-
ety] ... into individual atoms," but like Standard Oil, instead validated or 
signaled approval of some restrictions on rivalry that appeared to produce 
technological efficiencies within firms.288 For instance, while the Court 
banned outright limits on how and where a dealer could resell a product, it 
approved identical limits on dealers that took the form of consignment 
agreements.289 Such contractual arrangements, which controlled dealers so 
long as title remained within the manufacturer, allowed firms some control 
over their distribution network and thus advanced price-theoretic competi-
tion.290 Moreover, while the Court was generally hostile to horizontal and 
vertical mergers during this period, it repeatedly signaled its approval of 
transactions that eliminated rivalry between smaller firms if necessary to 
produce (technological) economies of scale and thereby create a more ef-
fective competitor.291 Like consignment agreements, such transactions re-
283. See Brief for the United States at 19, Sealy (No. 9); see also Brief in Reply for the United States 
at 3, Topco (such restrictions are unlawful per se because "[t]he theory of the Sherman Act is that the free 
forces of the marketplace, and not agreements among competitors, are to determine the allocation of 
business."). 
284. See Brief for the United States at 26, Topco (No. 70-82). 
285. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. 
286. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (explaining that Standard Oil equated "competi-
tion" with rivalry). 
287. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. 
288. Cf N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 193,411 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
289. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 377-82 (1%7). 
290. See Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. at 379-81; id. at 382 (sustaining district court's finding that 
the "net effect" [of a consignment arrangement] is to preserve and not to damage competition in the bicy-
cle market"). 
291. See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277 (1966) (suggesting that a merger 
could be "defended on the ground that ... the two had to merge to save themselves from destruction by 
some larger and more powerful competitor"); United States v. Phila. Nat'! Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370-71 
(1963) (noting that "two small firms ... [may] merge in order ... to compete more successfully with the 
leading firms"); United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. 294, 319-20 (1962) (stating that merger be-
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strained competition in some sense, by eliminating rivalry that might oth-
erwise take place. Nonetheless, the Court said, such restrictions advanced 
overall competition as understood by price theorists, and thus were not un-
due restrictions of competition of the sort condemned by Standard Oi/?92 
Even decisions of this era that voided nonstandard contracts often in-
voked Standard Oil, purporting at least to ban only those restraints that un-
reasonably restrained trade.293 However, price theory's conclusion that 
nonstandard contracts produced no cognizable benefits led the Court to 
conclude that such agreements were not normal, usual, or ordinary prac-
tices that advanced competition and trade, but were instead unusual meth-
ods that reflected the exercise of or attempt to acquire market power and 
thus threatened the "evil consequences" of monopoly.294 Because such re-
straints were inconsistent with a competitive market, they restrained trade 
unduly and were thus banned.295 While the Court voided some restraints 
that the Standard Oil Court may have approved, it did not reject the deci-
sion's normative premise but instead applied that premise in light of new 
theory, just as Standard Oil suggested.Z96 
To be sure, the vision of competition embraced by the Court served 
social and political goals aside from the furtherance of economic effi-
ciency.297 In particular, decisions voiding nonstandard contracts appeared 
tween small firms could create a more effective competitor against dominant firms and thus result in a 
"stimulation to competition"). 
292. See supra notes 38---39 and accompanying text (Standard Oil forbids only undue limits on corn-
petition); see also Phila. Nat'/ Bank, 374 U.S. at 367 ("The test of a competitive market is not only 
whether small competitors flourish but also whether consumers are well served."). 
293. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1972}; Arnold, Schwinn & 
Co., 388 U.S. at 374 (citing Standard Oil for the proposition that the Court must determine "whether the 
restraint is 'reasonable' in the special sense in which § 1 of the Sherman Act must be read for purposes of 
this inquiry"}; Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 2fJ7, 211 (1959) (describing Standard 
Oil as "(a]landrnark (case]" that "read§ 1 to prohibit ... undue restraints of trade"); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. 
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958} ("The courts have construed[§ 1] as precluding only those contracts or 
combinations which 'unreasonably' restrain competition.") (citing Standard Oil). It should be noted that 
several decisions that failed to cite Standard Oil relied upon N. Pac. Ry. Co.'s articulation of the per se 
rule. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Motors Co., 384 U.S. 127, 145--46 (1966}. 
294. See Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. at 379 (enforcement of vertical restraints "would sanction 
franchising and confinement of distribution as the ordinary instead of the unusual method"}; Klor's, Inc., 
359 U.S. at 213 (group boycott per se unlawful because it had a "monopolistic tendency"); id. at 211 
(Standard Oil banned contracts with a "monopolistic tendency" (quoting Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. 
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 57 (1911))}. 
295. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc., 359 U.S. at 213 (group boycott "interferes with the natural flow of inter-
state commerce"); cf Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 61 (Sherman Act forbids contracts that produce an "un-
due restraint of the course of trade"}; id. at 58 (American common law treated as illegal contracts that 
had the effect of restraining the "free flow of commerce"). 
296. See supra notes 35-40 (showing that Standard Oil's Rule of Reason necessarily requires courts 
to apply evolving economic theory). 
297. See Meese, supra note 107, at~ (describing influence of "Populist" social and political 
concerns on antitrust doctrine during this period}; see also Topco, 405 U.S. at 610-11 (characterizing the 
Sherman Act as a "Magna Carta of free enterprise" that guarantees individual traders the "right" to be 
free of voluntary contractual restrictions on competition); United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. 294, 
344 (1962) (claiming that Congress intended the Oayton Act to further decentralization of economic 
power even if higher costs and prices might result). 
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to enhance the freedom of dealers and others bound by such agreements.298 
Still, as a rhetorical matter at least, the Court embraced its version of com-
petition primarily because of its economic benefits.Z99 In language that 
could have come from a textbook on industrial organization, the Court in-
sisted that its version of competition between firms unrestrained by non-
standard contracts would produce competitive markets and thus optimal 
(competitive) prices, output and quality, maximizing the economic welfare 
of society and consumers.300 Any furtherance of noneconomic values was 
incidental to competition's tendency to enhance economic welfare. 
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of 
economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competi-
tion as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that "the unre-
strained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation 
of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and 
the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an 
environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic po-
litical and social institutions.301 
By defining competition so narrowly, to exclude nonstandard contracts as 
monopolistic, the Court was able to justify expansive interference in the 
economy, under the guise of correcting market failure.302 So long as the 
298. See Meese, supra note 112, at 176-83 (describing so-called Populist approach to vertical re-
straints that seeks to enhance the "freedom" of dealers and others from such contracts). But see id. at 
184-95 (arguing that nonstandard agreements actually enhance freedom). 
299. See Donald I. Baker & William Blumenthal, Ideological Cycles and Unstable Antitrust Rules, 31 
ANTITRUST BULL 323, 330 (1986) (arguing that during this period, "[t)he precise objective of antitrust 
policy was unimportant, for populist and economic approaches yielded consistent results"). Other schol-
ars have been less charitable, asserting that the Court used economic theory as a fig leaf, to justify prede-
termined results. See Thomas E. Kauper, The "Wa"en Court" and the Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, 
Populism, and Cynicism, 67 MlCH. L. REv. 325, 330 (1968) (arguing that the Warren Court "used eco-
nomic doctrine to support decisions arrived at upon other grounds"); Alan J. Meese, Economic Theory, 
Trader Freedom, and Consumer Welfare: State Oil v. Khan and the Continuing Incoherence of Antitrust . 
Doctrine, 84 CORNELLL. REv. 763,768 (1999) (arguing that Supreme Court opinions "almost always con-
tained assertions about the economic effects of the practices in questions"); Frederick M. Rowe, The De-
cline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 GEO. L.J. 
1511, 1524-27 (1984) (same). 
300. See infra notes 378-80 and accompanying text (describing price theory's conclusion that 
"competitive" markets produce optimal allocation of resources, prices, output, and quality). 
301. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (emphases added); see also Times-
Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953) ("Tying arrangements, we may readily 
agree, flout the Sherman Act's policy that competition rule the marts of trade. Basic to the faith that a 
free economy best promotes the public weal is that goods must stand the cold test of competitio~; that 
the public, acting through the market's impersonal judgment, shall allocate the Nation's resources and 
thus direct the course its economic development will take."). The United States agreed: "The policy 
of the Sherman Act is that the most efficient use of economic resources and the most desirable distri-
bution of economic power results from the separately made choices of buyers and sellers in a competi-
tive marketplace." Brief for the United States at 7, White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 
(1963) (No. 54). 
302. See MACHOVEC, supra note 41, at 194-200 (arguing that application of perfect competition 
model justified expanded antitrust intervention); see also id. at 52-95 (exploring link between perfect 
competition model and calls for central planning to achieve "perfect" result); Carl J. Dahlman, The Prob-
lem of Externality, 22 J.L. & EcoN. 141 (1979) (arguing that many economists improperly assume that any 
departure from perfect competition justifies regulatory intervention). See generally HAYEK, supra note 
226, at 100 (arguing that the unrealistic definition of "competition" embraced by many economists creates 
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dominant economic paradigm defined competition to exclude such agree~ 
ments, the Court could employ economic theory as a fig leaf, justifying a 
pursuit of social values by invoking efficiency concems.303 
D. The Collapse of Price Theory and a New Definition of Competition 
Price theory did not maintain its monopoly on industrial organization 
and antitrust policy indefinitely. Just as rules of per se illegality had 
reached their greatest scope, a competitor emerged in the form of transac-
tion cost economics. TCE embraced price theory's normative premise, 
seeking to determine whether practices are competitive in the sense of fur-
thering economic welfare.304 In so doing, however, TCE challenged the 
root assumption of price theory's descriptive model of competition, namely, 
that technological factors gave rise to the existence of firms and determineci 
the proper boundary between the firm and the market.305 While techno-
logical considerations might explain why two stages of a production process 
should take place in close physical proximity, they could not explain why a 
single owner should coordinate both stages of the process.306 In particular, 
proponents of TCE's new paradigm emphasized that reliance upon market 
contracting to perform a particular economic function involves a unique 
cost, namely, the cost of transacting, not incurred when a firm performs an 
activ!!Y itself.307 The choice between the firm and the market, then, de-
a "standard of perfection as something desirable or to be aimed at" and that in the real world this stan-
dard should be "wholly irrelevant"). · 
303. See Meese, supra note 299, at 789-94 (arguing that changes in economic theory have made it 
more clear that protection of "trader freedom" entails an economic cost and thus caused the Supreme 
Court to pursue consumer welfare exclusively). 
304. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
305. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text. 
306. Consider what Professor Bain called the "classic case" of technological benefits purportedly 
produced by vertical integration: the unification "of iron-making and steel-making to effect a saving in 
fuel costs by eliminating a reheating of the iron before it is fed into the steel furnace." See BAIN, lNDUS-
lRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 196, at 381; DIRLAM & KAHN, supra note 200, at 23 (employing similar 
examples); KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 205, at 120 (giving "integrated steel plant" as example of 
technical economies produced by vertical integration which "leads to an alteration of the structure of the 
plant as well as the firm" (emphasis added)); see also supra note 200 (collecting additional authorities in-
voking this example). As Professor Williamson has pointed out, such considerations may well explain 
why two processes are located in close proximity. They do not, however, explain why both processes fall 
under common ownership. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market 
Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112 (1971) (discussing traditional view that vertical integra-
tion produces economies through technical complementarity in flow process operations); id. at 116-17 
(arguing that "flow process economies between otherwise separable stages of production [are J really a 
special case of the contractual incompleteness argument. ... The advantages of integration thus are not 
that technological (flow process) economies are unavailable to nonintegrated firms, but that integration 
harmonizes interests (or reconciles differences, often by fiat) and permits an efficient (adaptive, sequen-
tial) decision process to be utilized."). 
307. See Coase, supra note 198, at 390 ("The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm 
would seem to be that there is a cost of using !_he price mechanism."-}. 
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pends at least in part upon the transaction costs of using the latter, costs 
that are unrelated to production technology.308 
The antiseptic models of price theory-what Professor Coase called 
"blackboard economics"-had ignored these costs, assuming, for instance, 
that bargaining and information costs did not exist, and that market trans-
actions consisted simply of costless standard contracts readily enforceable 
by the courts.309 By contrast, practitioners of TCE emphasized that the real 
world often differed substantially from the state of the world assumed by 
price theory, thus suggesting that price theory's methodology for evaluating 
the cause and consequence of vertical integration was incomplete.310 Most 
importantly, attention to the real world revealed transaction costs in abun-
dance. Firms must identify trading partners and determine the price and 
quality of the product or service offered.311 They must negotiate and me-
morialize agreements governing the transaction, attempting to anticipate 
and provide for each and every contingency that might occur over a long-
term transaction-including the possibility that one or both parties might 
behave opportunistically, that is, take advantage of the other party so as to 
reallocate to itself a greater portion of the benefits of the relationship than 
the parties initially anticipated.312 While parties could, theoretically provide 
for all contingencies by relying upon implicit or explicit requirements of 
good faith, the costs of enforcing such provisions are very real, and courts 
308. COASE, supra note 206, at 7 ("The limit to the size of the firm is set where its costs of organizing 
a transaction become equal to the cost of carrying it out through the market."); Coase, supra note 198, at 
390-91; Williamson, supra note 306, passim. 
309. See supra notes 189-232 arid accompanying text. 
310. See Langlois, supra note 200, at 13-14. Here again Professor Coase was prophetic. Speaking of 
economists' general approach to problems of regulating industry, he said: 
Contemplation of an optimal system may suggest ways of improving the system, it may provide 
techniques of analysis that would otherwise have been missed, and, in certain special cases, it may 
go far to providing a solution. But in general its influence has been pernicious. It has directed 
economists' attention away from the main question, which is how alternative arrangements will 
actually work in practice. It has led economists to derive conclusions for economic policy from· a 
study of an abstract model of a market situation. It is no accident that in the literature (and for 
that matter in Professor Caves's paper) we find a category "market failure" but no category 
"government failure." Until we realize that we are choosing between social arrangements which 
are all more or less failures, we are not likely to make much headway. 
Ronald H. Coase, The Regulated Industries-Discussion, 54 AM. ECON. REV. 194, 195 (1964); see also 
HAYEK, supra note 226, at 92 (arguing that the price-theoretic definition of competition "has little claim 
to be called 'competition' at all" and that "its conclusions are of little use as guides to policy"). 
311. See Dahlman, supra note 302, at 144-47 (defining transaction costs); see also CoASE, supra note 
206, at 6 ("In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes to 
deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading !!P 
to a bargain, to draw up a contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the 
contract are being observed, and so on." (quoting Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L & 
ECON. 1, 15 (1960))). 
312. WILLIAMSON, supra note 197, at 47-52 (defining opportunism); id. at 32 (contending that, in the 
real world, parties must contend with possibility of opportunism when negotiating contracts); Williamson, 
supra note 306, at 115-11. · 
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are blunt instruments for interpreting and adjusting commercial relation-
ships.313 
This new TCE provided an entirely new lens through which to exam-
ine the causes and consequences of vertical integration. Even if potential 
trading partners possessed superior technology and thus lower production 
costs, reliance upon such partners, i.e., the market, to perform a particular 
function might be ill-advised given the cost of transacting. Put more 
bluntly, price theory's market-a series of spot transactions governed by 
standard contracts-often failed to provide the cheapest way of coordinat-
ing the use of a given technology.314 As a result, practitioners of TCE came 
to presume that complete vertical integration is an attempt to avoid or 
overcome such market failures, thus assuring the best possible allocation of 
resources in an imperfect world.315 Forms of integration that economists 
and courts once treated as attempts to leverage market power to gain stra-
tegic advantage over rivals were now seen by many as attempts to over-
come market failure and enhance social welfare, without creating or relying 
upon market power_316 
TCE did more than explain many instances of complete vertical inte-
gration-it also offered insights into the rationale of partial integration ac-
complished solely by contract. Indeed, TCE suggested that the firm is sim-
ply a shorthand description of a particular set of contractual relationships, 
i.e., "a nexus of contracts."317 Adoption of this particular set of contractual 
arrangements (complete vertical integration) can generate its own costs, 
and the firm and the (spot) market are not the only means of conducting 
economic activity.318 There are an infinite variety of (nonstandard) ar-
rangements "in between," arrangements for which price theory had pro-
313. WILLIAMSON, supra note 197, at 32 ("Since the efficacy of court ordering is problematic, con-
tract execution falls heavily on the institutions of private ordering."); id. at 68--84 (describing shortcom-
ings of classical contract law as a vehicle for policing opportunism). 
314. See OLNER WILUAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES 8-10, 20-21 (1975) [hereinafter 
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS]. 
315. See CoASE, supra note 206, at 5-7; WILLIAMSON, supra note 197, at 103-30 (arguing that "verti-
cal integration ... is more consistent with transaction cost economizing than with the leading alterna-
tives"); WILUAMSON, MARKETS, supra note 314, at 20 (stating that "a presumption of market failure is 
warranted where it is observed that transactions are shifted out of a market and into a firm"); Williamson, 
supra note 208, at 273 ("The older theory of the firm as production function gradually made way (or gave 
way) to a theory of the firm in which express allowance was made for transaction costs. Accordingly, the 
firm was thereafter described as a governance structure ... technology was no longer determinative, and 
the boundaries ofthe firm (what to make, what to buy, how to trade, etc.) now needed to be derived."). 
316. See Coase, supra note 196, at 67-68 (asserting that nonstandard contracts and other practices 
inexplicable under price theory are often necessary for "bringing about a competitive situation"); cf 
HAYEK, supra note 226, at 96 (suggesting that many activities inconsistent with the perfect competition 
model are in fact methods of achieving a more "competitive" result). 
317. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Dernsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Or-
ganization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972); see also Scott E. Masten, A Legal Basis for the Firm, 4 J.L 
EcoN. & ORG. 181, 194-95 (1988) (observing that transactors could replicate by contract the various 
rights and obligations that arise by default within a firm). 
318. See WILUAMSON, MARKETS, supra note 314, at 8-9; Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Latera/Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 
(1986). 
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duced no benign explanation.319 Relying upon a revised paradigm based 
upon transaction cost reasoning, economists and others offered new inter-
pretations of old phenomena-nonstandard contracts-the price-theoretic 
inhospitality tradition had condemned.320 Tying contracts, for instance, 
were often beneficial methods of protecting the goodwill of a manufacturer 
or franchisor by ensuring that purchasers would choose complements of 
sufficient quality.321 Vertical restraints on dealers such as exclusive territo-
ries or minimum resale price maintenance could encourage optimal promo-
tional efforts by ensuring that dealers who invested in such promotion re-
ceived remuneration for their efforts.322 Maximum resale price 
maintenance could also enhance a manufacturer's goodwill, by preventing 
opportunistic price gouging by dealers that could undermine the manufac-
turer's reputation.323 
Although initially couched as an explanation for vertical restraints, 
TCE suggested new explanations for horizontal agreements as well. The 
firm itself, of course, was simply a nexus of contracts between potential 
competitors.324 Like vertical restraints, horizontal limits on rivalry by joint 
venture partners could combat market failure and make the venture a more 
effective competitor.325 Price ceilings set by otherwise independent venture 
partners could protect consumers and the venture from opportunism?26 
Concerted refusals to deal could be salutary methods of self-help by ven-
319. See Steven Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 1, 19 (1983) ("The 
polar cases are complicated by middlemen and subcontractors; agents contract among themselves; and 
any type of input may support a variety of contractual arrangements. We surmise that these very compli-
cations, which render the 'firm' ambiguous, have arisen from attempts to save transaction costs that were 
not avoidable in the polar cases."); Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the 
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 297, 326 (1978) ("[The) primary distinction between 
transactions made within a firm and transactions made in the marketplace may be too simplistic. Many 
long-term contractual relationships ... blur the line between the market and the firm."). 
320. See CoASE, supra note 206, at 6-7 ("The existence of transaction costs will lead those who wish 
to trade to engage in practices which bring about a reduction of transaction costs whenever the loss suf-
fered in other ways from the adoption of those practices is less than the transaction cost saved. The peo-
ple one deals with, the type of contract entered into, the kind of product or service supplied, will all be af-
fected." (emphasis added)); see also THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCI1JRE OF SOENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 114-
17 (2d ed. 1970) (explaining that paradigm shifts cause reinterpretation of previously observed phenom-
ena). 
321. See Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, 28 
J.L. & EcoN. 345 (1985) (arguing that franchise tying contracts can protect goodwill of a franchise sys-
tem); Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21 J.L. & ECON. 
223 (1978); see also Meese, supra note 68, at 61-94 (employing transaction-cost reasoning to show that 
tying contracts are often voluntary integration designed to obviate market failure). 
322. See Robert H. Bark, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Divi-
sion, 75 YALE L.J. 373,429-52 (1966) (Part II); Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair 
Trade, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 86 (1960). 
323. See Meese, supra note 112, at 165-66; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 
U. CHI. L. REv. 886, 893--95 (1981) (arguing that joint venturers can use maximum price-fixing to estab-
lish collective reputation for low-cost pricing). 
324. See generally Alchian & Dernsetz, supra note 317, passim. 
325. See Bork, supra note 322, at 429-65. 
326. See Easterbrook, supra note 323, at 893--95. 
138 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2003 
ture partners enforcing beneficial forms of contractual integration.327 Pro-
ponents of a transaction cost approach opined that such nonstandard prac-
tices were presumptively efficient attempts to avoid the market failures that 
would otherwise result from reliance on standard contracting in an atom-
istic market}28 . 
TCE did more than provide new explanations for a variety of prac-
tices. It also implied an entirely different model of competition relevant to 
application of Standard Oil's Rule of Reason and its distinction between 
ordinary and undue restraints on competition or rivalry. Price theory, it 
will be recalled, equated competition with technological rivalry between 
autonomous firms, unconstrained by nonstandard contracts.329 Such rivalry 
took the form of quality improvements and price reductions and, when un-
constrained, produced the best possible allocation of resources?30 While 
mergers or internal expansion could enhance such competition by generat-
ing technological efficiencies, contracts that limited rivalry between other-
wise independent firms produced no cognizable benefits. Such agreements 
were therefore anticompetitive in a price-theoretic sense and thus undue 
restraints under Standard Oil, restraints that exercised market power and 
produced a departure from the optimal mix of price, quality, and output 
that a "competitive" market would produce.331 Government, it was said, 
should employ antitrust regulation to correct these market failures. 
According to the new paradigm, however, it was price-theoretic com-
petition that would often lead to market failure and thus interfere with an 
efficient allocation of resources.332 Instead of producing the most favorable 
mixture of price, output, and quality, reliance upon technological rivalry 
and standard contracts to conduct economic activity often led to suboptimal 
results from the perspective of society and consumers.333 Far from "de-
stroying" useful competition and enhancing market power, then, complete 
327. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 42, at 224-27 (describing possible procompetitive purposes of 
collective refusals to deal); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTNE 
207-11 (1976) (characterizing boycotts as self-help measures that can often serve beneficial purposes). 
328. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 198, at 28 (concluding that there is a "rebuttable presumption that 
nonstandard forms of contracting have efficiency purposes"); see also CoASE, supra note 206, at 26 (not-
ing the ubiquity of transaction costs and resulting market failure in the real world). 
To be sure, some proponents of this more hospitable approach to nonstandard contracts purported 
to rest their arguments on "price theory." See, e.g., BORK, supra note 100, at 117-29 (arguing that 
"price-theory" should guide application of antitrust statutes); Robert H. Bork, Resale Price Mainte-
nance and Consumer Welfare, 77 YALE L. J. 950, 952 (1968) (contending that arguments in favor of 
minimum rpm are "grounded in basic price theory"); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Anti-
trust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 928 (1979) (arguing that hospitable, "Chicago" approach to an-
titrust rests upon rigorous application of price theory); see also Jacobs, supra note 65, at 228-29 (argu-
ing that Chicago School approach rested on applied price theory). However, close analysis shows that, 
despite this rhetorical embrace of price theory, these insights in fact rested upon a rejection of many 
assumptions of price theory in favor of Transaction Cost Economics. See Meese, supra note 112, at 
166-70. 
329. See supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
330. !d. 
331. See supra notes 233-39 and accompanying text. 
332. See infra notes 338-68 and accompanying text. 
333. See supra notes 24{}-51 and accompanying text. 
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vertical integration and various forms of nonstandard contracting often 
promoted competition and consumer welfare by guiding the allocation of 
resources closer to the socially optimal result that a well-functioning market 
would actually produce.334 An exclusive territory that induced dealers to 
provide appropriate services and information to consumers produced a bet-
ter allocation of resources and more consumer satisfaction, while at the 
same time furthering rivalry between manufacturers.335 Similarly, a franchi-
sor's requirement that its franchisees purchase inputs from it could encour-
age investments in quality that consumers were willing to pay for, avoiding 
the suboptimal inefficient equilibrium that unconstrained rivalry might oth-
erwise produce and furthering rivalry between franchise systems.336 Finally, 
restrictions on the marketing discretion of joint venture partners could in-
duce each v:enturer to engage in optimal promotion of the venture's prod-
uct, enhancing competition with other ventures and assuring more con-
sumer satisfaction than unconstrained competition would produce.337 
To be sure, each such contract restrains competition in one sense. 
Yet, if courts insist, as they have, on defining competition as that process 
which best serves the interests of consumers, none of these arrangements is 
anticompetitive in a sense relevant to Rule of Reason analysis.338 That rule 
does not treat competitive rivalry as an end in itself, but instead views ri-
valry and cooperation as complementary tools for maximizing social wel-
fare.339 The competition that takes place in the real world and between 
various groups ultimately depends upon the institution of private contracts, 
many of which, including the firm itself, are nonstandard.340 Innovation in-
cludes the discovery of new organizational forms and the application of old 
334. See William F. Baxter, The Viability of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75 CALL. REv. 933,947-48 
(1987) (arguing that vertical restraints are forms of partial integration that overcome market failures and 
associated distortions of the allocation of resources); Coase, supra note 1%, at 68 (arguing that nonstan-
dard contracts and other practices are often "a necessary element in bringing about a competitive situa-
tion"); Oliver Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transac-
tion Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 953, 987-88 (1979} ("[A]llocative inefficiency is more apt to arise 
with respect to cost concerns, such as diseconomies of scale, failure to operate assets in a least cost way, 
and the incurring of significant transaction costs. Organizational changes that give rise to cost savings in 
any of the respects will, if not accompanied by offsetting price distortions, invariably yield social gains."); 
cf KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 205, at 12-13 (arguing that courts should void anticompetitive ar-
rangements, thus furthering "competition" in each industry and enhancing social welfare) (citing Pioou, 
supra note 238). 
335. See Bork, supra note 328, at 950; Bork, supra note 35, at 473-75; Williamson, supra note 334, 
passim. 
336. See Klein & Saft, supra note 321, at 349-54. 
337. See Bork,supra note 35, at472-75. 
338. See supra notes 240-45 and accompanying text (showing that courts embraced this technical 
model of competition during the inhospitality era}; see also supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text 
(Standard Oil equated competition with "rivalry"). 
339. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 286--88 and accompanying 
text (arguing that courts embracing the price-theoretic paradigm did not void all restrictions on rivalry}. 
340. See Nat'! Soc'y of Prof! Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. 
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977); Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 
(1918); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911}; cf HAYEK, supra note 226, at 96 
(arguing that various activities inexplicable under price theory's model of competition are in fact neces-
sary to achieving a competitive result). 
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forms to new contexts.341 Such contracts prevent or attenuate market fail-
ure, moving the market toward what economists would deem a more com-
petitive result. Indeed, as Professor Coase pointed out, many markets 
deemed "perfectly competitive" are in fact the end result of complex con-
tracts limiting rivalry between competitors.342 This contractual competition 
cannot produce perfect results-no human institution ever can. Nonethe-
less, the result is superior to that which would obtain in a (real) world with-
out nonstandard contracting.343 These contracts do not depend upon the 
creation or enhancement of market power and thus do not produce the 
evils against which antitrust law is directed. From the perspective of the 
Sherman Act and Standard Oil's Rule of Reason, such limitations are not 
undue, but instead serve to promote and enhance the sort of real world 
341. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 84 (1943) (arguing 
that price competition is "a matter of comparative indifference" when compared to "the competition 
from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, [or) the new type of organiza-
tion" (emphasis added)); Oliver E. Williamson, Antitrust Lenses and Transaction Cost Economics, in AN-
TITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS 139 (Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece eds., 1992) 
("That the 'same technical facilities' produce with a 'great variety of costs' comes as no surprise if nontriv-
ial cost consequences result when firms are organized and managed differently."). 
342. Speaking in particular about commodity exchanges, Coase noted: 
I refer to commodity exchanges and stock exchanges. These are normally organized by a group 
of traders (the members of the exchange) which owns (or rents) the physical facility within which 
transactions take place. All exchanges regulate in great detail the activities of those who trade in 
these markets (the times at which transactions can be made, what can be traded, the responsibili-
ties of the parties, the terms of settlement, etc.), and they all provide machinery for the settlement 
of disputes and impose sanctions against those who infringe the rules of the exchange. It is not 
without significance that these exchanges, often used by economists as examples of a perfect market 
and perfect competition, are markets in which transactions are highly regulated (and this quite apart 
from any government regulation that there may be). It suggests, I think correctly, that for anything 
approaching perfect competition to exist, an intricate system of rules and regulations would nor-
mally be needed. Economists observing the regulations of the exchanges often assume that they 
represent an attempt to exercise monopoly power and aim to restrain competition. They ignore 
or, at any rate, fail to emphasize an alternative explanation for these regulations: that they exist 
in order to reduce transaction costs and therefore to increase the volume of trade. 
COASE, supra note 206, at 8-9 (emphasis added); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 
63 TEx. L. REv. 1, 1 (1984) ("The goal of antitrust is to perfect the operation of competitive markets. 
What does this mean? A 'competitive market' is not necessarily the one with the most rivalry moment-
to-moment. The auction in which atomistically small buyers and sellers continuously shout out bid and 
asked prices, the picture of 'perfect competition' found in economic texts, is a hypothetical construct 
Every market entails substantial cooperation over some domain in order to facilitate competition else-
where. . . . Markets themselves are organized. The Chicago Board of Trade, perhaps the closest of mod-
em markets to the textbook ideal, has a sheaf of rules and cooperative arrangements that reduce the cost 
of competition."). Compare Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604, 616 (1898) (sustaining rules ancil-
lary to cattle exchange whose object was to "provide for the ready transaction of the business of the asso-
ciates by obtaining a general headquarters for its conduct, and thus to ensure a quick and certain market 
for the sale or purchase of the article dealt in"), with HAYEK, supra note 226, at 96 ("The whole organiza-
tion of the market serves mainly the need of spreading the information on which the buyer is to act." 
(emphasis added)). 
343. See HAYEK, supra note 226, at 100 ("The basis of comparison, on the grounds of which the 
achievement of competition [in the real world) ought to be judged, cannot be a situation which is different 
from the objective facts and which cannot be brought about by any known means. It ought to be the 
situation as it would exist if competition were prevented from operating. Not the approach to an un-
achievable and meaningless ideal but the improvement upon the conditions that would exist without 
competition should be the test."). Applying Professor Hayek's wisdom, then, many decisions during the 
price-theoretic era "prevented competition from operating." 
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competition that would develop trade and advance society's welfare.344 
Given this recognition of contractual competition, proof that a nonstandard 
contract limits rivalry in no way indicates that it is anticompetitive. 
E. TCE in the Supreme Court: A Partial Victory for the New Paradigm 
The insights produced by TCE soon came to influence antitrust policy, 
leading the Supreme .Court to contract the scope of certain per se rules. 
Most notably, these advances in theory caused the courts and enforcement 
agencies to abandon their hostility toward many vertical restraints. In Con-
tinental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., for instance, the Court abandoned 
the per se rule against manufacturer restrictions on locations, territories, 
and customers that dealers could serve.345 The Court relied expressly upon 
transaction cost reasoning, emphasizing that a "purely competitive situa-
tion" between dealers could produce a market failure, namely, inadequate 
promotional expenditures.346 Thus, while vertical restraints necessarily hin-
dered intrabrand competition, they could in some cases enhance interbrand 
competition between manufacturers by preventing dealers from free riding 
on the promotional efforts of their colleagues.347 While such restraints con-
strained the discretion of dealers, such a noneconomic concern was beyond 
the scope of the Sherman Act.348 
A decade later, the Court narrowed the definition of minimum resale 
price maintenance, excluding agreements between a dealer and manufac-
turer to terminate another dealer that was cutting prices.349 Here again, the 
Court relied upon transaction cost reasoning, noting that reductions in 
dealer prices could go hand-in-hand with a reduction in promotional ef-
forts, to the detriment of interbrand competition and consumers.350 An-
344. See Coase, supra note 198, at 68. 
345. 433 u.s. 36 (1978). 
346. "Because of market imperfections such as the 'free rider' effect, these [promotional] services 
might not be provided by retailers in a purely competitive situation, despite the fact that each retailer's 
benefit would be greater if all provided the service than if none did." /d. at 55. 
347. /d. at 55-56; see also WILUAMSON, supra note 197, at 370-73 (describing the transaction-cost 
basis of GTE Sylvania). 
348. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 53 n.21 ("Competitive economies have social and political as 
well as economic advantages, but an antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would lack any 
objective benchmarks. As Mr. Justice Brandeis reminded us: 'Every agreement concerning trade, every 
regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence."' (quoting Chi. Bd. of Trade v. 
United States, 246 U.S. 231,238 (1918))). 
349. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988); see also Monsanto v. Spray-
Rite Serv. Co., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (stating that a manufacturer's termination of one distributor after 
complaints from competing distributors cannot itself support finding of resale price maintenance). 
350. See Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 727-28. To be sure, the Court did not carefully examine 
whether, in fact, the restraint at issue actually produced the benefits the defendants claimed for it. See 
Williamson, supra note 341, at 156-57 (criticizing the Court for simply "parroting" defendants' free rider 
argument, even though the evidence was "conflicting"). It should be emphasized, though, that the rea-
sonableness vel non of the restraint was not before the Court. Instead, the narrow question presented was 
whether the restraint plausibly produced procompetitive benefits and thus survived per se scrutiny. See 
Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 728-30 (declining to apply a per se rule because "a quite plausible purpose 
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other decade would pass before the Court abandoned the per se ban on 
maximum resale price maintenance, finding that such restraints could fur-
ther interbrand competition by protecting consumers from opportunistic 
price gouging by a manufacturer's dealers.351 
At the same time, the Court slowly contracted the scope of the per se 
rule against horizontal restraints on rivalry, recognizing in the process that 
such restraints can produce nontechnological efficiencies.352 In Broadcast 
Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., for instance, the Court refused to apply the per se 
rule to a price agreement between thousands of composers, finding that the 
arrangement was necessary to the creation of a new product-a blanket li-
cense-and thus properly subject to analysis under the Rule of Reason.353 
In NCAA, discussed earlier,354 the Court further contracted the per se rule, 
holding that some cooperation between competitors-including coopera-
tion on price-was necessary to create college football, with the result that 
Rule of Reason treatment of other horizontal ancillary restraints was ap-
propriate.355 Like GTE Sylvania, Inc., and its progeny, each of these deci-
sions relied on transaction cost reasoning. In Broadcast Music, Inc., for in-
stance, the Court emphasized that individual bargains between composers 
and performers-price-theoretic competition-were rarely feasible, and 
that the blanket license under challenge was necessary to overcome these 
costs and thus increase the output of performances and compositions.356 
Moreover, the Court in NCAA concluded that (price-theoretic) "competi-
tion" between schools to attract athletes would transform amateur football 
into professional football, undermining the league's effort to offer a distinc-
tive product to consumers.357 In each case, the Court recognized that un-
of the restriction [is 1 to enable [the defendant 1 to provide better services under the sales franchise agree-
ment"). 
351. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Meese, supra note 299, at 777-81 (explaining how 
TCE undermined economic premises of Albrecht). It should be noted that Albrecht also fell prey to de-
velopments within price theory, particularly the recognition that maximum resale price maintenance 
could eliminate the so-called double mark-up problem and thus expand output. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair 
& John E. Lopatka, The Albrecht Rule After Khan· Death Becomes Her, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 123, 
153-59 (1998). 
352. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (declaring ancillary territorial re-
straints unlawful per se); United States v. Sealy, 388 U.S. 350 passim (1%7) (same). 
353. 441 u.s. 1, 19-25 (1979). 
354. See supra notes 118-30 and accompanying text. 
355. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents ofUniv. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101...{)2 (1984). 
356. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20-23 (1979); see also NCAA, 468 U.S. at 114 ("In 
Broadcast Music, the availability of a package product that no individual could offer enhanced the total 
volume of music that was sold."); HOVENKAMP, supra note 46, at 210 ("The blanket license arrangement 
[at issue in Broadcast Music, Inc.) saved untold millions in transaction costs."). 
357. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101...{)2 ("Moreover, the NCAA seeks to market a particular brand of foot-
ball-college football. The identification of this 'product' with an academic tradition differentiates col-
lege football from and makes it more popular than professional sports to which it might otherwise be 
comparable, such as, for example, minor league baseball. In order to preserve the character and quality 
of the 'product,' athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the like. And the integ-
rity of the 'product' cannot be preserved except by mutual agreement; if an institution adopted such re-
strictions unilaterally, its effectiveness as a competitor on the playing field might soon be destroyed. 
Thus, the NCAA plays a vital role in enabling college football to preserve its character, and as a result 
enables a product to be marketed which might otherwise be unavailable. In performing this role, its ac-
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constrained rivalry between horizontal competitors could produce a market 
failure, reducing the welfare of consumers and society.358 
Each of these modern decisions rejected a price-theoretic account of 
competition in favor of one derived from TCE. In so doing, courts trans-
lated Standard Oil's normative premise in light of new understandings of 
the economic causes and consequences of certain restraints.359 Restraints 
once deemed entirely anticompetitive and thus unlawful per se now could 
produce cognizable benefits and were properly subject to a more discrimi-
nating analysis under the Rule of Reason.360 
This reliance upon a new economic paradigm led some to proclaim 
the death of the inhospitality tradition.361 The tradition is alive, if not en-
tirely well, however. GTE Sylvania, Inc., itself drew a line between non-
price vertical restraints and minimum resale price maintenance, suggesting 
that the latter would remain unlawful per se, as it has.362 Such a distinction 
has no basis in TCE, which views both practices as methods of overcoming 
the market failure that unbridled rivalry would produce.363 Nearly a decade 
after GTE Sylvania, Inc., the Court reaffirmed the per se rule against tying 
contracts, failing to recognize the various benefits of these arrangements 
and reiterating the claim that such agreements necessarily thwart "competi-
tion on the merits" when obtained by sellers with market power.364 In so 
doing, the Court reiterated its claim that technological competition would 
maximize social wealth.365 Finally, the Court has also reaffirmed the per se 
tions widen consumer choice-not only the choices available to sports fans but also those available to ath-
letes-and hence can be viewed as procompetitive.'"). 
358. See supra notes 352-57 and accompanying text. 
359. See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text (showing that Standard Oil contemplates such 
translation). 
360. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15-16 (1997); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 
433 u.s. 36,54-59 (1977). 
361. See, e.g., Richard Markovits, The Limits to Simplifying Antitrust: A Reply to Professor Easter-
brook, 63 TEx. L. REv. 41, 51 (1984) ("The inhospitality tradition is dead, or at least dying."); Richard A. 
Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 1, 5-12 (1978) (describing various precedents purportedly "endangered" by the GTE Sylvania 
decision). 
362. See GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 51 n.18; see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 
U.S. 717, 724-25 (1988) (adhering to per se rule against minimum rpm) (dicta); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-
Rite Serv. Co., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (declining invitation of Amicus Curiae United States to reconsider per 
se ban on minimum rpm). 
363. See William F. Baxter, Vertical Practices-Half Slave, Half Free, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 743 (1983); 
Williamson, supra note 334, at 954-60. 
364. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984) (concluding that where seller 
possesses market power, '"forcing' is present, [and] competition on the merits in the market for the tied 
item is restrained"); accord Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); see 
also Meese, supra note 68, at 86-94 (arguing that developments in transaction cost economics require re-
pudiation of Jefferson Parish). It should be noted that, despite its adherence to the per se rule, Jefferson 
Parish adopted a more rigorous definition of market power than that embraced by prior decisions. See id. 
at 26-29. But see Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 467-78 (holding that the existence of information gaps and 
specific-investments confers market power for per se purposes). 
365. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12. 
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rule against maximum horizontal price-fixing, reiterating its previous asser-
tion that such conduct thwarts "the forces of the competitive market. "366 
Despite the revolution in economic theory worked by TCE, the case 
law governing the scope of per se rules lacks a coherent account of competi-
tion. Some doctrines still equate competition with technological rivalry, 
unconstrained by nonstandard contracts.367 Arrangements inconsistent with 
such rivalry are therefore anticompetitive. Other decisions embrace a more 
modem, contractual version, which recognizes that real world competition 
usually requires contracts and other practices inexplicable with price-
theoretic models.368 The trend, if there is one, would seem to be away from 
price theory. 
IV. THE RULE OF REASON'S OUTMODED MODEL OF COMPETITION 
By embracing TCE in some per se contexts, the Court has significantly 
expanded the number of contracts subject to full analysis under the Rule of 
Reason. Unlike per se analysis, which consists of purely hypothetical asser-
tions about a restraint's costs and benefits, analysis under the Rule of Rea-
son calls for examination of a restraint's actual economic irnpact.369 Under 
current law this analysis contains three main elements. First, the plaintiff 
must establish a prima facie case, by showing that a restraint produces ac-
tual detrimental effects or offering indirect evidence that the defendants 
possess or may acquire market power.370 Second, if the plaintiff makes such 
a showing, defendants must respond by offering proof of real cognizable 
benefits that outweigh any harm identified by the plaintiff.371 Third, even if 
the defendants show that the benefits of a practice outweigh its harms, a 
plaintiff can respond by showing that a less restrictive alternative will pro-
duce the same benefits.372 
As shown below, the current structure of Rule of Reason analysis as 
applied to contractual integration reflects an outmoded model of competi-
tion, a model that the Court has often rejected in the per se context. Al-
though judicial embrace of TCE and a contractual version of competition 
has saved many forms of contractual integration from condemnation under 
366. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332,346-47 (1982) (quoting Albrecht v. 
Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152 (1968)). It should also be noted that the Court has retained the distinction 
between "competition on the merits" and presumptively anticompetitive nonstandard contracts in the 
monopolization context. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 482-83 (holding that contracts by monopolists 
that foreclose "competition on the merits" for a significant portion of the marketplace are presumptively 
unlawful.); accord Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985); see also Alan 
J. Meese, Don't Disintegrate Microsoft (Yet), 9 GEO. MASON L. REv. 761, 786-90 (2001) (showing that 
Court's preference for "competition on the merits" in the monopolization context reflects the inhospi-
tality approach to antitrust). 
367. See supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
368. See supra Part III.D. 
369. See supra notes 103-04 . 
370. See supra Part II.C.l. 
371. See supra Part II.C.2. 
372 See supra Part II.C.3 (describing current law). 
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the per se rule, the current structure of Rule of Reason analysis applied to 
these very same restraints rejects TCE in favor of a price-theoretic, techno-
logical account of competition. More precisely, each element of the cur-
rent Rule of Reason balancing test rests upon the sort of outmoded price-
theoretic premises that gave rise to the inhospitality tradition and its broad 
per se rules. 
Application of the TCE paradigm suggests that the current Rule of 
Reason test is flawed as applied to contractual integration in three distinct 
ways. First, proof of actual detrimental effects should not suffice to estab-
lish a prima facie case that contractual integration that plausibly overcomes 
market failure is harmful. Second, if such proof does suffice and defendants 
show that such integration will overcome a market failure, courts should 
not balance such benefits against purported harms. Third, proof that a less 
restrictive alternative will produce benefits similar to those produced by the 
restraint in question should not entitle a plaintiff to judgment. While the 
current Rule of Reason test may well make sense when applied to restraints 
or mergers that create technological efficiencies that arise within a firm, ap-
plication of that test to contractual integration that purportedly prevents 
market failure cannot be justified. Courts and the enforcement agencies 
should alter the structure of Rule of Reason analysis to account for recent 
advances in economic theory, just as they have done so often in the per se 
context. 
A. The Prima Facie Case 
Current law allows plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case by showing 
that the contract under challenge produces higher prices or a reduction i.n 
output or quality when compared to the status quo ante.373 While plaintiffs 
can also rely upon proof that the defendants possess a significant share of a 
properly defined market characterized by entry barriers, relatively few 
plaintiffs are able to make such a showing. Leading scholars and the en-
forcement agencies have endorsed the actual detrimental effects approach, 
although some lower courts, particularly the Seventh Circuit, have de-
murred.374 
On its face, the actual detrimental effects test seems a straightforward 
application of Standard Oil. That decision, after all, held that the Sherman 
Act bans those contracts producing the "evils" or consequences of monop-
oly, viz. higher prices, lower output, or a deterioration in quality.375 Proof 
that a restraint results in a change in price or output should therefore, it 
seems, cast upon the defendants some burden of justification. 
373. See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., FfC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 
U.S. 447, 460-{i1 (1986); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents ofUniv. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 1~8 (1984). 
374. See, e.g., Chi. Prof) Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 6()()..{)1 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Mur-
row Furniture Galleries, Inc. v. Thomasville Furniture Indus., Inc., 889 F.2d 524,528 (4th Cir. 1989). 
375. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (explaining Standard Oil's normative premise). 
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Current law's definition of a prima facie case is a faithful application 
of Standard Oil if the price-theoretic approach to industrial organization 
provides a satisfactory model for interpreting the causes and consequences 
of economic activity in general and nonstandard contracts in particular. As 
explained earlier, the price-theoretic paradigm assumes that competition 
consists of constant technological rivalry between various firms, uncon-
strained by nonstandard contracts.376 This rivalry manifests itself in unilat-
eral efforts to alter the cost and quality of a firm's products.377 While merg-
ers and other practices producing technological efficiencies can be 
competitive within this paradigm, nonstandard contracts cannot produce 
cognizable benefits and are thus monopolistic. 
The competition imagined by price theory and endorsed during the 
inhospitality era results in a competitive result, that is, a competitive equi-
librium in prices, output, and quality.378 This equilibrium reflects an opti-
mal allocation of resources and thus maximizes the welfare of society.379 
These results, in turn, form a sort of baseline, the departure from which is 
presumptively (and etymologically) anticompetitive. By their nature, non-
standard contracts produce no cognizable benefits and thus reflect an anti-
competitive attempt to exercise or obtain market power and thereby pro-
duce price, quality, and output different from the competitive baseline. 
Such reasoning led courts at one time to condemn all such nonstandard 
contracts as unlawful per se or nearly so, with little or no analysis of their 
actual effects.380 
As explained earlier, the Supreme Court has rejected the price-
theoretic account of competition in certain per se contexts, mandating Rule 
of Reason scrutiny of many nonstandard contracts as a result.381 Moreover, 
a requirement that a plaintiff actually prove that a restraint produces tangi-
ble anticompetitive effects would seem to be an improvement over the hos-
tility toward such restraints manifested by the inhospitality tradition. None-
theless, reliance upon actual detrimental effects to establish a prima facie 
case rests upon a similar embrace of price-theoretic competition as a base-
line for evaluating the effect of contractual integration. For instance, any 
presumption that a price increase caused by the adoption of a restraint re-
flects the exercise of market power necessarily depends upon an assump-
tion that the prices set by the preexisting unrestrained market were com-
petitive in some relevant sense.382 Such an assumption, of course, flows 
376. See supra notes 218-26 and accompanying text. 
377. See supra notes 227-32 and accompanying text. 
378. See supra notes 218-26, 2~6 and accompanying text. 
379. SeeN. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United 
States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953); see also supra notes 218-26 and accompanying text. 
380. See supra notes 246-73. 
381. See supra notes 346-52 and accompanying text. 
382. The enforcement agencies have embraced this assumption explicitly, stating that the "central 
question" in Rule of Reason analysis is whether a restraint results in prices or output different from what 
an "unrestrained" market would produce. See COMPETITOR COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 
144, § 3.1 ("Rule of reason analysis focuses on the state of competition with, as compared to without, the 
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naturally from application of the price-theoretic paradigm and its account 
of competition. 
Adoption of the revised economic paradigm produced by TCE un-
dermines price theory's model of competition and with it the account of 
anticompetitive harm that drives the definition of a prima facie case em-
braced by courts, enforcement agencies, and numerous leading scholars. 
According to this new paradigm, there is no reason to presume that results 
produced by rivalry unconstrained by nonstandard contracts are competi-
tive in any relevant sense or otherwise appropriate benchmarks for measur-
ing the effect of a restraint.383 To the contrary, TCE predicts that unre-
strained rivalry between autonomous firms will often result in a market 
failure, that is, a departure from the optimal allocation of resources that a 
perfectly competitive market would produce.384 Such a departure will nec-
essarily manifest itself in prices, output, or quality different from what a 
well-functioning market would bring about. 
As a result, where defendants avoid per se liability by plausibly assert-
ing that a restraint combats a market failure, proof that contractual integra-
tion results in prices or other terms of trade different from those that ex-
isted before the agreement does not suggest the presence of or attempt to 
obtain market power. As noted earlier, TCE adopts a presumption that 
nonstandard contracts have efficiency purposes, absent concrete proof to 
the contrary.385 By embracing TCE in the per se context, the Supreme 
Court has adopted a similar presumption, which plaintiffs must rebut by es-
tablishing a prima facie case when challenging a restraint under the Rule of 
Reason. 
Proof that an agreement results in prices or output different from the 
status quo ante in no way establishes that a restraint produces cognizable 
antitrust harm. Here it is important to keep in mind that: (1) the defendant 
has avoided per se treatment by adducing a plausible story that the restraint 
overcomes market failure; (2) the plaintiff has adduced no evidence regard-
ing the structure of the relevant market; and (3) market failures are wide-
relevant agreement. Under the rule of reason, the central question is whether the relevant agreement 
likely harms competition by increasing the ability or incentive profitably to raise prices above or reduce 
output, quality, service or innovation below what likely would prevail in the absence of the relevant 
agreement."); see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104-08 {1984) (proof that 
ancillary restraint reduced output and increased prices when compared to operation of a "free market" 
sufficed to establish a prima facie case); id. at 114-15 (proof that restraint produced prices higher than the 
"competitive" market undermined claim that arrangement was procompetitive); Nat'! Soc'y of Prof! 
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693--95 (1978) (justification that assumed that restraint produced 
prices higher than unrestrained rivalry is not cognizable); 7 AREEDA, supra note 28, '111504, at 380-81 
(justification that rests upon assertion that "competitive" prices are too low cannot be cognizable); id. 'II 
1511, at 432-33 (endorsing NCAA's approach to defining a prima facie case). 
383. See supra notes 329-44 and accompanying text. 
384. See supra notes 331-34 and accompanying text. 
385. See supra notes 321-28 and accompanying text; see also WILLIAMSON, supra note 197, at 28 
(concluding that there is "[ aJ rebuttable presumption that nonstandard forms of contracting have effl>. 
ciency purposes"). 
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spread.386 As a result, proof that a restraint alters price or output when 
compared to the status quo ante is at least equally consistent with an alter-
native explanation, namely, that the agreement under scrutiny corrects a 
market failure and does not involve the exercise or creation of market 
power.387 Because such failures can result in prices that are below the opti-
mum, or output that is above it, contracts that correct or attenuate market 
failure will often increase prices or reduce output when compared to the 
status quo ante.388 As a result, proof that such a restraint alters price or 
other terms of trade is at least equally consistent with a procompetitive ex-
planation, and thus cannot give rise to a prima facie case under settled anti-
trust doctrine.389 Absent proof that market structure is conducive to the 
creation or exercise of market power, a plaintiff's attempt to establish a 
prima facie case should fail. 
Consideration of three examples will illustrate this counterintuitive 
point. First, assume that a manufacturer grants its dealers exclusive territo-
ries, departing from a prior policy that allowed dealers to sell where they 
pleased.390 Assume further that a terminated dealer (or the government) 
challenges the policy under the Sherman Act. Under current law, the par-
ties to the arrangement could avoid per se condemnation by claiming that 
the restraint will prevent dealers from free riding on each others' promo-
386. See CoASE, supra note 206, at 26 (noting that transaction costs and thus market failures are 
ubiquitous in the real world). 
One might argue that the very fact that a plaintiff has selected a particular case fof"iitigation itself 
suggests that the defendants' conduct is more harmful than the average contract. Why, after all, would 
a plaintiff waste resources challenging an arrangement that a court will most likely deem reasonabfe? 
However, it should be noted that a plaintiff's chance of success will itself be a function of the structure 
of Rule of Reason analysis articulated by the courts. If a plaintiff could establish a prima facie case 
simply by showing that a restraint produced prices above the status quo ante, then plaintiffs could 
more readily avoid summary judgment and thus use the threat of treble damage liability to negotiate a 
generous settlement. The prospect of such a settlement, and not the underlying economics of the chal-
lenged agreement, may drive much antitrust litigation, with the result that there is no reason to assume 
that challenged agreements are significantly more anticompetitive than those that are not, at least so 
long as courts adhere to the current approach to Rule of Reason litigation. 
387. See Baxter, supra note 334, at 948; Coase, supra note 196, at 68 (contending that nonstandard 
contracts and other practices are often attempts at "bringing about a competitive situation"); Williamson, 
supra note 334, at 987--SS ("[A]llocative inefficiency is more apt to arise with respect to cost concerns, 
such as diseconomies of scale, failure to operate assets in a least cost way, and the incurring of significant 
transaction costs. Organizational changes that give rise to cost savings in any of these respects will, if not 
accompanied by offsetting price distortions, invariably yield social gains."). 
388. See supra notes 297-301 (explaining that price-theoretic "competition" can produce prices, out-
put and quality that depart from the optimum). 
389. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-95 (1986) (holding 
that evidence that is equally consistent with pro and anticompetitive objectives cannot by itself support an 
inference of anticompetitive harm); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S 752, 761-64 (1984) 
(same); First Nat'! Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 27~0 (1968) (same); see also Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466--67 (1992) (stating that legal presumptions 
employed in antitrust litigation should rest on actual market realities and not implausible economic-theo-
ries). 
390. Cf Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 38-39 (1977) (describing GTE Sylva-
nia's reform of its distribution system that included creation of location clauses). 
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tional efforts and thus counteract a market failure.391 Moreover, the logic of 
decisions such as NCAA and Indiana Federation of Dentists suggests that 
proof that the restraint increases the retail price of the manufacturer's 
product should establish a prima facie case that the arrangement is "anti-
competitive."392 Should proof that the restraint produces prices above the 
preexisting level establish a prima facie case?393 Emphatically not. A mar-
ket that is competitive in a price-theoretic sense may not produce sufficient 
dealer investment in promotional activity or other services. Such activity 
costs money, and a dealer will not invest money in promotion unless it can 
capture the benefits of such expenditures.394 Thus, reliance on uncon-
strained dealers to distribute a product may produce a market failure, that 
is, suboptimal dealer expenditure on promotional activities and nonoptimal 
consumer demand for the product in question.395 This failure, in tum, will 
manifest itself in the form of lower prices.396 
An exclusive territory could correct this market failure, by conferring 
a sort of property right on dealers to sell in a particular area.397 Armed with 
391. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Co., 485 U.S. 717,725-29 (1988); GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 
U.S. at 36. 
392. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104--DS (1984) (holding that proof 
that a restraint increases prices of defendants' products suffices to establish a prima facie case); see also 
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 29-31 (1984) (conducting Rule of Reason analysis 
despite absence of market power); GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 51-59 (suggesting that courts should 
analyze nonprice vertical restraints by comparing impact on "intrabrand" and "interbrand" competition); 
supra notes 117-38 and accompanying text (showing that the Supreme Court has not limited the "actual 
detrimental effects" test to the horizontal context). But see supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text 
(suggesting that some courts apparently require proof of marketwide "actual detrimental effects" where 
certain vertical restraints are concerned). 
393. See GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 51-52 (assuming that reduction in intrabrand competition is 
an antitrust harm). It should be noted that some scholars who would otherwise apply the "actual detri-
mental effects" approach conclude that a plaintiff should have to offer some evidence of market shares to 
establish a prima facie case when challenging a vertical distribution restraint. None of these scholars, 
however, would require plaintiffs to establish the sort of market structure ordinarily associated with a 
market power filter, and each offers a test that seems to ignore the presence or absence of barriers to en-
try. See 8 AREEDA, supra note 138, 'JI1648d2B, at 530 (stating that manufacturer's possession of thirty-
percent share of relevant market sufficient to establish prima facie case; no analysis of entry barriers indi-
cated); cf Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 26-29 (noting that thirty-percent share of properly defined market 
does not establish market power, despite the existence of some customers with strong preferences for the 
defendant's product); HOVENKAMP,supra note 46, at 488--89 (stating that proof that a manufacturer has a 
forty-percent share of a relevant market and that one half of its dealers are governed by a restraint should 
establish a prima facie case, apparently without regard to entry conditions); id. at 446 (asserting that entry 
by multiproduct retailers cannot be presumed "easy"); SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 53, at 327-32 
(purporting to apply market power screen but defining market power as including successful "brand dif-
ferentiation" without regard to presence or absence of barriers to entry). 
394. See GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 54-56; Bork, supra note 322, at 433-36; Telser, supra note 
323, at 89-92; Williamson, supra note 334, at 958--60, 975--80. 
395. See GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 55 ("Because of market imperfections such as the so-called 
'free rider' effect, the (promotional] services might not be provided by retailers in a purely competitive 
situation, despite the fact that each retailer's benefit would be greater if all provided the services than if 
none did."); Bork, supra note 322, at 429-38; Telser, supra note 322, at 89-92. 
396. See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: Analysis of the Restricted Dis-
tribution, Horizontal Merger, and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 282, 284--85 (1975) 
(noting that free riding results in lower dealer prices). 
397. See Bork, supra note 328, at 956 ("Contract Jaw delegates to private persons the power to create 
property rights because of their superior knowledge of the efficiencies to be gained in particular situa-
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this right, dealers could invest in optimal levels of promotion, knowing that 
they could recapture the benefits of such investment.398 Such investment 
would raise dealers' cost of operation and thus result in prices higher than 
those that obtained before the restraint, so long as consumers are willing to 
pay the premium that reflects this additional service. All beneficial vertical 
restraints are designed to increase price in exactly this manner.399 
Such a price increase would not reflect any exercise of market power 
and thus would not manifest the sort of "evil consequence" the Sherman 
Act condernns.400 Economists, including those who adhere to price theory, 
define market power as the ability profitably to restrict output and price 
above the cost of production, and this is the sort of power Standard Oil had 
in mind.401 If an exclusive territory raises prices by eliminating or attenuat-
ing market failure, such an increase would reflect increased dealer costs and 
thus not reflect any exercise of market power.402 Despite its (indirect) im-
pact on price, such a restraint would not be undue, but would instead con-
stitute a normal, ordinary, or usual method of furthering trade.403 Although 
a nonstandard contract that reaches beyond the firm, such an arrangement 
would be economically indistinguishable from a manufacturer's (cost-
tions. R.P.M. is best seen as an instance of this general principle."); Meese, supra note 107, at 487 n. 109 
(analogizing exclusive territories to property rights). 
398. Bork, supra note 322, at 433-36. 
399. See Baxter, supra note 334, at 945-46 ("Higher retail prices are entirely consistent with the 
benign explanation of resale price maintenance. Imposition of [resale price maintenance J reflects a 
judgment on the part of the brand owner that her products will compete more successfully, both 
against other branded products and against generic rivals, if the retailer competes along parameters 
other than price. And the retailer's expenses of engaging in those other forms of rivalry are financed 
by setting a retail margin higher than would prevail if retail price competition were allowed or encour-
aged."); Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANlTfRUST L. J. 135, 
156 (1984) ("Every restricted dealing arrangement is designed to influence price. It must be. If territorial 
limits induce dealers to supply additional service and information, they do so only because they raise the 
price and call forth competition in the service dimension .... Every argument about restricted dealing 
implies that the restrictions influence price. There is no such thing as a free lunch; the manufacturer can't 
get the dealer to do more without increasing the dealer's margin."); Posner, supra note 396, at 284; see 
also Telser, supra note 322, at 91 (absent such restraints dealers "reduce their prices because they avoid 
the additional cost of the special services"). 
400. See Standard Oil Co. of NJ. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911) (noting that Sherman Act 
does not forbid contract that "indirectly" raises prices); Posner, supra note 396, at 284 (noting that higher 
prices occasioned by vertical restrictions reflect additional cost of optimal service and not market power); 
see also supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text. 
401. See KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 205, at 12-13 (treating economic efficiency as primary goal 
of antitrust and equating efficiency with marginal cost pricing); Landes & Posner, supra note 46, at 937. 
402. See Easterbrook, supra note 399, at 156. 
403. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717,729-30 (1988) (stating agreement be-
tween dealer and manufacturer to terminate a second dealer was "ancillary" despite possible impact on 
price); Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 66 ("To treat as condemned by the act all agreements under which, as a 
result, the cost of conducting an interstate commercial business may be increased would enlarge the ap-
plication of the act far beyond the fair meaning of the language used. There must be some direct and im-
mediate impact upon interstate commerce in order to come within the act." (quoting Hopkins v. United 
States, 175 U.S. 578, 592 (1898))); see also Fowle v. Park, 131 U.S. 88, 97 (1889) (enforcing resale price 
maintenance and exclusive territories ancillary to sale of patent medicine); United States v. Addyston 
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271,283 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft. J.) (citing Fowle as a case properly enforcing an an-
cillary restraint), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (discussing distinc-
tion between direct and indirect restraints). 
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increasing) decision to enter employment contracts with additional sales-
people or advertising experts to promote the product "itself."404 Even 
price-theorists would treat such "intrafirm" activities as "competitive"; 
there is no reason to treat other contracts that produce the same results any 
differently.405 Thus, proof that such a restraint produces increased prices 
may simply confirm that the arrangement is having its laudable, welfare-
enhancing effect.406 Because such proof is equally consistent with the de-
fendants' procompetitive account of the restraint, it cannot establish any 
presumptive entitlement to judgment.407 
Ironically, the Supreme Court's approach to nonprice vertical re-
straints in the per se context would seem to compel rejection of the actual 
detrimental effects test in this context. As already noted, the Court has 
embraced TCE 's model of competition when addressing non price vertical 
restraints, recognizing that restraints limiting intrabrand competition may 
be reasonable insofar as they prevent free riding.408 The Court has also re-
fused to apply the per se rule simply because a vertical practice results in 
prices higher than those that obtained before the restraint.409 In so doing, 
404. See Walsh v. Dwight, 58 N.Y.S. 91, 93 (App. Div. 1899) (holding resale price maintenance not 
an unlawful restraint of trade because manufacturer could have achieved same objective by relying upon 
its own employees to distribute the product in question); Bork, supra note 322, at 438 ("[S]ince there is 
presently no antitrust objection to the most efficient utilization of local sales effort by ownership inte-
grated fmns, there seems no reason to discriminate against the achievement of the same objective by con-
tract-integrated systems through the use of market division agreements."). 
405. See supra notes 307-11 and accompanying text (describing price-theoretic definition of "compe-
tition."); see also, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 381-82 (1967) (finding con-
signment agreement reasonable method of distributing manufacturer's goods). 
406. See Baxter, supra note 334, at 945-46; Easterbrook, supra note 144, at 127 ("[M]onopoly and 
efficiency explanations so often imply similar traits. Think of vertical restrictions within a dealership net-
work. If these monopolize, the price rises and output falls. If the restraints cause dealers to supply effi-
cient point-of-sale services delivered to consumers, again price rises, and quantity may fall (although con-
sumers' surplus would rise because they value the higher quality)."); Meese, supra note 107, at 495. 
407. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-95 (1986) (holding 
that evidence that is as consistent with procompetitive as with anticompetitive account of a restraint can-
not, without more, support an inference of anticompetitive conduct); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv., 
Co., 465 U.S. 752,761-64 (1984) (same); First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253,279-80 
(1968) (same). 
Of course, manufacturers that adopt vertical restraints in an attempt to overcome market failure 
hope that additional sales effort induced by the restraint will ultimately result in increased output, as 
consumers demand more of the product. Nonetheless, proof that such a restraint results in reduced 
output should not suffice to establish a prima facie case. Such proof may simply reflect a variety of 
phenomena unrelated to the exercise of market power. For instance, a manufacturer may lose sales 
because it has miscalculated consumers' response to additional promotion only to find consumers have 
chosen substitute products in response to the increased price of the manufacturer's product. It would 
be perverse to rest a prima facie case on evidence that the market had punished a firm's poor judg-
ment. Moreover, much promotional activity will only enhance consumer demand over the longer run. 
For instance, automobile dealers may slowly enhance goodwill by advertising, participating in commu-
nity activities, and providing excellent post-sale service. Such activities could actually reduce the 
dealer's sales in the short run, with the result that a plaintiff challenging an exclusive territory could 
show that output fell after a manufacturer granted the dealer such protection. However, such a show-
ing should not suffice to establish a prima facie case. 
408. See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36,54-57 (1977). 
409. See Bus. Elecs. Corp., v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 731 (1988); see also Monsanto Co. v. 
Spray-Rite Serv. Co., 465 U.S. 752,762-64 (1984). 
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the Court has explicitly recognized that vertical agreements may increase 
prices by inducing dealer promotion and that such price increases are pro-
competitive.410 Moreover, the Court has explicitly held that product differ-
entiation is procompetitive.411 Application of an actual detrimental effects 
test, by contrast, necessarily rests upon a repudiation of TCE's more plau-
sible conception of competition in favor of the outmoded model associated 
with price theory. 
Consider as a second example a horizontal restraint, drawn from an 
actual case.412 Assume that a number of local moving companies form a 
joint venture (Hercules) designed to create a national moving system. The 
venture engages in national advertising, takes calls on a "1-800" number 
from customers, and settles customer complaints.413 The venture also 
promulgates uniform standards governing various aspects of member ser-
vices, trains member employees in how to meet those standards, and moni-
tors compliance with those requirements.414 The venture itself owns no 
trucks and employs no drivers but instead refers customers who contact it 
to individual members, who display the venture trademark on their trucks, 
the uniforms of their employees, and their own local advertising.415 Finally, 
assume that the venture sets rates for moving services provided to those 
customers that contact the venture directly, leaving members free to set 
rates for customers generated by their own local sales effort.416 
Two years after the venture's inception, Hercules revises its bylaws, to 
provide that the venture shall set rates governing any carriage of goods un-
der the venture's trademark, without regard to the source of the customer 
in question.417 The bylaws also provide that members are free to carry 
410. See Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 727-2B ("Any agreement between a manufacturer and a 
dealer to terminate another dealer who happens to have charged lower prices can be alleged to have been 
directed against the terminated dealer's 'price cutting.' In the vast majority of cases, it will be extremely 
difficult for the manufacturer to convince a jury that its motivation was to ensure adequate services, since 
price cutting and some measure of service cutting usually go hand in hand."); id. at 731 (noting that "price 
cutting is frequently made possible by 'free riding' on the services provided by other dealers"); Monsanto 
Co., 465 U.S. at 762-63 ("The manufacturer often will want to ensure that its distributors earn sufficient 
profit to pay for programs such as hiring and training additional salesmen or demonstrating the technical 
features of the product, and will want to see that 'free-riders' do not interfere .... Thus, the manufac-
turer's strongly felt concern about resale prices does not necessarily mean that [a violation of the Sherman 
Act has occurred]."). 
411. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101-DZ (1984) (stating that contrac-
tual restrictions on horizontal rivalry were necessary to enable the NCAA to differentiate its product 
from minor league sports); see also GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 56 n.25 (asserting that "a large part of 
the promotional efforts resulting from vertical restrictions [will] convey socially desirable information 
about product availability, price, quality, and services"). 
412. See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
413. See id. at 211. 
414. See id. at 211-12. 
415. See id. at 212 (describing such an allocation of responsibility). 
416. It should be noted that this assumption is a slight departure from the actual facts in Rothery. 
There the venture initially allowed members absolute price discretion with respect to all customers. See 
id. at 211-12. 
417. See id. at 213 (describing such a policy change). 
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goods at other rates, so long as they generate and conduct such business 
under their own local trademarks.418 
Assume now that the venture expels a member for carrying goods un-
der its trademark at rates below what the venture has prescribed. The for-
mer member challenges the expulsion under the Sherman Act, claiming 
that the expulsion enforced unlawful price maintenance.419 While the plain-
tiff asserts that the restraint is unlawful per se, the venture avoids summary 
condemnation by asserting that the agreement on price is ancillary to the 
formation of the venture and necessary to prevent some members from un-
derselling others and thus expropriating an undue share of the opportuni-
ties created by the venture.420 Although the Supreme Court declined to 
recognize such arguments during the inhospitality era, more recent legal 
developments suggest that the Court might treat such benefits as cogniza-
ble, thus obviating application of the per se rule.421 
How then might the plaintiff go about establishing a prima facie case 
under the Rule of Reason? Under current law, the most obvious route 
would be to establish that prices for the carriage of goods by the venture 
rose, or that the venture's output fell, after the bylaw amendment.422 Here 
418. Seeid. at213. 
419. ld. at 216-18 (describing plaintiff's assertion that similar conduct constitutes price mainte-
nance). As a formal matter, the plaintiff could also allege that the expulsion constitutes a group boycott. 
See id. at 215-16 (evaluating such an argument and finding that such boycotts are analyzed under the 
Rule of Reason). 
420. See id. at 224-30 (agreement on price charged by members operating under venture's trade-
mark analyzed under the Rule of Reason); see also, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 
U.S. 85, 101-D2 (1984) (noting that horizontal agreement not to pay athletes a salary could thwart market 
failure that unbridled competition would produce); Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20-21 
(1979) (joint price setting that accompanied creation and enforcement of blanket license analyzed under 
the Rule of Reason); Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,238-40 (1918) (analyzing horizontal 
price restraint ancillary to the formation of a grain exchange under the Rule of Reason); Chi. Prof'! 
Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 597-6)0 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J.) (agreement by rival 
NBA franchises to limit output of televised games judged under the full Rule of Reason given plausible 
benefits and extent of contractual integration between the parties); SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 
F.3d 958, 969-72 (lOth Cir. 1994) (finding that joint venture could exclude competitor to prevent latter 
from reaping undue portion of the fruits of the venture); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 
F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.) (finding that horizontal division of markets ancillary to creation 
of a shopping center could reduce free riding and was thus properly analyzed under the Rule of Reason). 
421. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596,606-12 (1972) (finding that the presence 
or absence of such benefits was irrelevant to the per se inquiry). But see Rothery Storage, 792 F.2d at 223-
30 (Topco does not survive rationale of NCAA, GTE Sylvania, Inc., and Broadcast Music, Inc.); see also 
Chi. Prof/ Sports Ltd. P'ship, 95 F.3d at 597-QOO (output limitation ancillary to joint venture analyzed 
under the Rule of Reason); Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 188-90 (analyzing agreement restricting products each 
party could sell under the Rule of Reason). 
Two scholars have suggested that Topco is stiii good law, even with respect to ancillary restraints, 
because the Supreme Court declined to modify the decision in Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 
(1990) (per curiam). See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 53, 229-30. There was, however, no asser-
tion in Palmer that the horizontal division of territories in question produced the sort of cognizable 
benefits involved in Topco. Thus, the Court's failure in Palmer to opine regarding an issue not before 
it should not be taken as a reaffirmation of this aspect of Topco. 
422. See FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986); NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104-08 
(proof that an ancillary restraint increased price and reduced output of defendants' product sufficed to 
establish a prima facie case); Re/Max Int'l, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995, 1014-15 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(proof that practice raised commissions paid by the plaintiffs established prima facie case); Law v. 
154 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2003 
again, though, such proof should not raise a presumption that the restraints 
produce anticompetitive harm. 
To be sure, the arrangement eliminates horizontal rivalry with respect 
to price, but then so do restraints ancillary to the formation of a partner-
ship.423 In so far as the defendants have adduced a plausible claim that un-
restrained rivalry results in a market failure, there is no reason to assume 
that the rivalry that preexisted the restraint produced prices or output that 
were competitive in any meaningful sense. To the contrary, a policy allow-
ing venture members to set whatever rates they wished for locally gener-
ated customers could well produce an inefficient equilibrium, that is, prices 
and quality below the social optimum and output above it. After all, even 
customers generated by individual members would rely at least in part on 
the reputation associated with the venture's trademark. That reputation, in 
tum, would be a function of expenditures on national advertising, as well as 
the quality of service provided by each member of the venture.424 By an-
nouncing and charging cut-rate rates for locally generated business, some 
members could deprive others of the prices necessary to cover the cost of 
maintaining high quality service.425 Moreover, such price cutting could de-
prive the venture's membership of the resources necessary to cover the cost 
of sufficient national advertising, which price cutters who generate a signifi-
NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (lOth Cir. 1998) {finding that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case 
because the challenged practice "was successful in artificially lowering the price of coaching services" pur-
chased by defendants); Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1319 {9th Cir. 1996) (proof that 
restraint excluded member school from bowl competition sufficed to establish prima facie case); J.F. 
Feeser, Inc. v. Serve-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524, 1542-43 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding that proof that supply 
contract caused some firms to pay higher prices for the defendant's products established prima facie case); 
7 AREEDA, supra note 28, 'l[1511, at 432-33; COMPETITOR CoLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 
144, § 3.3; HOVENKAMP, supra note 46, at 256 & n.25 ("(O]bserved decreases in output, an observed in-
crease in price coordination or exclusion from the market of firms that seem to be competitive entrants" 
is sufficient to establish a prima facie case); id. at 262 (finding that proof that restraint results in a reduc-
tion in output establishes a prima facie case); see also supra notes 116-53 and accompanying text. 
Indeed, it should be noted that the enforcement agencies would apparently require even less of a 
plaintiff in this context. See COMPETITOR COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 144, § 3.3 (stat-
ing that proof of explicit agreement on price or output itself requires some evidence of justification). 
Of course, the argument in the text, namely, that proof of actual detrimental effects should not suffice 
to establish a prima facie case, applies with even greater force against this position. See generally 
Meese, supra note 107, at 478-89 (arguing that mere proof of explicit agreement on price or output 
should not establish a prima facie case). 
Finally, it should be noted that Professor Hovenkamp concludes that the restraint in Topco should 
survive Rule of Reason scrutiny because of the venture's low market share. See HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 46, at 260. He does not explain why application of a market power screen is appropriate in this 
context, but inappropriate in a case like NCAA, where he approves application of an "actual detri-
mental effects" route to establish a prima facie case. See id. at 262-63. 
423. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 211, 230 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft, J.), affd, 
175 u.s. 211 {1899). 
424. See Rubin, supra note 321, at 227-28 (stating that the reputation associated with franchise sys-
tem depends upon collective efforts of franchisees). 
425. See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 222-23 (D.C. Cir. 1986); 
Rubin, supra note 321, at 228 (describing propensity of franchisees to free ride on efforts of others absent 
effective monitoring). 
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cant portion of their business locally might deem less important than aver-
age members of the venture.426 
Of course, tolerance of absolute pricing discretion could reduce prices 
and seemingly enhance output of the venture's services-the number of 
moves-in the short run, as price cutters attract business by free riding off 
the quality image associated with the venture trademark. Over the longer 
run, however, consumers stung by low quality may choose a different ven-
ture for their future moves.427 By setting uniform rates, then, the venture 
can prevent this deterioration in quality, protecting the reputation associ-
ated with the trademark and enhancing the overall demand for the ven-
ture's product over the longer run.428 While such a restraint would increase 
price or reduce output compared to the status quo ante, such effects are en-
tirely consistent with the defendants' account of the restraint's cognizable 
benefits. 
In the same way, of course, the formation of a partnership by two pre-
viously independent lawyers would eliminate the pricing discretion that 
426. More precisely, venture members may find that their own costs plus the pro-rata costs of sus-
taining the venture's operations are higher than the. market price that results from unbridled rivalry 
among members. Cf Chi. Prof) Sports, Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 673 (7th Cir. 1992) (describing 
disparate incentives faced by sporting teams that generate substantial revenue in national market through 
television contracts and those that generate most revenue locally through gate receipts). 
427. See Klein & Saft, supra note 321, at 349-51 (describing the so-called superhighway problem 
whereby consumers attribute poor quality of one franchise to other firms operating under the same 
trademark, ultimately reducing the demand for products sold under the franchise trademark). The Fed-
eral Trade Commission's opinion in In re California Dental Association also illustrates the shortcomings 
of an "actual detrimental effects" test. See In re Cal. Dental Ass'n, 121 F.T.C. 190 (1996), affd, 128 F.3d 
720 (9th Cir. 1997), vacated on other grounds, 526 U.S. 756 (1999). There the Commission relied on evi-
dence that certain dentists used advertising to increase their sales to support its conclusion that the Asso-
ciation's rules against false advertising were presumptively anticompetitive. See Cal. Dental, 121 F.T.C. at 
310-11. Such evidence, however, was equally consistent with the Association's assertion that the advertis-
ing was inherently misleading and that regulation of members' advertising was therefore necessary to 
forestall an inefficient equilibrium. See Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 771-73 (finding that such self-regulation 
of advertising could be procompetitive for this reason). After all, firms engage in false advertising to in-
crease their sales, and proof that the Association's regulations reduced the advertising and output of some 
dentists may simply have indicated that the regulations were having their intended, beneficial effect. See 
Meese, supra note 107, at 495-96 n.143. 
428. See, e.g., Telser, supra note 322. Some scholars have argued that price maintenance cannot by 
itself induce venture members to invest in an appropriate amount of promotion. See Benjamin Klein & 
Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1989). 
These scholars claim that dealers subject to price maintenance might simply "pocket" the difference be-
tween the price set by the manufacturer and the preexisting price, without providing any additional pro-
motional services. !d. As a result, these scholars conclude that price maintenance merely guarantees 
dealers economic rents, and that manufacturers still must monitor and police dealers' promotional efforts, 
terminating those who shirk by not providing sufficient promotional services. See id. 
The author respectfully disagrees with this analysis of vertical restraints. So long as there is effec-
tive interbrand competition, dealers who fail to provide an effective level of promotion will suffer vis-
a-vis dealers of competing products. In other words, while price maintenance may not itself guarantee 
that dealers will engage in promotional efforts, an agreement setting a floor on retail priees ensures 
that dealers who engage in such promotion will reap the rewards of their efforts. Dealers who face 
significant interbrand competition will have every incentive to engage in such promotion. Because the 
presence of "actual detrimental effects" does not negate the existence of interbrand competition, 
proof of such effects is equally consistent with defendants' assertion that such a restraint solves a mar-
ket failure. 
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each lawyer previously enjoyed. Moreover, restraints on moonlighting 
could prevent one partner from luring customers away from the partnership 
with cut rates for shoddy work.429 Thus, the formation of the partnership 
and associated restraints could increase prices, by enhancing the quality as-
sociated with the venture and thus differentiating its product. Under cur-
rent law, a plaintiff challenging the initial formation of the partnership-a 
merger of once independent firms-would have to establish a relevant 
market and the existence of concentration within it before the defendant 
would bear any burden of production.430 Proof of actual detrimental effects 
would not suffice. Moreover, once the merger took place, any pricing deci-
sions would be beyond scrutiny under section 1 of the Sherman Act.431 
There is simply no good reason to treat one variety of contractual coopera-
tion-the formation and operation of a partnership-differently from an-
other-the creation of a legitimate joint venture with ancillary restraints.432 
Proof that an ancillary restraint increases prices is entirely consistent with 
the venture's account of its benefits and thus cannot itself form the basis for 
a judgment against the defendants.433 Similar logic applies to other horizon-
tal restraints that plausibly counteract market failure.434 
Here again, reliance upon actual detrimental effects to establish a 
prima facie case would seem inconsistent with the Supreme Court's pro-
nouncements in the per se context. As explained earlier, the Court's juris-
prudence on nonprice vertical restraints assumes that such restraints can 
eliminate market failure and thus result in prices higher than those that ex-
isted before the restraint.435 There is simply no reason in law or economics 
to confine this rationale to the vertical context; horizontal restraints can 
429. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft, J.) 
("(W)hen two men became partners in a business, although their union might reduce competition, this 
effect was only incidental to the main purpose of a union of their capital, enterprise, and energy to carry 
on a successful business, and one useful to the community. Restrictions in the articles of partnership upon 
the business activity of the members, with a view of securing their entire effort in the common enterprise, 
were, of course, only ancillary to the main end of the union, and were to be encouraged."), affd, 175 U.S. 
211 (1899); Matthews v. Associated Press of N.Y., 136 N.Y. 333, 341 (1893) (Peckham, J.) ("A business 
partnership could provide that none of its members should attend to any business other than that of the 
partnership, and that each partner who came in must agree not to do any other business and must give up 
all such business as he had theretofore done. Such an agreement would not be in restraint of trade, al-
though its direct effect might be to restrain to some extent the trade which had been done."). 
430. See FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F3d 1045, 1051-54 (8th Cir. 1999); New York v. Kraft 
Gen. Foods, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 321, 361-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra 
note 114, § 1-2. 
431. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (finding that wholly 
owned subsidiaries or divisions of the same firm are not capable of conspiring for section 1 purposes); see 
also Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 357 (1982) (stating that price setting by doc-
tors in a partnership would be "perfectly proper"). 
432. See Chi. Prof! Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593,597-98 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J.) 
(characterizing a business finn as contractual cooperation between otherwise independent actors); supra 
notes 317-19 and accompanying text (explaining that a "firm" is simply one variety of contractual integra-
tion). 
433. See supra notes 148-57 and accompanying text. 
434. See, e.g., Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188-90 (7th Cir. 1985) (ana-
lyzing ancillary horizontal agreement under Rule of Reason). 
435. See supra notes 409-11 and accompanying text. 
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also combat market failure in a variety of ways.436 Indeed, the line between 
vertical and horizontal restraints is not always clear. Franchising, for in-
stance, is a vertical restraint to some and a horizontal restraint to others.437 
The effect of such arrangements is the same regardless of the label at-
tached. More to the point, the Court in NCAA expressly recognized that 
unbridled horizontal rivalry-there, the competition for student athletes-
could result in a market failure, namely, the devolution of college football 
into professional.438 Thus, the Court suggested, a horizontal restraint on 
price rivalry could produce cognizable benefits, viz., the reduction of prices 
for athletes' services to a level below that which price-theoretic competition 
would produce.439 Here again, the Court has embraced alternative defini-
tions of competition in the Rule of Reason and per se contexts. 
Consider a third example, namely, an agreement between several elite 
universities eliminating competition with respect to methods of setting fi-
nancial aid.440 In particular, the agreement prevents participating schools 
from offering financial aid on any basis other than demonstrated financial 
need.441 While such an agreement is not ancillary to any larger venture, 
participants could perhaps avoid per se condemnation by arguing that the 
436. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 46, at 205-11; Martin B. Louis, Restraints Ancillary to Joint Ven-
tures and Licensing Agreements: Do Sealy and Topco Logically Survive Sylvania and Broadcast Music?, 
66 VA. L. REv. 879, 912-13 (1980) (arguing that rationale of Sylvania applies with similar force to hori-
zontal ancillary restraints); Meese, supra note 107, at 479--81 (arguing that restraints characterized as "ver-
tical" are often equally "horizontal"); Posner, supra note 396, at 298-99 (antitrust treatment should not 
tum on characterization of restraints as "horizontal" or "vertical" but instead upon whether restraints 
produce benefits}; id. (arguing that horizontal ancillary restraints should be lawful absent showing of 
market power); see also SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 970-72 (lOth Cir. 1994) (finding 
that horizontal restraint ancillary to joint venture was reasonably necessary to protect venture from free 
riding); Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 189-90 (explaining how restraint ancillary to the formation of a shopping 
center could prevent free riding and thus encourage investment in the initial venture). 
437. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 46, at 205 ("[R]estaurateurs scattered across a wide area might 
develop joint menus, building plans, and methods of doing business, and then promote their 'chain' na-
tionally. This national name recognition will enable them to reach traveling customers that might other-
wise avoid a local restaurant about which they know nothing; The Topco case ... involved such a ven-
ture."); WILLIAMSON, supra note 197, at 181-82 (characterizing franchise contract as agreement between 
various potential competitors); Meese, supra note 107, at 491-92 (arguing that franchise systems can be 
characterized as a horizontal agreement); see also Chi. Prof! Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 598 
(7th Cir. 1996) (describing McDonald's franchise system as agreement among potential competitors); 
Rubin, supra note 321, passim. 
438. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101...{)2 (1984); see also Broad. Mu-
sic, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 7-23 (1979) (holding that horizontal price setting minimized transaction 
costs and thus increased output). 
439. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 102. Moreover, as Professor Hovenkamp has recognized, the existence 
of a sports league implies the ability to determine the number of games in a season and thus the output of 
the league's members. See HOVENKAMP,supra note 46, at 262. Presumably a league's decision to reduce 
the number of games in season would not-and certainly should not-ipso facto give rise to a prima facie 
case, even if the plaintiff could show that the restraint actually reduced the number of games played. 
There is no apparent distinction between such a decision and a decision to limit the number of games that 
are televised. But see HOVENKAMP, supra note 46, at 256--57 n.25 (endorsing actual detrimental effects 
test}; id. at 262-63 (arguing that government established a prima facie case in NCAA despite the absence 
of any convincing market definition). 
440. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993) (evaluating such an agreement 
among members of the Ivy League and MIT). 
441. /d. at 662. 
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restraint allows parties to allocate limited financial aid toward students 
whose personal characteristics or backgrounds would enhance the socio-
economic diversity of each school.442 Assuming that such a justification is 
cognizable, proof that the restraint produces prices higher than those that 
previously obtained should not suffice to establish a prima facie case. Here 
again, the defendants' justification depends upon an assertion that unbri-
dled rivalry in financial aid determinations would produce an inefficient 
equilibrium; lower prices, yes, and perhaps higher output, but also reduced 
educational quality manifested in less diverse student bodies.443 Thus, proof 
that the restraint results in higher prices is entirely consistent with the de-
fendants' account of the arrangement's legitimate purpose and effect.444 In-
creased quality often involves higher costs-here the cost of providing the 
aid necessary to attract diverse students. Because they are cost-justified, 
these higher prices do not reflect any exercise of market power, but instead 
a higher quality product for which consumers are willing to pay.445 
Certainly the rationale for the three restraints discussed above de-
pends upon the existence of product differentiation, differentiation that 
might confer some modest market power on the manufacturer.446 In some 
cases, for instance, the restraint in question may itself be a source of differ-
entiation, as when colleges agree not to pay athletes, thus creating a prod-
uct different from other forms of athletic entertainment.447 In other cases, 
such restraints might facilitate the advertising and promotion of a manufac-
turer's product, thus accentuating such differentiation, and enhancing any 
market power such differentiation might confer. Moreover, the availability 
of various promotional devices that inform consumers of functional distinc-
tions between products may encourage manufacturers to innovate, knowing 
that a "better mousetrap" will win consumer patronage.448 
442. See Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 675-78 (accepting variant of this argument); Meese, supra note 107, 
at 490 (arguing courts should evaluate such restraints under the Rule of Reason); cf Thomas C. Arthur, A 
Workable Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 337, 379 n.263 (2000) (arguing that the benefits touted by 
the Ivy League overlap group were not cognizable). 
443. See Meese, supra note 107, at 495 (asserting that defendants' justification in this context rests 
upon an assertion that unbridled rivalry will produce an inefficient equilibrium). 
To be sure, output as measured simply by number of matriculations could increase as lower prices 
attracted additional "non-diverse" students who might otherwise matriculate elsewhere if the re-
straints were enforced. These students would be paying a lower price, but they would also be obtain-
ing an inferior product. As a result, proof that "output" fell after the parties imposed the restraint 
should not give rise to a prima facie case. 
444. See Meese, supra note 107, at 495-96. 
445. See id.; see also supra notes 397-411 and accompanying text (showing that price increases asso-
ciated with vertical restraints are cost-justified and do not reflect an exercise of market power). 
446. See Telser, supra note 322, at 87 (assuming that product differentiation that leads firms to adopt 
vertical restraints gives rise to market power). 
447. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S 85, 101--{)2 (1984) (opining that restric-
tions on compensation designed to preserve amateur quality of college football was legitimate attempt at 
product differentiation). 
448. See, e.g., Lee Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J.L. & EcoN. 337, 
352 (1972) (finding that restrictions on advertising of eyeglasses raised prices). 
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The presence or prospect of such differentiation does not change the 
analysis offered here. While firms may seek market power through product 
differentiation, they do not always succeed. The Edsel was different from 
all other cars, and the new Coke was different from Pepsi and, for that mat-
ter, the old Coke. Although both Ford and Coke spent millions of dollars 
promoting their innovations, it seems highly unlikely that either product 
conferred market power on its inventor. Few business mistakes are as spec-
tacular as these, of course, and many attempts at differentiation are success-
ful. Nonetheless, success in a free economy often simply means the absence 
of failure, that is, the ability to price at marginal cost and earn a normal re-
turn in competition-present or future-with other differentiated products. 
Such competition, of course, may radically change the character of con-
sumer demand for the differentiated product, rendering once loyal custom-
ers entirely indifferent. Thus, even where a justification depends upon the 
creation or enhancement of product differentiation, proof that the restraint 
produces detrimental effects is entirely consistent with defendants' attempt 
simply to obtain a normal return and the existence of enough substitutes to 
render the seller a price taker.449 That the firm hopes for more does not 
create antitrust harm. 
At any rate, even if one stipulates that such differentiation always 
gives rise to market power, there is still no reason to embrace the actual 
detrimental effects test. So long as entry is feasible, even firms that sell dif-
ferentiated products will find themselves confined to a normal rate of re-
449. The assertion that product differentiation need not confer market power may seem incorrect to 
economists and economically sophisticated antitrust scholars, who assume that such differentiation always 
confers some degree of market power, no matter how modest. See, e.g., F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, 
INDUSTRIAL STRUCfURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 32-33 (1990); see also HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 46, at fJ7 ("[l]n a product differentiated market firms have the ability to exploit a small amount of 
market power."). This assumption, however, is purely tautological, insofar as economists define as "dif-
ferentiated" any product for which a seller faces a downward sloping demand curve in the region above 
its average cost curve. See, e.g. SCHERER & Ross, supra, at 16. This downward slope, it is said, reflects the 
fact that some consumers prefer the product in question to any substitutes. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 
46, at 36-37 ("Although Ford and Chrysler automobiles compete, some buyers prefer one to the other 
and are willing to pay more for their first choice. To the extent this is true, the manufacturer faces a 
slightly downward sloping demand curve and may charge a price above marginal cost." (emphasis 
added)); SCHERER & Ross, supra, at 16 (same). The ability to price above cost in this manner, of course, 
rests upon the assumption that (1) firms fully understand the demand curves they will face and; (2) tech-
nology is sufficiently plastic that a firm can enter at a scale small enough to price above marginal cost, but 
large enough to achieve a profitable level of average costs. 
Nonetheless, the mere fact that a demand curve is downward sloping at some levels of output at a 
particular time does not mean that it is downward sloping at all levels of output at all times. A fmn 
with numerous loyal consumers today may find most of the same consumers indifferent tomorrow, 
after a rival introduces a similar product. In such a case, the firm's demand curve may well shift to the 
left and become horizontal at all profitable levels of output. See generally SCHUMPETER, supra note 
341, at 80-86. The discussion in the text therefore departs from the economist's tautology and defines 
"product differentiation" as any difference in attributes among products, including brand names, with-
out regard to the effect of such differences on the shape of demand curves at a firm's conceivable lev-
els of output. See also infra notes 446-60 and accompanying text (arguing that, even if product differ-
entiation does confer market power, such differentiation should not suffice to establish a prima facie 
case). 
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tum, as any above-normal profits attract new rivals.450 To be sure, the exis-
tence of a downward sloping demand curve implies that such firms will 
price above marginal cost, and such pricing is an exercise of market 
power.451 Nonetheless, differentiation meets real consumer tastes and 
needs, and there is no reason to believe that the alternative, a world of en-
tirely homogenous products priced at marginal cost, would be superior 
from the perspective of consumers or anyone else.452 Nor will attempts to 
penalize contractual attempts at differentiation cause sellers of differenti-
ated products to expand output and price at marginal cost.453 Absent some 
examination of entry conditions-an inquiry the actual detrimental effects 
test abjures- there is simply no reason to treat the presence or creation of 
differentiation as a harm for antitrust purposes.454 
Indeed, even if barriers to entry ensure that a defendant selling a dif-
ferentiated product might earn more than a normal return, there is still no 
reason to treat such differentiation as an antitrust harm. While the Ameri-
can economy is generally competitive, the prospect of achieving supra-
competitive returns is a powerful motivating force, driving firms to innovate 
in the search for that ever-elusive monopoly. Moreover, the benefits of in-
novation usually outweigh the allocational losses that accompany any re-
sulting market power.455 Punishing mere product differentiation would thus 
450. EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOUSTIC COMPETITION 69-88 
(1933); CLARK, supra note 239, at 21, 53, 120; HAYEK, supra note 226, at 105 (suggesting that entry or 
threat thereof will ensure that no firm earns more than a normal rate of return). 
451. See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 450, at 74--81; see also SCHERER & Ross, supra note 449, at 23. 
452. Indeed, Professor Chamberlin, who popularized the theory of monopolistic competition, argued 
that a world containing such differentiation was superior to that portrayed by the perfect competition 
model. "Differences in tastes, desires, incomes, and locations of buyers, and differences in the uses which 
they wish to make of commodities all indicate the need for variety and the necessity of substituting for the 
concept of a 'competitive ideal' an ideal involving both monopoly and competition." See EDWARD HAsT-
INGS CiiAMBERUN. THE THEORY OF MONOPOUSTIC CoMPETITION 214-15 (6th ed. 1948), quoted in 
SCHERER & Ross, supra note 449, at 2; CLARK, supra note 239, at 4-5; see also supra note 411 and ac-
companying text (showing that price theorists generally believed that some differentiation was healthy). 
453. Cf CLARK, supra note 239, at 214 (noting that attacks on product differentiation based on mar-
ginal-cost pricing standard are "meaningless"). 
454. Cf supra note 114 and accompanying text (noting that courts that apply a market power filter 
require plaintiffs to show the existence of barriers to entry to establish a prima facie case). The argument 
made in this paragraph may seem inconsistent with Standard Oirs normative premise that above-cost 
pricing is the sort of harmful "consequence of monopoly" at which the Rule of Reason is directed. See 
supra note 179 and accompanying text. However, classical economics did not recognize the concept of 
"marginal cost," and it therefore seems likely that the Standard Oil court was referring to average cost 
See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, at 273 ("(C)lassicism knew nothing of marginal cost .... "). 
Thus, to the extent that: (1) Standard Oil's overriding concern is the enhancement of purchaser welfare 
and; (2) the existence of product differentiation enhances that welfare, proof that a restraint produces or 
enhances product differentiation should not ipso facto give rise to a prima facie case. A contrary ap-
proach would produce absurd results, presumptively banning all contractual restrictions that tend to dif-
ferentiate a product. Cf NCAA Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984) (suggesting 
that contractual restrictions that limit competition for players are procompetitive efforts to differentiate 
the NCAA's product). 
455. See HAYEK, supra note 226, at 101 ("A person who possesses the exclusive knowledge or skill 
which enables him to reduce the cost of production of a commodity by 50 percent still renders an enor-
mous service to society if he enters its production and reduces its price by only 25 percent-not only 
through that price reduction but also through his additional savings of cost. But it is only through compe-
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sap the economy of its driving force. "The successful competitor, having 
been urged to compete, must not be turned on when he wins."456 While 
many such innovations are technological (the better mousetrap), others re-
quire nonstandard contracts, as when franchisees agree to be open from 
seven until eleven or to serve Coca-Cola instead of Pepsi.457 Moreover, all 
innovations are worthless unless consumers know about them, and non-
standard contracts often facilitate promotion and advertising.458 Even price 
theorists recognized that technological innovations that result in product 
differentiation are competitive because they enhance the welfare of con-
sumers who naturally have varying preferences.459 Like new technologies, 
nonstandard contracts can qualify as innovations, helping to create a new 
product. They can also help innovating firms inform consumers of their 
"better mousetrap." There is no reason to treat such contractual competi-
tion any differently from technological competition that takes place within 
the firm.460 
B. Balancing Harms and Benefits 
Of course, even if a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, defendants 
may still introduce evidence in rebuttal.461 Under current law, defendants 
must do more than show that a restraint produces significant benefits by, 
for instance, combating a market failure. Instead, defendants must also 
show that such benefits outweigh, counteract, or offset any anticompetitive 
harm.462 For instance, if the plaintiff's prima facie case consists of a showing 
that a restraint increases prices, the defendants mus( offer evidence that be-
cause of these benefits, the restraint reduces or at least does not increase 
prices.463 This, of course, is the same approach lower courts and the en-
tition that we can assume that these possible savings will be realized."); Oliver Williamson, Economies as 
an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 699, 706-09 (1977). 
456. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.); see also 
Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665,673 n.4 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.). 
457. See Martino v. McDonald's Sys., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 356,357-58 (N.D. ill. 1985) (evaluating con-
tractual requirement that McDonald's franchisees serve Coca-Cola). 
458. See HAYEK, supra note 226, at 96. 
459. See supra notes 228-32 and accompanying text. 
460. Cf Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36,56 n.25 (1977) (concluding that a ban on 
vertical restraints would lead firms to "shift to less efficient methods of obtaining the same promotional 
effects"). 
461. See supra notes 153-68. 
462. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 113-20 (1984); 7 AREEDA, supra 
note 28, 'II 1507b, at 397-99 (arguing that even if defendant produces evidence of significant benefits, the 
tribunal must determine whether a less restrictive alternative is present and, if not, "weigh and balance 
the harm against benefit"); id. at 398 (arguing that where restraint produces only minor benefits, a court 
should declare it unlawful once plaintiff establishes a prima facie case); CoMPETITOR CoLLABORATION 
GUIDELINES, supra note 144, § 3.37 (agencies attempt to determine whether "cognizable efficiencies 
likely would be sufficient to offset the potential of the agreement to harm consumers"); see also supra 
notes 157-65 and accompanying text. 
463. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 114; COMPETITOR CoLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 144, 
§ 3.37; see also Nat'! Soc'y of Prof! Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693-95 (1978) (noting that pur-
ported benefit is only cognizable if it tends to offset price increase). 
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forcement agencies employ when evaluating mergers.464 Such an approach 
assumes that once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, any pro-
competitive benefits necessarily coexist with some anticompetitive harm, 
thus necessitating some comparison of the two effects.465 This assumption 
rests upon price theory's partial equilibrium trade-off model, which econo-
mists and antitrust scholars use to model the welfare effects of mergers and 
other transactions that produce technological efficiencies such as economies 
of scale.466 
As shown below, this requirement that courts balance justifications for 
nonstandard contracts against actual detrimental effects rests upon out-
moded price-theoretic assumptions, namely, that higher prices or reduced 
output are necessarily anticompetitive harms, that any benefits must coun-
teract or outweigh.467 Application of TCE, by contrast, suggests that proof 
that contractual integration combats a market failure should ipso facto re-
but any prima facie case, regardless whether such proof tends to show that 
prices are lower or output higher than before the restraint. Thus, such 
proof undermines the price-theoretic assumption inherent in the partial 
equilibrium trade-off model that any benefits necessarily coexist with anti-
competitive effects. 
Return first to the example of an exclusive territory discussed ear-
lier.468 Assume that a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case by showing 
that the restraint has resulted in prices higher than those that existed before 
it. Assume further that the defendants prove that, but for the restraints, in-
dividual dealers would underinvest in promotional services, free riding on 
the efforts of fellow dealers. Under the current standards governing Rule 
of Reason analysis, such proof would be an invitation to further inquiry, as 
a court attempts to determine whether these benefits outweighed the pre-
sumed harrn.469 Or, as courts often put it, the fact-finder would balance any 
464. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
465. See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE 
W. REs. L. REv. 381 (1980); Williamson, supra note 455, at 718. 
466. BoRK, supra note 328, at 107-10 (arguing that this model should be the basis for antitrust pol-
icy); HOVENKAMP, supra note 46, at 501-D2 (describing application of this model in the merger context); 
see also Wesley J. Liebler, Comments, 28 J.L. & ECON. 335, 335-36 (1985) (arguing that Rule of Reason 
analysis should "balance the gains from increased efficiency against the losses from increased market 
power"). 
467. See supra notes 381-S4 and accompanying text. 
468. See supra notes 390-99 and accompanying text. 
469. See supra notes 390-92 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., 8 AREEDA, supra note 138, '111649, 
at 547-49 (outlining balancing test to be applied in this context); SULUVAN & GRIMES, supra note 53, at 
333-35 (same). It should be noted that Professor Hovenkamp would generally eschew balancing in this 
context and approve any restraint for which the defendant is able to establish the existence of significant 
benefits. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 46, at 489 (arguing that once defendant demonstrates that there-
straint advances a legitimate business purpose, the court should approve the restraint, unless the plaintiff 
shows actual collusion or "anticompetitive dealer domination"). He would, however, continue to apply 
the less restrictive alternative test in this context. See id. 
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improvement in interbrand competition against the harm flowing from a 
reduction in intrabrand competition.470 
While such an approach makes sense under a price-theoretic, techno-
logical conception of competition, it cannot survive application of the 
transaction cost paradigm and its recognition of contractual competition. 
According to TCE, proof that a restraint combats free riding suggests that 
the unrestrained rivalry that preexisted the arrangement produced an inef-
ficient equilibrium and with it a nonoptimal price.471 This price was not 
competitive in any meaningful sense, and thus not an appropriate bench-
mark for ascertaining whether, in fact, the restraint produces net procom-
petitive effects. Thus, proof that the restraint in fact produces cognizable 
benefits undermines any presumption that the agreement creates anticom-
petitive harm, since such proof establishes that the prices (and output) that 
preexisted the restraint were a product of market failure. Absent such a 
presumption, of course, the plaintiff's case collapses, without regard to 
whether the restraint's benefits outweigh any purported harms by reducing 
prices or otherwise. For, any conclusion at the per se stage that such bene-
fits are cognizable under the Sherman Act necessarily rests on the assump-
tion that the elimination of market failure is an unambiguous benefit, and 
that elimination of that failure may increase prices.472 Any attempt to bal-
ance an increase in interbrand competition against the harm of reduced in-
trabrand competition misses the point.473 Proof that the restraint amelio-
rates a market failure by reducing overzealous intrabrand rivalry 
establishes that there is no harm in the first place, period, thus undermining 
the case for application of the partial equilibrium trade-off model. 
It is true that the restraint may have increased prices above those that 
previously obtained. But then so would a manufacturer's decision to forgo 
470. See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1977) ("The market impact of 
vertical restrictions is complex because of their potential for a simultaneous reduction of intra brand com-
petition and stimulation of interbrand competition."); id. at 57 n.27 (concluding that such balancing is an 
appropriate judicial function). 
471. See supra notes 332-37 and accompanying text. 
472. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717,727-28 (1988); id. at 731 (same); 
see also GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 54-57 (stating that elimination of free riding is a beneficial effect 
of vertical restraints). 
473. As then-Professor Easterbrook put it when speaking of vertical restraints: 
No one can sensibly weigh inter- and intrabrand competition against one another; they are 
not ·commensurable. The reduction in "intrabrand competition" is the source of the competitive 
benefit that helps one product compete against another. Intrabrand competition as such is worth-
less; one might as well complain when a corporation does not have internal competition to make 
the product most cheaply .... No manufacturer wants to have less competition among its dealers 
for the sake of less competition. The reduction in dealers' rivalry in the price dimension is just 
the tool the manufacturer uses to induce greater competition in the service dimension. As I 
spelled out above, restricted dealing alters the product's attributes. There is no "less" in one col-
umn to "balance against a gain" in the other, any more than the manufacturer's sole prerogative 
to decide what physical product to make creates a "reduction in intrabrand competition." 
See Easterbrook, supra note 399, at 155-56; Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment 
of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. On. L. REv. 6, 18-21 (1981); see also Alan J. Meese, An-
titrust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean World: The Case of Franchise Tying Contracts, 95 MICH. L. REv. 
111, 141-42 (1996) (arguing that proof that a franchise tying contract produces significant benefits rebuts 
any presumption that the agreement is the result of forcing and should entitle the defendant to judgment). 
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contracts with independent dealers and enter employment contracts with its 
own sales force in an attempt to increase expenditures on promotion.474 
Both forms of (contractual) competition would result in price increases. 
Each price increase would be entirely procompetitive, however, and neither 
would depend upon any exercise of market power. There is, therefore, 
simply no reason to ask whether the benefits of these arrangements out-
weigh the purported harms of such higher prices. 
Similar analysis applies to the ancillary and "naked" horizontal price 
restraints discussed earlier.475 As suggested above, the ancillary restraint 
between members of the Hercules venture could prevent some members of 
the venture from free riding on the goodwill associated with the venture 
trademark and driving prices so low that the venture could not sustain an 
optimal level of service quality and advertising.476 Here again, current law 
and scholarly opinion would require courts to determine whether any bene-
fits produced by such restraints offset the harms presumed once a plaintiff 
established a prima facie case.477 However, proof that the venture in fact 
produces such benefits undermines any assertion by the plaintiff that higher 
prices indicate that the restraint creates or exercises market power.478 For, 
as described earlier, such price increases may simply reflect the enhanced 
quality produced by the restraint.479 As a result, there is simply no reason 
474. See Bork, supra note 322, at 438 ("[S)ince there is presently no antitrust objection to the most 
efficient utilization of local sales effort by ownership integrated firms, there seems no reason to discrimi-
nate against the achievement of the same objective by contract-integrated systems through the use of 
market division agreements."); see also Chi., St. Louis & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. PullmanS. Car Co., 
139 U.S. 79, 89 (1891) (finding contract granting one company the exclusive right to obtain sleeping cars 
valid at common law because "[the defendant's) duty, as a carrier of passengers, was to make suitable 
provisions for their comfort and safety. Instead of furnishing its own drawing-room and sleeping cars, as 
it might have done, it employed the plaintiff, whose special business was to provide cars of that charac-
ter"); Illinois Corporate Travel, Inc v. Am. Air Lines, 806 F.2d 722, 727 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J.) 
("The question is not whether the arrangement affects moment-to-moment rivalry in a way that raises 
today's prices, but whether this effect is associated with potential benefits to consumers that are worth the 
price. Higher quality may come with higher prices. The antitrust laws do not adopt a model of atomistic 
competition that condemns all organization; otherwise they would forbid Sears to tell the managers of its 
stores what prices to charge." (emphasis added)); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 
287 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft, J.) (suggesting that such a contract would be valid under the Sherman Act be-
cause "[t)he railroad company ... may secure to the sleeping-car company the same freedom from com-
petition that it would have itself in discharging the duty"), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); Walsh v. Dwight, 58 
N.Y.S. 91, 93 (App. Div. 1899) (holding that minimum rpm was not an unlawful restraint of trade because 
"the defendants would have the right to establish agencies for the sale of their goods, or to employ others 
to sell them, at such prices as the defendants should designate"). 
475. See supra notes 412-35 and accompanying text. 
476. See supra notes 423-35 and accompanying text. 
477. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text. Indeed, Professor Hovenkamp argues that, 
where horizontal restraints are concerned, a plaintiff should prevail whenever procompetitive benefits 
and anticompetitive effects coexist. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 46, at 257. That is, he would not allow a 
defendant to show that the benefits of the practice outweigh the harms. 
478. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text. 
479. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text; see also SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 
F.3d 958, 970 (lOth Cir. 1994) (noting that exclusion of competitor from joint venture could prevent late-
comer from reaping benefits of members' investments and thus encourage initial investment in the ven-
ture product); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210,222-23 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(Bork, J.) (explaining that horizontal price restraints could protect quality of the venture's product by 
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to balance benefits against banns, since proof of benefits negates the exis-
tence of any banns by establishing that any price increase shown by the 
plaintiff does not necessarily reflect an exercise of market power.480 Simi-
larly, proof that the agreement between Ivy League universities on financial 
aid actually enhances educational quality rebuts any assertion that higher 
tuition or reduced output is a manifestation of above-cost pricing.481 Thus, 
there is no reason to weigh benefits against anticompetitive harm, since the 
very existence of such benefits undermines any presumption of harm. 
While the plaintiff should be free to prove that any benefits produced by 
the restraint are illusory,482 a tribunal should not allow the plaintiff simply 
to rest on its initial proof that the restraint produces actual detrimental ef-
fects, hoping that the fact-finder will strike a balance in its favor. 
It will not do to argue, as·some have, that such claims of benefits nec-
essarily depend upon the possession of market power with the result that 
some balancing is inevitable.483 They do not. Numerous horizontal re-
straints on price and output exist despite the apparent absence of any mar-
ket power.484 In a world of perfect competition, it is true, no firm or subset 
preventing price deterioration and ensuring members adequate return on their investments in quality); 
Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 190 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.) (arguing 
that covenant restricting products that each party could sell could enhance welfare by encouraging in-
vestment in promotion by each party). 
480. The same analysis would apply, it should be noted, if the restraint in question was an ancillary 
horizontal division of territories. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 passim (1972); 
supra notes 471-74 (collecting authorities showing that such restraints can combat market failure and thus 
encourage optimal promotion). 
One need not rely upon the assertion by Judge Bork that such balancing is beyond judicial capacity. 
See Rothery Storage, 792 F.2d at 229 n.11. The point of the argument in the text is that, regardless of 
the capacity of courts, such balancing is premised upon the false assumption that procompetitive bene-
fits necessarily coexist with anticompetitive effects. 
481. See supra notes 442-51. 
482. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117-19 (1984) (finding that re· 
straint did not in fact produce the benefits that the defendants touted); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 
1020-24 (lOth Cir.1998) (same). 
483. See Nat'! Soc'y of Prof! Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-95 (1978) (rejecting justifica-
tion as necessarily depending upon ability to price above the "competitive" level); SULUVAN & GRIMES, 
supra note 53, at 211 (stating that the possession of market power was implicit in defendants' characteri· 
zation of the justification in NCAA); Herbert Hovenkamp, Competitor Collaboration After California 
Dental Association, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 149, 179-80 (arguing that the justifications offered in NCAA 
necessarily contemplated a "market-wide output decrease" and "depend[ed)on the exercise of market 
power"); see also 7 AREEDA, supra note 28, 'II 1504, at 380-81 (arguing that justification in Professional 
Engineers depended upon existence of noncompetitive pricing). 
The assertion that the restraints in NCAA necessarily depended upon the exercise of market power 
seems particularly difficult to accept, given their humble origins. The NCAA first adopted restraints 
on output in 1951, long before college football had any conceivable market power. See NCAA, 468 
U.S. at 89-91 (detailing origins of the restraints). Moreover, for reasons explained in the text, and by 
the Court itself, not every instance of cooperation between competitors that affects price or output 
involves an exercise of market power. See id. at 101-{)2 (concluding that some horizontal cooperation, 
including an agreement not to pay athletes a salary, is necessary to create and enhance the product of 
college football); see also infra note 491 (describing various horizontal restraints that cannot be ex-
plained as attempts to acquire or exercise market power). 
484. See, e.g., Topco, 405 U.S. 596 passim (declaring unlawful ancillary horizontal restraint among 
firms with six-percent share of relevant market); Rothery Storage, 792 F.2d 210 passim (evaluating re-
straint ancillary to joint venture among firms with six percent of the relevant market); Polk Bros., 776 
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of firms can affect the price or output of their own products through con-
tractual restraint or otherwise. In this world, any change in a firm's price 
will cause all consumers to shift to other products which, by hypothesis, are 
perfect substitutes. In the real world, however, substitutes are rarely per-
fect, and firms are constantly striving to build a new mousetrap and con-
vince consumers that it is better. Such quality improvements cost money, 
and improvements that are cost-justified will win over consumers, even if 
prices are higher than those of substitutes.485 Contractual integration can 
play an important role in this process, as firms moderate rivalry that un-
dermines attempts at differentiation or thwarts efforts to communicate such 
differentiation to consumers.486 At any given time, of course, several firms 
within the same market may be pursuing such strategies; others might be 
pondering entry or extension of product lines. The end result is a market 
full of differentiated products, serving the various needs of consumers. 
While economists generally assume that such differentiation creates market 
power, it need not; a firm with a loyal customer base may lose most of its 
customers tomorrow to an innovative substitute.487 Moreover, a flrm may 
create a new product expecting a loyal customer base, only to flnd that most 
view its innovation with relative indifference. All firms hope that their ef-
forts lead to market power, but such efforts are equally consistent with the 
achievement of a normal return and marginal cost pricing.488 
This is not to say that balancing is never a valid method of evaluating 
defendants' justification for a restraint that is apparently detrimental. 
Where a restraint purportedly creates benefits that are technological in ori-
gin, ostensibly reducing the cost of production, such balancing pursuant to 
the partial equilibrium model is certainly in order. If, for instance, defen-
F.2d 185 passim (evaluating restraint ancillary to formation of a shopping center selling appliances and 
lawn care products). 
Similarly, some college sports leagues have adopted horizontal restrictions on competition for ath-
letes more stringent than those mandated by the NCAA. Members of the Patriot League, for in-
stance, have agreed not to grant athletic scholarships in all sports except basketball. See Mark Asher 
& Seth Emerson, American to Leave CAA for the Patriot League, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2000, at D-1; 
The Official Site of the Patriot League, About the Patriot League, at http://patriotleague.ocsn. 
com/school-bio/patr-school-bio-aboutpl.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2002). These restrictions obviously 
reduce the price that these schools pay for the services of hundreds of athletes. See Law, 134 F.3d at 
1020 (finding proof that salary cap had reduced salaries of "restricted earnings coaches" sufficed to 
establish a prima facie case). Is it possible that American, Army, Bucknell, Colgate, Holy Cross, La-
fayette, Lehigh, and Navy-the members of the Patriot League-have "market power" in the market 
for collegiate sports talent? Moreover, numerous law firm partnerships and physician practices set 
prices and bind their members to noncompete agreements and other ancillary restraints. Do each of 
these firms have "market power?" 
485. See supra note 330 and accompanying text. 
486. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 98-104; Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 45-47 
(1977); see also supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text (describing role that nonstandard contracts can 
play in enhancing product differentiation). 
487. See supra note 449 and accompanying text (arguing that firms with differentiated products may 
not possess market power due to existence of substitutes that lure away once loyal consumers); see also 
SCHUMPETER, supra note 341, at 80-86. 
488. See HAYEK, supra note 226, at 104--D5; supra notes 446-49 and accompanying text (arguing that 
mere distinction between products does not ipso facto confer market power). 
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dants claim that an apparently anticompetitive merger will result in econo-
mies of scale and thus reduce the unit cost of production, courts should 
weigh those benefits against any anticompetitive harms the transaction 
might create.489 For, unlike those instances in which a restraint purportedly 
attenuates a market failure, the creation of technological efficiencies by 
merger does not ipso facto undermine a plaintiff's prima facie case, and ap-
plication of the partial equilibrium trade off model is appropriate. By their 
very nature, such efficiencies produce lower costs of production that can 
logically coexist with the exercise of market power. Thus, the presence of 
such efficiencies does not explain or rebut proof that the transaction pro-
duces actual detrimental effects.490 
C. The Less Restrictive Alternative 
Under current law, proof that a restraint's benefits outweigh the 
harms identified by the plaintiff will not necessarily sustain it. For, courts 
and the enforcement agencies uniformly declare such restraints unlawful if 
the plaintiff can demonstrate a less restrictive alternative that will produce 
the same benefits as the restraint.491 Many scholars have gone even further, 
arguing that proof that an alternative produces "nearly" the same benefits 
or "adequately" advances defendants' objective, should suffice.492 Applica-
489. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 114, § 4; HOVENKAMP, supra note 46, at 
500-01. The exact nature of such weighing will depend upon the normative premise that one adopts. If 
the antitrust statutes merely outlaw those transactions that result in a net reduction in social wealth, 
courts will want to balance any cost savings against the deadweight allocative losses resulting ·from a 
transaction. See Williamson, supra note 455, at 728. If, on the other hand, these statutes outlaw any 
transaction that results in higher consumer prices, courts should determine whether the efficiencies in 
question are so large that they offset any increase in market power, thus preventing a price increase. See 
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 114, § 4; HOVENKAMP,supra note 46, at 502-03. 
490. See generally Williamson, supra note 455, at 18. 
491. See Re/Max Int'l, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995, 1015 (6th Cir. 1999) (rejecting claim 
that price-fixing was necessary to protect investment in employees where such benefits could be realized 
via less restrictive alternative of long-term contracts and covenants not to compete); Chi. Prof! Sports 
Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667,675-76 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.) (declaring restriction on output 
of televised games unlawful where same benefits could be achieved by charging members of venture a fee 
for every game broadcast); Gen. Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat'! Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 
1984) (Posner, J.) (finding that horizontal allocation of territories was not justified by desire to prevent 
free riding by members on provision of repair services because venture could and did charge members for 
such services); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding limits on free agency unreason-
able in light of purported less restrictive alternatives); see also supra notes 169-70 (collecting other judi-
cial, executive, and scholarly authorities endorsing use of the less restrictive alternative test). It should be 
emphasized that scholars do not distinguish between vertical and horizontal restraints on this score. See, 
e.g., 8 AREEDA, supra note 138, 'II 1649d3, at 557-58; HOVENKAMP, supra note 46, at 489. 
492. See 7 AREEDA,supra note 28, 'lf 1505, at 383-89; 7 id. 'I! 1507b, at 397-99; SULLIVAN & GRIMES, 
supra note 53, at 223 (arguing that courts should ask whether less restrictive alternative proffered by the 
plaintiff is "nearly as effective"); Sullivan, supra note 172, at 851. Moreover, Professor Hovenkamp has 
suggested on one occasion that less restrictive alternatives need not be equally effective. See HOVENKAMP, 
supra note 172, 'li 1912i, at 302 ("If the defendant succeeds [in showing that a restraint produces benefits], 
then the plaintiff is permitted to show that the same (or nearly the same) procompetitive benefits could 
be achieved by a realistic, less restrictive alternative."). In a subsequent work, however, he indicates that 
a less restrictive alternative should serve the purported objective equally well. See HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 46, at 257 (asking whether the "same efficiencies" can be achieved via a less restrictive means). 
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tion of such a test, it is said, ensures that defendants achieve their objectives 
with as little harm to competition as possible.493 
The less restrictive alternative test is plainly flawed, resting, as it does, 
on an outmoded, price-theoretic model of competition. To begin with, 
many of the less restrictive alternatives posited by courts and scholars are 
either less effective, more expensive to administer, or both.494 Indeed, some 
scholarly proponents of this test admit as much, contending that plaintiffs 
should prevail if they show that an alternative will advance an objective 
"nearly as much" as the challenged restraint, or further it "adequately."495 
Adoption of such alternatives, it is said, would render the market in ques-
tion more competitive.496 
Given the vision of competition suggested by TCE and the recognition 
that less restrictive alternatives are likely less effective, there is no reason to 
believe that such alternatives are in fact more competitive than restraints 
under challenge. An assertion that alternatives are more competitive de-
pends upon the assumption that the restraints in question actually injure 
competition in the first place. To be sure, proof that defendants could have 
adopted a less restrictive and less effective restraint is consistent with the 
hypothesis that the restraint exercises or creates market power, and that the 
benefits it creates coexist with anticompetitive harm. However, such proof 
is at least equally consistent with an alternative hypothesis, namely, that the 
defendants are attempting to minimize market failure at the lowest cost 
possible and that the restraints are unrelated to any exercise of market 
power.497 Such a cost-minimizing business strategy is exactly the sort of 
(contractual) "competition" that TCE suggests is necessary to maximize so-
ciety's welfare.498 Moreover, while such a strategy limits rivalry between 
firms bound by the restraint, it does not depend upon the possession or at-
tempt to obtain market power. 
493. See, e.g., 7 AREEDA, supra note 28, 'li 1505, at 384 (application of less restrictive alternative test 
determines whether defendants' "objective [can] be achieved as well without restraining competition so 
much"). 
494. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, supra note 197, at 187 (arguing that various less restrictive alternatives 
to vertical distribution restraints are also less effective); Bork, supra note 322, at 46.5-ti9 (discussing vari-
ous alternatives and arguing that they are generally less effective); Victor P. Goldberg, The Law and Eco-
nomics of Vertical Restrictions: A Relational Perspective, 58 TEx. L. REv. 91, 107 (1979) (arguing that less 
restrictive alternatives to vertical distribution restraints are also less effective); Meese, supra note 107, at 
487 n.l09 (arguing that alternatives proffered for horizontal allocation of territories are generally less ef-
fective at achieving the proffered benefits). Meese, supra note 68, at 71-84 (canvassing various less.re-
strictive alternatives to tying contracts and showing that such alternatives are generally less effective as 
well); Meese, supra note 112, at 189-95 (showing that various less restrictive alternatives often proffered 
for vertical restraints are also less effective); Easterbrook, supra note 342, at 9 (arguing that less restrictive 
alternatives are often more costly to administer). 
495. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text 
496. See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text. 
497. See, e.g., Meese, supra note 112, at 192-93 (arguing that failure to adopt less restrictive but less 
effective alternative to vertical restraint suggests parties are attempting to minimize transaction costs); 
Meese, supra note 68, at 7l-86 (arguing that failure to adopt less restrictive alternatives to tying contracts 
is consistent with cost-minimizing objective). 
498. See supra notes 334-44 and accompanying text. 
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By itself, then, proof that defendants could have employed a less re-
strictive, less effective alternative is entirely consistent with the defendants' 
assertion that any "detrimental effects" produced by the restraint reflect a 
correction of. preexisting market failure and not any anticompetitive 
harm.499 Proof of such an alternative cannot therefore support a conclusion 
that procompetitive and anticompetitive effects coexist.500 Absent such co-
existence, the rationale for application of a less restrictive alternative test 
collapses. 501 
Consider, as just one example, the so-called area of primary responsi-
bility, often touted as an alternative to vertically imposed exclusive territo-
ries or exclusive territories created ancillary to a joint venture between 
competitors.502 Such restraints assign dealers or venture members a particu-
lar area in which they must make their "best efforts" to promote the ven-
ture product. In this way, it is said, a manufacturer or venture can further 
its legitimate interest in promotion without restricting competition "too 
much."503 
As many scholars have recognized, however, so-called areas of pri-
mary responsibility are less effective and more expensive to administer than 
an airtight exclusive territory.504 The fact that a firm has the primary re-
sponsibility for one area does not prevent other firms from invading its ter-
ritory and thus does little to prevent free riding.505 Moreover, there are real 
costs to determining whether, in fact, a dealer has engaged in sufficient 
promotion within its territory, an issue on which dealer and manufacture 
will likely disagree, and enforcement of such a vague contractual obligation 
will be costly.506 An airtight exclusive territory, by contrast, avoids these 
shortcomings while at the same time furthering the manufacturer's or ven-
499. See supra notes 386-445 and accompanying text (arguing that proof that a restraint increases 
prices is consistent with the assertion that a restraint combats a market failure). 
500. See supra note 407 (collecting authorities holding that evidence equally consistent with a pro-
competitive justification for a challenged agreement cannot support a judgment against a defendant). 
501. See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text (explaining that application of less restrictive 
alternative test depends upon assumption that procompetitive and anticompetitive effects coexist). 
502 See, e.g., SUll.IVAN, supra note 239, at 386 (arguing that manufacturer can adequately further 
interest in promotion by stipulating desired service in distribution contract and monitoring dealer's com-
pliance with it); SUll.IV AN & GRIMES, supra note 53, at 332 (identifying area of primary responsibility as 
less restrictive means of encouraging promotion by joint venture partners); Piraino, supra note 169, at 930 
(same); Robert Pitofsky, A Framework for Antilrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 74 GEO. L.J. 1605, 1621 
(1986) (arguing that the defendants in Topco could have achieved the legitimate objective of furthering 
promotion by adopting areas of primary responsibility); Sullivan, supra note 172, at 886 (arguing that area 
of primary responsibility was viable less restrictive alternative to restraints in Topco ); Turner, supra note 
205, at 699 (stating that the area of primary responsibility will assure effective promotion by dealers thus 
obviating need for exclusive territories). 
503. See supra note 501 (collecting authorities). 
504. See Bork, supra note 322, at 467-69; Meese, supra note 107, at 487 n.109 (arguing that areas of 
primary responsibility are generally less effective at achieving legitimate benefits than airtight exclusive 
territories); see also WILUAMSON, supra note 197, at 187 (arguing that more complex restraints are more 
difficult to police and enforce than less complicated ones). 
505. See Bork, supra note 322, at 467-68; Meese, supra note 107, at 487 n.109. 
506. See Bork, supra note 322, at 468--69; Meese, supra note 107, at 487 n.109. 
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ture's interest in promotion.507 Proof that defendants have adopted exclu-
sive territories instead of areas of primary responsibility is thus entirely 
consistent with an assertion that the restraints further competition, properly 
understood. More importantly, such proof undermines entirely any asser-
tion that the procompetitive benefits of the restraint coexist with anticom-
petitive effects. Any reduction in competition is entirely illusory, then, and 
there is no reason to require the defendants to achieve their objectives via a 
"less anticompetitive means." 
In some cases, plaintiffs may establish the existence of less restrictive 
alternatives that are in fact every bit as effective as the restraint under chal-
lenge. Even here, however, such proof should not entitle the plaintiff to 
judgment. For, the existence of such an alternative does not tend to ex-
clude the hypothesis that the restraint merely combats market failure and 
thus produces no competitive harm in the first place. To be sure, the chal-
lenged restraint places a greater limitation on rivalry than the proffered al-
ternative, and such limitation is consistent with the plaintiffs assertion that 
the benefits produced by the restraint coexist with procompetitive effects. 
At the same time, however, adoption of the more restrictive restraint is also 
consistent with an alternative hypothesis, namely, that the defendants have 
made a random selection of one equally effective restraint over the other. 
Such a selection, in tum, is entirely consistent with defendants' assertion 
that the restraint combats a market failure, and that elimination of that fail-
ure is responsible for any change in price or output. Thus, proof that an 
equally effective restraint is available should not give rise to liability.508 
V. CONCLUSION 
Standard Oil requires courts to apply reason to determine whether a 
restraint harms consumers.509 While courts have often embraced TCE 
when policing the boundaries of the per se rule, they have clung to an out-
moded price-theoretic definition of competition when conducting analysis 
under the Rule of Reason. Courts should restructure Rule of Reason 
analysis to account for the modernization of economic theory. 
507. See Bork, supra note 322, at 467-68 ("Market division cures these problems [associated with 
areas of primary responsibility] automatically by making the reseller's interest in local sales effort coex-
tensive with the manufacturer's interest."); Meese, supra note 107, at 487 n.109 (analogizing exclusive 
territory to a property right that overcomes shortcomings of areas of primary responsibilities). 
508. There may be one instance in which proof of a less restrictive alternative should be sufficient to 
establish that a challenged restraint is unreasonable. If the alternative offered by the plaintiff is more ef-
fective or less costly to administer, then the existence of the alternative suggests that the restraint under 
question is not simply an attempt to combat a market failure. 
509. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
